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Abstract 
By recovering non-canonical works of female social reformers of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and reading them in light of 
more recent historical research on late-Victorian secularisation and 
religion, Darwinism and the women's movement, this dissertation 
examines the intellectual histories of Annie Besant and Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman, whose works reflect a predominant concern with 
religious matters. Heavily influenced by the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
Besant and Gilman also develop views on the social applications of 
scientific methods and incorporate these into their theodicies, or 
solutions to the evils they perceive in society. Formal choices and 
rhetorical modes employed by Besant and Gilman in the interests of 
redefining gender and thereby reforming society include 
autobiographies, novels, tracts, pamphlets, speeches or sermons and 
poetry. These are intended to bring audiences and readers to a 
conversion to principles established by the authors' respective ethical 
systems. However, relationships between theory and practice, ethics and 
doctrine are shown to be determined largely by choices of narrative and 
genre, which are paradoxically dependent on pre-existing concepts of 
progress or degeneration and the use of religion in the interest of 
legislating for the body. 
Chapter One examines similarities and differences between Besant 
and Gilman, the conflict of science and religion, the secularisation 
debate, and issues of social reform pertaining to feminism more 
generally. Chapter Two discusses Besant's autobiographies as 
proselytising works of sage writing. Chapter Three describes 
Theosophy's development in light of Judeo-Christian rhetoric and 
ideology and how it helps fulfil Besant's theological and political 
mission. Chapter Four introduces Gilman's sociology of women and 
details the influence of Christianity and science on Gilman's philosophy 
through non-fiction prose, short stories and poetry. Chapter Five 
explores concepts of utopia and Gilman's early utopias. Chapter Six 
discusses sexual difference in Gilman's most famous utopian novel, 
Herland (1915). 
CONTENTS 
List of Abbreviations 5 
Acknowledgements 6 
Introduction 7 
I. A New Reformation: Intellectual History 34 
H. From Propaganda to Prophecy 79 
III. Some Progress Toward Utopia: A Theosophical The(odyssey) 139 
IV. `Whoso doeth the will shall know of the doctrine': 
God's immanence and human responsibility 173 
V. Woman on the Edge of the Twentieth Century: Rediscovering Utopia 252 
VI. His Religion and Herland: The Re-education of Desire 294 
Conclusion 327 
Bibliography 337 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Works by Annie Besant: 
AA An Autobiography, 1893 
AS Autobiographical Sketches, 1885 
Works by Charlotte Perkins Gilman: 
H Herland, 1915 
HH His Religion and Hers, 1923 
Living The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 1935. 
MTM Moving the Mountain, 1911 
MMW The Man-Made World or Our Androcentric Culture, 
1911 
WE Women and Economics, 1898 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My gratitude goes out to those who have tried to help me maintain a 
straight and narrow path (and transoceanic lifestyle) through my 
research and writing. First, I would like to thank members of the 
English Department for guidance and support both personal and 
academic, including (in alphabetical order) Zoe Anderson, John Barrell, 
Jacques Berthoud, Claire Lindsay, Jane Moody, Felicity Riddy, and my 
extraordinary supervisor Hugh Stevens. Trev Broughton, of the 
Department of Women's Studies, also helped set me on the right track 
by reading early drafts, offering wisdom, and providing certain valuable 
materials I would have had much difficulty obtaining otherwise. 
Many thanks are due also to the various libraries I have been 
fortunate to use: the J. B Morrell at the University of York, the British 
Library, the Theosophical Society Library in London, the library at 
Indiana University and Purdue University, Indianapolis, the Robert W. 
Woodruff Library at Emory University in Atlanta, the Arthur and 
Elizabeth Schlesinger Library at Radcliffe College, the Houghton 
Library at Harvard University, The Library of Congress, the McKeldin 
Library at the University of Maryland, College Park, the Henry Madden 
Library at California State University, Fresno and, most especially, the 
Doe Library at the University of California, Berkeley. Barnes and Noble 
Booksellers has also provided excellent service and speedy deliveries for 
many months. 
Finally, I would like to thank an elderly Armenian translator for 
reminding me that `life is a series of salvage operations, ' my parents for 
teaching me the craft of salvation (secular or otherwise), and my sister, 
Katina, for all the encouragement and comic relief. But I could not have 
done this without James. 
INTRODUCTION 
Much Western political philosophy of the last two and a half 
centuries or so implies that church and state may be segregate 
institutions without detriment to concepts of citizenship and peaceful 
society. That religion does not need to play the major role in the 
formation of the character and behaviour of the citizens of a nation has 
been accepted in France, in England and North America without much 
legal dispute. ' When the concept of organised traditional religion is 
challenged and then modified, removed, or replaced with something 
else, the process has been called secularisation. But what are the ethical 
implications of ecumenical or even secular thought and are they a 
practicable ethics amongst increasingly diverse and ostensibly 
democratic Western societies? How, amongst such religious diversity, 
is consistency to be obtained, if a truly harmonious, embracing and 
universally beneficial system of belief and practice is in fact deemed 
desirable and possible? In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the notion of an Esperanto-like solution in the discovery or composition 
of a universal religion or at least universal solidarity of some kind did 
not seem absurd to many. But in order to see why such apparent 
A notable exception to this, of course, is the continuing controversy over abortion rights in the 
United States which rights are challenged from a religious point of view. Very few complain 
about the more general ideal ensconced in the Pledge of Allegiance, memorised by every child at 
school, and repeated often as effective rhetoric in political campaign speeches: that Americans are 
one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. ' 
idealism was possible, it is necessary to sketch out some very general 
details. 
Experiencing the pressures of increasing immigration and post-Civil 
War politics on one side of the Atlantic and the consequences of 
imperial rule and the conquest of nations and cultures on the other, the 
relatively homogenous American and English societies of the late- 
nineteenth century, where those of white, Northern European descent 
were still in the majority, formed crucibles for religious and social 
change which has been documented and studied, especially in more 
recent decades. The increased activism of women, who were 
sometimes involved on all of these fronts while simultaneously making 
a case for their own literal and figurative emancipation, applied the lens 
of gender to such questions. This confrontation with other religions and 
social and religious histories was occurring while two somewhat allied 
currents in Western intellectual history came to cross each other: the 
rationalism championed by eighteenth-century scholars of 
`Enlightenment' which produced schism in the churches and progress in 
the sciences and the Romantic reaction of the poets and philosophers 
2 See, for example, William Ralph Inge, Christian Ethics and Modern Problems (London: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1930), Warren Sylvester Smith, The London Heretics, 1870-1914 (London: 
Constable, 1967), Hugh McLeod, Class and Religion in the Late Victorian City (London: Croom 
Helm, 1974), Owen Chadwick, The Secularisation of the European Mind in the Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: CUP, 1975), Donna A. Behnke, Religious Issues in Nineteenth-Century 
Feminism (Troy, NY: The Whitsun Publishing Co., 1982), Richard J. Helmstadter and Bernard 
Lightman, ed., Victorian Faith in Crisis: Essays on Continuity and Change in Nineteenth-Century 
Religious Belief (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990), Frank M. Turner, Contesting Cultural Authority: 
Essays in Victorian Intellectual Life (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), John Wolffe, God and Greater 
Britain: Religion and National Life in Britain and Ireland 1843-1945 (London: Routledge, 1994), 
S. J. D. Green, Religion in the Age of Decline: Organisation and experience in industrial Yorkshire 
1870-1920 (Cambridge: CUP, 1996). 
who refused to deny man his own individual destiny and purpose in the 
universe. 
The influence of the Enlightenment created alternative views of faith, 
including the classic example of religious ecumenism found in 
eighteenth-century Freemasonry3 and also what has been called `natural 
religion' or Deism. A prominent affiliation amongst scientists, 
philosophers, and other sceptics in the seventeenth, eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, Deism negates revelation and asserts a rational and 
materialist approach to divinity, allowing natural phenomena to 
determine the attributes of an immanent God who has created but does 
not intervene in the universe. Interested in revealing rather than 
disproving God, Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) or Isaac Newton (1642- 
1727) determined the success of their efforts through the illumination of 
divinity in nature. 4 Revealing the ways of God to men through science 
was a solution which would effectively disallow the supernatural in 
favour of earthly reality and individual intellectual sovereignty while 
maintaining a divine presence and source. But empiricism and the 
emphasis on creation rather than being would continually challenge the 
3 Freemasonry, the Free and Accepted Masons founded in London, 1717, remains a large, 
decentralised fraternal institution ostensibly based on the traditions of the builders of King 
Solomon's temple and medieval stoneworkers guilds, or, as some would argue, on the ritual and 
ideology of the actual Knights Templar. It possesses no dogma (and does not allow members to 
discuss religion at meetings), however, offers no sacraments, and does not offer salvation by any 
means. It does encourage religion, however, in the sense that it expects each member to follow a 
faith as well as the moral teaching of Freemasonry, which is essentially the principle of Brotherly 
Love, acceptable to all religions, or so Freemasonry claims. For extensive history of the 
relationship of the organisation to the Knights Templar, especially as pertaining to the English 
Peasants' Revolt of 1381, see John J. Robinson, Born in Blood: The Lost Secrets of Freemasonry 
(New York: M. Evans and Company, 1989). For detail on English Freemasonry see John Hamill, 
The Craft: A History of English Freemasonry (London: Aquarian Press, 1986). 
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notion of God. Historian Jon Roberts argues that Protestant thinkers 
made a choice to concern themselves with teleological rather than 
ontological questions, and instead of considering `God as Being Itself 
and the beings that inhabit the universe' they focused on `the 
relationship between Creator and creation grounded on the discoveries 
disclosed by science concerning the structure and behavior of 
phenomena. ' 5 This would accomplish the transfer of a tremendous 
amount of intellectual authority to science. By the nineteenth century, 
the application of positivist terms to the understanding of all natural 
phenomena made such interpretation seem `ever more authoritative, 
Yet it is well-documented that many of those even irrefutable. '6 
scientists working during the decades of fallout after the publication of 
Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection would still 
consider themselves religious and were definitely not championing a 
belligerent atheism. 7 
Applying empirically inspired analytical methods to religious texts, 
the twenty or more Protestant faculties teaching theology in Germany in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries produced scholars like 
4 Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas that Have Shaped 
Our World View (New York: Ballantine, 1991) 300. 
s Jon H. Roberts, Darwinism and the Divine in America: Protestant Intellectuals and Organic 
Evolution 1859-1914 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988) xv. 
6 Janet Oppenheim, The Other World: Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 1850- 
1914 (Cambridge: CUP, 1985) 119. 
7 James Moore, The Post-Darwinian Controversies: A study of the Protestant struggle to come to 
terms with Darwin in Great Britain and America 1870-1900 (Cambridge: CUP, 1979) 109,252- 
298,348-349,392. Warren Wagar, ed., The Secular Mind: Transformations of Faith in Modern 
Europe (New York, London: Holmes and Meier, 1982) passim. See also Turner, Contesting 
Cultural Authority, and Roberts, Darwinism and the Divine in America, above. 
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J. G. Eichorn (1752-1827), W. M. L. de Wette (1780-1849), and J. 
Wellhausen (1844-1918) who professionalized the study of the Bible, 
continuing the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Jean Astruc 
(1684-1766), and Richard Simon (1638-1712), and encouraged the 
further subjection of scripture to literal examination. Such scholars 
created completely new and sensational versions of High and Low 
criticism which systematically challenged text, authorship and dates, 
sources, genres, historicity and doctrinal tendencies. This would 
eventually doom the project of establishing the historical Jesus for most 
and found the literary mythological nature of the Bible as an historical 
and technical fact, a course of study pursued by scholars through the 
twentieth century. 8 Here then is evidence of the strengthened attempt to 
separate doctrine from ethics, assuming that either may stand alone. 
Also accommodating the intellectual shift toward a more 
anthropocentric world view in the nineteenth century were the notable 
works of G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), August Comte (1798-1857), L. 
A. Feuerbach (1804-1872), J. S. Mill (1806-1873), Karl Marx (1818- 
1883), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), and Herbert Spencer (1820- 
1903). To address the individual theological or metaphysical concerns 
of these writers is, of course, quite beyond the scope of this essay. Yet 
their works demonstrate that there remained the possibility of finding a 
spiritually inspired or theologically informed space within philosophies 
which prescribed utilitarian or materialist approaches to social 
8 J. W. Rogerson, An Introduction to the Bible (New York: Penguin, 1999) 149-151,154-158. 
12 
problems. Keeping pace with economic and social changes, such 
intellectuals and ideologues of the nineteenth century perceived and 
developed more pragmatic needs. More broadly based social and 
political solutions arose to solve the problems posed by population 
growth, child labour, urban life and alienation, and included the 
establishment of many co-operative communities in Europe as well as 
the United States. Various organisations like the Salvation Army and 
other temperance groups formed by the energies of the women's 
movement went forth to rescue and retrain the dissolute. Women's 
groups devoted to suffrage and other political and social matters (e. g. 
Karl Pearson's Men and Women's Club) also developed. The need to 
manage real social concerns required the expression of ethical principles 
which could sustain such organisations, the Salvation Army being the 
most obvious example. Christian Socialism and Edward Bellamy's 
`religion of solidarity' or Nationalism, which he considered `a religion 
in itself' re other patent examples. 9 Socialism, in general, matured into 
a major political and, many would argue, religious movement. 
But there were also movements which placed themselves directly in 
the middle of perceived conflict between science and religion. 
Spiritualism, a multifaceted phenomenon linked to many of the people 
and movements animating this period, developed during the 1850s in 
North-eastern America and spread to Europe, becoming extremely 
fashionable amongst the middle and upper classes. Reading through 
9 Arthur E. Morgan, Edward Bellamy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944) 253-254. 
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various histories more recently generated on the subject shows that 
spiritualism of both Christian and anti-Christian varieties, for there were 
both, provided entertainment for some, real mystical experience for 
others, but most importantly a bridge between matters earthly and divine 
through an implied synthesis of religion and science which could be 
used to challenge one or both authorities. 10 Spiritualism was therefore a 
very useful, if somewhat awkward, vehicle for women. l l 
More formally religious but related alternatives had also appeared, 
like the Christianity of Swedenborg and the various versions of 
Theosophy, which owes a great debt to spiritualism and to masonry. 
These kinds of apparent solutions to a perceived lack of religious 
foundation, motivation or belief or to related problems of political or 
economic disenfranchisement remain options for many who have and 
desire to accommodate such needs today. But the existence of such 
organisations still hinges on universal definitions of what is good or bad 
for society, what is moral or ethical, and how to thereby categorize evil 
and good. The proliferation of societies dedicated to moral and social 
improvement, often aimed at the lower classes, frequently culminated in 
political activity. Were these organisations therefore secular or 
10 Janet Oppenheim accounts for the practice of spiritualism within the Anglican church as well as 
the important similarities between Christian and anti-Christian spiritualists in The Other World: 
Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 1850-1914 (Cambridge: CUP, 1985) 67-110. 
11 This view is corroborated by Barbara Goldsmith, Other Powers: The Age of Suffrage, 
Spiritualism, and the Scandalous Victoria Woodhull (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998) 34-37 
and by Alex Owen, who writes 'spiritualist mediumship was capable of sabotaging the mechanics 
of power inherent in the Victorian codification of gender differences' but also emphasises the 
contradictions of spiritualist practice for women in The Darkened Room: Women, Power and 
Spiritualism in Late Victorian England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) 11. 
14 
religious? How are the secular and the religious to be defined and 
separated? 
The question of secularisation is not merely an historical one, for it is 
based not simply on inevitably misleading churchgoing statistics or on 
the perceptions of those historical figures who have tried to effect or 
have been affected by change and written about it, but also on the 
categories we use (in both contemporary and historical terms) to define 
what is religious. These categories, such as the public and private, the 
individual and state, or religion and blasphemy or non-religion may be 
taken for granted. Moreover, are people, even scientists, who do not 
believe in God or any other god necessarily irreligious or non-religious 
or non-spiritual? Are those who still profess religious beliefs to be 
considered unenlightened or, dare we say, primitive? Is spirituality 
necessarily religious or not? If materialism is right and successful, why 
do we continue to disparage it and insist on our spiritual virtues, 
especially in the notoriously pragmatic and consumer-oriented culture of 
the West? Why has `less is more' become a new mantra? 
Our age has not answered these questions definitively, certainly not 
in any universally acceptable fashion. The evidence of much late 
nineteenth-century reform writing, and particularly those nearly- 
forgotten writers studied here, begs that these questions be answered, 
and not only for the particular historically delimited interests of gender, 
class, and race with which they concern themselves. The pain of dealing 
with what was becoming the modern mind, a mind challenged to 
determine truth for itself and to decide alone the fate of the individual, 
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has perhaps been numbed by post-modern (I use the term loosely) 
experience, but this was not the case for the writers studied here, Annie 
Besant and Charlotte Perkins Gilman. The truth finally declared by 
Jiddu Krishnamurti (1985-1986), that all must find truth for themselves 
and put away the past in the interest of world unity, is prepared for by 
the groundwork of the Reformation. 12 Still resilient to notions of 
alienation or existential horror or complete relativism and subjectivity 
and the cult of individualism, Besant and Gilman find themselves torn 
between what is and what ought to be, between objective and subjective, 
and believe they might work to discover and achieve the right ends. 
Creating the most accurate, the most complete account of the 
convergent intellectual and literary histories of these writers and their 
contexts should require a vast interdisciplinary study of history, 
theology and most of the arts and sciences. Perhaps this is not merely a 
peculiarity of dealing with the nineteenth century, but every path or 
branch seems to lead to another. This project does not presume to 
attempt such a study. Rather, I would like to examine how gender- 
related issues, which may be at the core of determining human 
behaviour, are addressed in light of questions about religion in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I would like to show how 
those concerned with issues of social reform, in a time when 
12 Krishnamurti, who would finally rebel against Theosophy and his patron, Annie Besant, 
emphasised individual religious experience as the basis for the discovery of truth and rejected all 
authority: `Revolt is essential in order to escape from the narrowness of tradition, from the binding 
influences of belief, of theories. If you would understand the Truth, you must be in revolt so that 
you may escape from all these - from books, from theories, from gods, from superstitions - from 
everything which is not of your own. ' J. Krishnamurti, Life in Freedom (New York: Horace 
Liveright, 1928) 39. 
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vocabularies and social roles were also changing on a vast scale, were to 
convey their insights and agendas through rhetorical modes heavily 
influenced by just such concerns over faith and morality. How do 
formal choices related to the project of redefining gender and reforming 
society correspond to developing views about the applications of 
scientific, religious, or even global political thinking? Obviously, some 
small steps will have to be taken in the direction of the aforementioned 
vast study in order to clarify the variables involved. There are a number 
of strands in the intellectual history of the nineteenth-century which 
have a particular tendency to become tangled together, but I will try to 
address the circumstances with a minimum of fuss while conveying the 
essential details. 
Annie Wood Besant (1847-1933) and Charlotte Perkins Gilman 
(1860-1935) seem to understand the concept of the use of religion 
intuitively, developing agendas for social reform and the legislation of 
earthly human behaviour which are intentionally based on religious 
principles. Their respective sociological and feminist positions as 
reformers may be more concretely elaborated when they are understood 
to emanate from a religious perspective. This study hopes to illustrate 
how their work is both liberated and controlled by historical context and 
their respective educational and intellectual environments and 
opportunities for activism. Their treatment of the conjunction of the 
rationalising process of an industrialised economy and the languages of 
the new `sciences' within a framework of social values that are steeped 
17 
in the rhetoric and ideas of a Judeo-Christian world view leads to 
writing that demonstrates the inherent difficulties and paradoxes of such 
an approach, but also reveals unexpected affinities. This is not to claim 
that the culture of Protestantism is solely responsible for all this, but I 
would like to suggest that the recognisably feminist or humanist 
intentions of these writers (as we would describe their programs today) 
are complicated by the attempt to deal with the apparently conflicting 
agendas of the same world view. On a purely conceptual level, then, I 
will examine the way these women writers participate in a 
predominating culture of liberal Protestantism which both protects and 
challenges its own ideology. 
What should be clear throughout this study is that I am not attempting 
to show that Gilman and Besant are unsuccessful merely because of the 
patriarchal languages they are forced to use, although this is an obvious 
issue (and they are not necessarily unsuccessful). Rather, it is the 
process of revision itself which creates complications for them. 
Uncertainty, and therefore complexity, in their writings reveals the way 
they are themselves changing and redefining gender and how this 
becomes essential to their ideas about science, ethics, and God. In turn, 
their project may be seen as the precursor to more recent attempts by 
feminist theologians of all faiths to determine what is useful or valuable 
in their own traditions in the similar interest of creating better societies. 
The project of revising religion for Gilman and Besant is much like that 
of revising history, on the one hand, but with a fundamental difference, 
which is that while the majority of religions dealt with in this regard are 
18 
text-based, the business of reinterpretation is not simply an academic 
exercise in re-reading. Indeed, as noted above, historical revisionism 
was still a radical thing at the turn of the century. That the Bible (or 
even the Upanishads) might be treated as literature and subjected to 
further excavation was still a new idea in the nineteenth century, which 
raises the question of the sacredness of the text, in this case, the 
religious text. That Besant and Gilman practice such revisionism places 
them in the category of subversive intellectual radicals. Such work had 
already been going on, but not in ways which moved very far beyond 
elite institutions and academic debate. But how far could/can such 
deconstruction and reconstruction go without recalling the categories 
against which such readings turn? Applying themselves to the business 
of analysing and reconstructing human society itself, Besant and Gilman 
mobilise art and politics for social service, thereby creating unique 
expressions of religious commitment. 
Both Besant and Gilman recognize, in themselves first, it should be 
said, the ineluctably religious nature of humanity. But what exactly is 
indicated by `religion' when Gilman refers to `this religion of mine' as 
essential to her sociology and what does Besant's mother, Emily Wood, 
mean when, as Besant explains in her autobiography, she describes her 
daughter as `too religious'? What is Besant claiming when she calls 
herself `the most religious of Atheists'? How this religious feeling leads 
to philosophy and to a practical desire to transform society in the work 
of these proto-feminist activists begs the already acknowledged question 
of secularism. 
19 
As early social scientists, writing and lecturing during the long stretch 
between the late Victorian 1880s and the early 1930s, Besant and 
Gilman share the conviction that it will be impossible to improve, 
reform, or otherwise restructure society unless the inner being of the 
human species is willingly changed. Machiavellian, Hobbesian and 
Lockeian ideas about human nature are not irredeemable facts. Hoping 
to create a new state of mind by appealing to that presumed moral or 
ethical sense of `goodness' which governs the individual relationship to 
society, each presents a theodicy, or solution to problems of evil, 
injustice, inequality, etc., in ways which may be said to `secularise' 
mainstream orthodoxies. That is, these theories move, displace, or 
otherwise transform the role played by traditional doctrines, 
accommodating them to what may be described as a more worldly world 
view. But the chicken-and-egg question arises: do they mount the 
emblem of modem progress on the front of an already formed world 
view or do they adjust their beliefs according to the latest research or 
discovery, and do the subsequent effects compromise their intentions or 
not? A critical understanding of what is meant by `secular' is obviously 
needed. 
To briefly summarise here, in order to emphasise the particular 
concerns of this essay, the great conflict between science and religion in 
the nineteenth century has been rather self-explanatory in the past. That 
the projects and language of reason and a supposedly rational industrial 
economy overwhelmed the prejudices and backwardness of state 
religions is attested to by the influential intellectual and political 
20 
tradition of the Enlightenment as well as the evidence of so many 
apparently secular and socially-oriented nineteenth-century 
organisations, such as the Secularists, Socialists, or Fabians in Britain or 
the Nationalists and Progressives in America. This has been the 
standard account of the process of secularisation. The twentieth century 
inherited the view that science and theology are diametrically opposed, 
as well as the thesis of assumed secularisation, which has been bolstered 
by the evidence of declining church memberships and increasing 
numbers of people ready to admit their apostasy. 
More recent scholarship, however, has demonstrated that the 
boundaries between science and religion are not so obvious. That the 
evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin actually grew out of the 
predominant Christian culture, and that the majority of scientists who 
professed materialism were, in fact, religiously motivated, are two 
current assertions. 13 Throughout the last decade or so of the twentieth- 
century, prominent nineteenth-century specialists have been re- 
examining some of these ideas in light of issues of nationhood, for 
example, or rural history, and have found a vast range of religious 
experience in Britain which can be defined in both traditional and 
radical terms. 14 In America, while the role of religion cannot be 
13 Sydney Eisen, introduction, Victorian Faith in Crisis, ed. Helmstadter and Lightman 1-2. 
James R. Moore, 'Theodicy and Society: The Crisis of the Intelligentsia, ' Victorian Faith in Crisis 
153-186. See also Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science (London: Walter Scott, 1892; London: 
J. M. Dent, 1937) and Thomas H. Huxley, Science and Christian Tradition (1894; London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1900) as examples of scientists who became concerned with the question of 
religion as it affects social values. 
14 See note 2. Wolffe helpfully uses the terms 'official' and 'unofficial' religion. 
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underestimated in any case, the tradition of radical religion presages a 
rather different tale, for the Protestant churches, after much tussle, were 
the receiving ground of the doctrines of Darwinism, which became 
translated into divine purpose, and eventually into the doctrines of 
Social Darwinism, and this will be discussed in greater depth later. 15 
Nevertheless, it is the perception of crisis amongst many Victorians 
which has further complicated our late twentieth-century understanding 
of how the Victorians dealt with challenges to their beliefs about reality. 
This crisis, or perception of crisis, seems to have affected the middle 
classes the most and therefore the pool of writers with whose works we 
most often come into contact, incidentally reinforcing the secularisation 
thesis as an apparent resolution. According to historian James R. 
Moore, this crisis of the intelligentsia `arose from the necessity laid 
upon them of prescribing purposive action, or practical measures, for 
dealing with social conflict in a manner consistent with securing their 
own status and emoluments in a diversifying economy. ' Moore further 
explains that for the rest of society, crisis lay `in the social conflicts 
themselves, arising chiefly from economic change, or in the flux of 
bourgeois opinion, which tended to undermine personal meaning and 
coherence. ' 16 This applies a more material analysis to the problem of 
faith, and suggests the link between religious faith and social and 
'5 See Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (1944; Boston: Beacon, 1992) 
24-30. 
16 James R. Moore, `Theodicy and Society: the Crisis of the Intelligentsia', ed. Helmstadter and 
Lightman 153. 
22 
economic conditions and power relationships, thus acknowledging the 
rather obvious notion that faith is a problem for the material world. 
What is compelling about the turn-of-the-century activists is their 
very idealism, their internalisation of the idea of progress, their 
optimism and faith in the goodness of human nature or in the 
possibilities of fixing human nature and of creating a world, in an 
imperialist age, in which all tribes and their stories could exist 
peacefully together under one umbrella. '7 The late-Victorian project of 
reform meant prescribing action and practical measures: temperance, 
abstinence (or some other solution), purity, welfare, suffrage, education 
and unionisation. 
That socio-economic conditions dictate socio-religious concerns is 
also the conclusion of Marxist sociologist Bryan S. Turner, who 
attempts to identify the project of postmodernism as a reaction to the 
secular version of modernity found within Protestantism, particularly 
that version of Calvinist Protestantism formed amongst the bourgeois of 
northern Europe, which assumes a process of `rationalisation and 
secularisation within the context of an urban industrial civilisation. ' 8 
Turner's definition of secularisation is complicated by his view of the 
operation of Protestant Christian valuation in the process of 
rationalisation itself, as opposed to the emotionality of alternatives like 
the aesthetic of the baroque movement. Asserting that feminism and the 
17 While for many this umbrella meant the state, the question of the closeness of religious and 
nationalist aims is also relevant. See John Wolffe above. 
18 Bryan S. Turner, Religion and Social Theory (London: Sage, 1983) xviii. 
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green movement may therefore be considered emotional movements that 
are reacting, rather paradoxically, as a postmodern reaction to the 
asceticism of traditional Protestantism. Turner assumes that 
postmodernism is defined by consumer and capitalist culture and is 
therefore a continuation of the economic results of (Protestant) 
rationalism. 19 But this challenge to traditional Protestantism (i. e. 
rationalism, asceticism, anti-magical belief) in the form of consumerist 
hedonism is answered by new fundamentalisms. What is most useful 
here, in addition to an intriguing interpretation of Protestantism's 
contribution to the process of rationalisation, is that Turner's analysis of 
the source of the religious impulse moves away from simplified notions 
of man as an ineluctably religious animal and toward the 
conceptualisation of the uses of religion, emphasizing Max Weber's 
mantra from the introduction to The Sociology of Religion that 
"elementary forms of behavior motivated by religious or magical factors 
are oriented to this world. s20 Similarly, our understanding of Victorian 
social theory should take account of those interesting paradoxes which 
reveal the relationship of trends in religious and scientific thinking to be 
less than entirely antagonistic. That those institutions, such as 
capitalism, the state, marriage, or the church, may dictate the terms with 
19 A similar point of view is shared by Victor Sage in Horror Fiction in the Protestant Tradition 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), which asserts that it is in fact the Protestant mentality which 
promotes the rationalising project while protecting its own supernatural world view through the 
various genres of horror and particularly the Gothic fiction of the nineteenth-century. 
20 Turner 2. 
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which they may be attacked is a conclusion to be borne out by this 
study. 
It is while holding to this idea of the centrality of the body and the 
material world to religious interpretation and legislation, in light of the 
apparently contradictory impulses found in Protestantism, that we may 
turn to the work of nineteenth-century feminist social reformers. While 
it will become apparent that these writers are ostensibly quite hostile to 
conservative Protestantism and Evangelicalism, it should become 
equally clear that positive aspects of their relationships to Judeo- 
Christian tradition are at the very least ambiguous and usually rather 
obvious. 
Were it not for the challenging intellectual currents flowing from the 
industrial and Darwinian revolutions and through the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, the notion of secularism would not be intelligible to 
us. 21 That science has to answer for its own formal practice of refusing 
to concede that any notion of subjectivity enters discourse or pertain to 
its methods is patent. But this is not a new accusation. Mathematician 
W. K. Clifford was apparently quite aware of such a problem. 22 In 
addition to Biblical criticism and materialist philosophy, we are also 
familiar with the streams of inventions and discoveries that seem to 
21 According to the OED, the words 'secularise' came into use in the early seventeenth century, 
`secularisation' in the early eighteenth century, and 'secularism' in the mid-nineteenth century. 
u Clifford writes: "the moment we use language at all, we may make statements which are 
apparently universal, by which we really only assign the meaning of words. " Quoted in George 
Levine, `Scientific Discourse as an Alternative to Faith' in Helmstadter and Lightman (1990) from 
W. K. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, 2 vols (London, 1910) 1: 390. 
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have occurred exponentially during this period leading into the early 
twentieth century: developments of research into evolutionary theory 
and the medical sciences, atomic theory, the discovery of elements and 
the periodic table, photography and film. What these activities 
accomplished, more than anything else, was the rapid categorisation and 
classification of the natural world, the reduction of the world to its 
smallest parts, the production of a way of seeing that purported to be 
more true, more realistic, of which reductionism many in the late 
nineteenth century were already complaining. 23 This process (which has 
not abated and continues today to find ever smaller parts in a seemingly 
endless deconstruction and demolition project) resulted in a subsequent 
proliferation of ideologies accounting for how things worked. 
Systematising the natural world this way gives the observer control over 
what is observed, and, as sociologist Abraham Maslow famously 
observed, may reveal a latent or unconscious fear, presumably of the 
possibility of disorder, especially as the world becomes increasingly 
complex due to such increasingly minute observation. 24 
This seems to be a vicious cycle. The impulse for such an industry 
has always moved beneath both science and theology and became, in the 
nineteenth century, what Peter Washington describes as `the search for a 
single key that would solve the mysteries of the universe. A key, it was 
thought, might unlock the source - while, conversely, the source would 
25 
23 Oppenheim 161-162. 
24 Theodore Roszak, The Gendered Atom (Berkeley: Conari Press, 1999) 12. See Abraham 
Maslow, The Psychology of Science (New York: Harper &Row, 1966). 
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provide a key.... The idea was not new. On the contrary, explaining 
apparent diversity in terms of actual unity is the formative principle of 
most ancient philosophies and religions. But this desire to find unity in 
diversity became a nineteenth-century obsession in direct proportion to 
the confusing multiplication of new ideologies. 25 The use of 
`ideologies' here aptly describes the consequences of change in the 
understanding of the natural world for personal beliefs, which very often 
became systematised themselves. 
A by-product of all this expenditure of energy, to use an unintended 
metaphor, is the gendering of the concepts created and used. That the 
atom of the physical sciences and the homologous structure of the cell in 
the biological sciences, for example, are the building blocks on which 
the material, or real, world is based, is not simply an objective truth. 
The androcentricity (and bizarre provenance) of these ideas, and the 
need to change them over for a more integrated and harmonious world 
view is demonstrated by Theodore Roszak in The Gendered Atom 
(1999). 26 It seems likely that `Madame' Helena Petrovna Blavatsky 
(1831-1891) intuited something of this when she anticipated the theory 
of relativity and the infinite divisibility of the atom in her attempt to 
explain, from an occult perspective, the relatedness and mutability of all 
matter and mind and the perpetual motion of life, postulating the will as 
u Peter Washington, Madame Blavatsky's Baboon (New York: Schocken, 1993) 9. 
26 Roszak's work on Mary Shelley's Frankenstein or the Modem Prometheus (1816) is the basis 
for this book. Also see the extensive work of Evelyn Fox Keller, for example, Secrets of Life, 
Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science (New York and London: Routledge, 
1992). 
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the source of life. By incorporating reason with apparent unreason, 
Blavatsky asserted authority in both traditionally masculine and 
feminine terms. The notion of infinite divisibility moves toward the 
absurdity of a universe made of nothing, for the power to change cannot 
be seen. Yet it is the recognition in Blavatsky's early theory that science 
had not accounted for the relationships between all forms of matter, 
visible and invisible, which powers so much research today. Currently, 
particle physicists are engaged in projects of extraordinarily esoteric 
proportions which are focused on the often uncontrollable relationships 
between the bits and pieces of the atoms they smash (Roszak compares 
this behaviour to that of boys playing roughly with their toys), bits 
which may exist independently for only a fraction of a millisecond. 27 
That a notoriously eccentric and androgynous woman Theosophist 
should have taken hold of the crux of the issue of gender in scientific 
thinking, perhaps without realising it, is scintillating. Nevertheless, the 
influence of the sciences, especially as applied during this period of 
reform, is problematic. Notwithstanding their tremendously useful 
contributions to the ideological foundations of feminist theory, Besant 
and Gilman, like Blavatsky, therefore still have a tendency to participate 
in the familiar discourse they attempt to challenge, complicating but 
enriching our understanding of their roles in intellectual, literary, and 
social history. 
27 Discussing the language used to describe chemical and biological organisms and properties, 
Roszak explains that, in describing particles, scientists may now refer to 'webs of relationships, ' 
'families, ' a 'behavior pattern, ' a 'communications center, ' 'dialogue, ' 'cities, ' 'governments, ' or 
even 'molecular democracy': 122-129. 
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At once desiring to free and empower women, races, and classes, 
Besant and Gilman also desire to purify society of its ills and to create a 
race of people that is morally, ethically, intellectually and even 
physically perfect. As good and bad, perfection and imperfection are 
defined, this project moves toward some questionable policies, often 
denying the diversity we would now consider valuable for the sake of 
unity, but this demonstrates that the work of these writers is directed not 
so much toward the resolution of the relationship between the individual 
and society, but between society and its counterpart, the ideal society, or 
paradise. Indeed, the notion of individual difference is largely anathema 
to their separate utopian visions and politics except so far as the superior 
individual may guide and instruct by providing an ideal example, or so 
far as difference enables the categorisation and assignment of social 
duty. But, given the stated goals, it is very likely that authoritarian 
positions, which conjure such heinous images for us, are not intended. 
Taken as a whole, then, the works of Besant (who is slightly older) 
and Gilman furnish a mobile landscape of late nineteenth-century and 
early twentieth-century intellectual history, inhabited by classical and 
radically modem ideas and haunted by the peculiarly nineteenth-century 
project of finding the (usually multifaceted) answer to everything, but 
always moving forward. They constantly reinterpret, revise and re- 
present their own ideas and those of others to show more clearly their 
visions of culminated progress, trying to spur readers and listeners to 
internalise this transformation and experience their own conversions and 
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finally act to realise that vision of some perfect life or world. By 
addressing the idea of modernisation on a rhetorical basis, it is possible 
to capture both the late-Victorian notion of science as an anti-religious 
modernising force and what this study considers to be an essentially 
religious agenda, which sanctions science and scientific methods in 
order to achieve human progress while paradoxically maintaining 
control over the definition of progress and concomitant system of ethics. 
This project will demonstrate that Besant and Gilman share the goal 
of creating an ethical system which will promote the transformation of 
human nature and, consequently, of society. Adapted to an evolutionary 
perspective which either assumes or promotes this transformation, their 
systems are imbued with religious purpose, aiming to enable 
comprehension and implementation of a divine plan which will counter 
perceived evils. This goal challenges notions of secularisation by 
creating a millenarian and utopian vision, simultaneously questioning or 
opposing and incorporating the dominant Judeo-Christian ideology. The 
use of the rhetoric and ideas of traditional Christian values and 
narratives are inherently problematic for the expression of their feminist 
or humanist programs and revaluation of gender roles. To which God(s) 
do they turn? Ostensibly, each turns to Truth, and truth is intrinsically 
exclusive, if universal. 
The use of a range of genres emphasises reliance on a process of 
revision as well as the importance of the use of religious writing or 
expression in the varied purposes of social reform. The extremely 
popular Roman-style oration, public lecture or sermon is used constantly 
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by each. Non-fiction prose in the form of journalistic pamphlet, 
editorial, essay or commentary is employed for didactic and 
proselytising purposes. Fiction works to create an actual vision of 
Gilman's utopia, and occasionally Besant's as well, for it is occasionally 
difficult to see, in Besant, where fact and fiction can be separated. 
Autobiographies produced by both convey different personalities driven 
by very similar objectives. Gilman's poetry is entertaining, didactic, and 
often poignant. Besant's retellings of the stories of saints for children 
reveal her own conflicting desires. 
Organisation of thesis: 
Chapter I will describe similarities and differences between the 
intellectual and social backgrounds of Besant and Gilman and discuss 
the intersection of science and religion. The relationship of social 
movements to a changing scientific and theological spectrum will be 
explained in more detail. Secularisation theory and its detractors will be 
discussed and the relationship of this subject to the projects of early 
feminism will be explicated. The project of the theodicy will be 
presented as a major element of the work of Besant and Gilman, which 
harmonises scientific social reform with a Judeo-Christian ethical 
perspective. 
Chapter II will discuss the latter two of Besant's three 
autobiographies as versions of sage-writing which become altered by her 
new faiths into confessional and proselytising works emphasising her 
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perception of continuity in her own thought. Besant's revision of her 
personal history functions as a transitional exercise between her former 
propagandist tone as a Socialist and Freethinker and her new utopian 
messianic voice, which will continue to transform the pamphlet and the 
lecture to serve a higher purpose while exploring the possibilities of the 
treatise and the exegetical writings of the prophet. 
Chapter III will describe the development of Theosophy, its origins in 
traditional Western philosophy as well as its eighteenth-century variants 
and its eventual institutionalisation as a direct reaction to Darwinism by 
H. P. Blavatsky (1831-1891) and her partner Henry Steele Olcott (1832- 
1907) in America in 1875. The unique way Theosophy combines 
religious mysticism with (occult) science makes it the perfect vehicle for 
Besant's teachings. 
Besant's versions of Theosophy and the way it functions in her 
thought as a whole will be explicated. As perceived through a range of 
genres, this will particularly emphasise Besant's use of Theosophy as a 
theodicy derived from Hindu, Buddhist and Judeo-Christian teachings as 
well as her reliance on it as a utopian narrative derived from a 
predominantly Judeo-Christian world-view. In spite of Theosophy's 
ecumenical and inclusive principles, it will be shown that Besant 
subverts evangelistic and practical intentions by concentrating on a 
simultaneously esoteric and utopian or millenarian vision of the 
resolution of the story of world history as Theosophy details it. 
The project of Indian Nationalism and the recovery of indigenous 
Indian religion and traditions, to which Besant eventually devoted 
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herself, may be viewed within this context as well as within the 
historical context of parallel nineteenth-century philological projects of 
recovering the `language of Paradise', of discovering the root of the 
Indo-European language in the Aryan civilisation of India and removing 
Christ as much as possible from his Hebrew origins. This project 
valorised the imaginative polytheism or pantheism of the Aryas against 
the monotheistic laws of Moses and influenced subsequent sociological 
and political thinking, particularly amongst those identifying themselves 
as Aryan, well into the twentieth century. 28 Simultaneously active and 
passive, Theosophy, as Besant uses it, attempts to revolutionise the 
concept of society and encourages prospects for peace amongst political 
and religious antagonists in the Indian Nationalist movement, but it also 
supports the status quo and traditional ethics, even furthering their 
purposes. Compared and contrasted with the social-engineering 
strategies of Malthusianism and Socialism, Theosophy makes catholic 
the intentions of a reforming spirit. 
Chapter N will detail Gilman's intellectual development and the 
genealogy of her ideas of spiritual equality. Her focus on developing a 
sociological perspective unites her religious impulse with the insights 
gained by applying science to society, thereby forming a theodicy. The 
28 M. 01ender, The Languages of Paradise: Race, Religion, and Philology in the Nineteenth 
Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) x: 'The 
comparative philology of the most ancient languages was a quest for origins, an attempt to return 
to a privileged moment in time when God, man, and natural forces still lived in mutual 
transparency. This plunge into the distant past in search of 'roots' went hand in hand with a never 
forgotten faith in a meaningful history, whose course, guided by the Providence of the one God, 
could be understood only in the light of Christian revelation. ' See also Stephen G. Alter, 
Darwinism and the Linguistic Image: Language, Race, and Natural Theology in the Nineteenth 
Century (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
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relevant peculiarities of her American environment will be explained 
and the initial phases of Gilman's utopian strategy in her poetry and 
prose will be outlined, as well as her beliefs in the immanence of God, 
in inevitable human progress, and in her ability to assist that progress 
via programs of social reform. 
Chapter V will discuss the concept of utopia and the development of 
Gilman's utopian vision through her early serialized novels and stories. 
Chapter VI will confront the issue of sexual difference in Gilman's most 
famous utopian novel, Herland (1915). The inability of these projects 
to perform their intended functions in actually achieving social change 
will be addressed, particularly in light of Gilman's adherence to Judeo- 
Christian ideology. As with Besant, the ultimate rejection of modified 
sexual identities and relationships as well as integrated racial 
environments leads to the implied acceptance of traditional gender roles 
and the status quo. 
The triumphs and failures of the utopian imagination will be 
discussed, in the conclusion, as necessarily emanating from a narrative 
and ideological structure that, albeit with the best of intentions, does not 
permit individual change or choice and conforms to traditional versions 
of Protestantism and Catholicism as they legislate for the body. This 
necessarily portends a battle for the right to govern utopia when the 
utopians are feminists. 
I. A NEW REFORMATION: INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
I am afraid I should not count even these things as marks of success, 
if I could not hope that I had somewhat helped that movement of opinion 
which has been called the New Reformation. Thomas Henry Huxley, 
`Autobiography' (1889)1 
ED `There is no religion higher than truth'2 
Besant and Gilman are truly an ocean apart in many ways. Having 
come of age during the height of the Victorian period in Britain, amidst 
much social and economic unrest, Besant (1847-1933) went through 
various stages of what must be called conversion in the process of 
combining her personal quest for Truth with her sense of civic 
responsibility and developing belief in the inevitable progress of society. 
Gilman (1860-1935), thirteen years younger, found her philosophy at a 
young age amidst a progressive New England familial environment and 
held on relentlessly to the end. Besant immersed herself in academic 
study. Taking a First Class degree in botany and animal physiology in 
1880 and teaching elementary physiology, she managed to obtain a grant 
from South Kensington and applied to University College for botany in 
1 Gavin de Beer, ed., Charles Darwin, Thomas Henry Huxley: Autobiographies (Oxford: OUP, 
1983) 109. Huxley's 'Autobiography' is a ten-page brief written for Louis Engel. 
2Annie Besant, Theosophy (London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1912) 90. This is the motto of the 
Theosophical Society. 
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1883 but, after three attempts, mysteriously failed to obtain a degree in 
science, though she was allowed to continue teaching at the Hall of 
Science. 3 Gilman had no formal education beyond a year of drawing and 
painting at the Rhode Island School of Design and essentially became an 
autodidact, reading the books that came into her possession or were 
recommended by her father and subjecting herself to a personalised 
regime of study. 
Besant wrote primarily non-fiction prose. 4 Gilman wrote non-fiction 
prose, poetry, and fiction. In their writings, each deals with the problem 
of creating an ethical system in a slightly different way. Gilman does 
not vary from her original analysis in finding the root of all evil in 
mistaken beliefs promulgated primarily by men throughout history and 
leading to the economic subjugation of women. Besant, however, 
consistently moves from one version of truth to another, labouring to fill 
in the gaps in her perspective and more definitively answer her 
questions. Most strikingly, Gilman strives to win her public in the 
vernacular language of popular journalism, fiction, and poetry. After 
many years as a journalist and lecturer for Socialism and Secularism, 
Besant eventually chooses the path of the initiate and an esoteric `secret 
doctrine' which provides her with authority and an apparent resolution 
to a lifelong struggle to integrate her personal convictions and 
intellectual development with her public life and interests. 
3Anne Taylor, Annie Besant: A Biography (Oxford, OUP, 1992) 144,183-84. 
4 Early examples of Besant's fiction are available in the book Legends and Tales (London: 
Freethought, 1885), which draws on various mythologies to create a series of children's stories 
reinterpreted for the Freethinker. 
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Similarities between the two, however, are more revealing. With 
regard to personal matters, first of all, they both had extraordinarily long 
lives in which to experience and experiment. Besant lived to eighty-six 
years and Gilman to seventy-five, when breast cancer made it 
impossible for her to work or be comfortable any longer and she decided 
to end her own life. Both Gilman and Besant had religious mothers and 
fathers who were antagonistic to religion and may have fostered 
scepticism in their daughters. Both experienced strong evangelical 
influence during their middle-class upbringings. Gilman was born to 
the Beechers, an old and enthusiastic Unitarian family (converted from 
Congregationalism), whose praises she would sing in her 
autobiography. 5 Besant, a daughter of less demonstrative Anglican 
background, became the charge of the strict evangelical Ellen Marryat, 
sister of Captain Frederick, of whose `somewhat Calvinistic teaching' 
she complains, citing this as a major reason for her continued search for 
a satisfying religious experience .6 Both would champion a remote 
but 
distinguished European racial heritage. Both would have unlucky 
marriages and difficulty with the role of wife. As mothers, one would 
lose and one relinquish custody of her child due to the consequences of 
her ambition-and both would describe temporarily debilitating 
depression, `nervous prostration' (Gilman) and illness associated with 
S Gilman, The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman (New York, London: D. Appleton-Century, 
1935) 3-4. `The immediate line I am really proud of is the Beecher family. Dr. Lyman Beecher 
was my father's grandfather, his twelve children were world-servers. ' 
6 Besant, Autobiographical Sketches (London: Freethought Publishing Co., 1885) 20. 
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the mental strain and anguish of fighting against prevailing societal 
expectations. Both presented their personal struggles, albeit to different 
effect, in autobiographical form. 7 
Academically, Gilman and Besant became extremely interested in the 
sciences, including the social sciences of sociology, anthropology and 
psychology, as well as chemistry and physics. The problem of evil, 
which both identified as pain, preoccupied each and would stimulate the 
development of theodicies and ethical systems in terms which reflected 
scientific interests and methods. 8 
The concept of the duty of service to humanity would also greatly 
impress both writers. Besant, desiring martyrdom, views self-sacrifice, 
in her reinterpreted use of the Christian term, as the essential aspect of 
service. For Gilman, this idea derives from her valorisation of inherent 
female racial characteristics, that is, her belief that the fundamental 
characteristics of woman are her nurturing and teaching abilities, which 
7 Frank Turner explains that evangelical autobiographies were often proselytising and written for 
friends, while those of doubters tended to portray an arduous struggle toward truth. Having heard 
certain secular or scientific lecturers or read certain scientific or historical texts, he points out, 
plays the same role for the unbeliever as hearing certain preachers and reading the scripture for the 
evangelical: 'Most important, the doubters and sceptics upheld the centrality of the Bible to the 
experience of unbelief. With the unbeliever as with the evangelical the reading of the scriptures 
led to the seeking of a new life and a real faith. ' 'The Victorian Crisis of Faith and the Faith That 
was Lost, ' Victorian Faith in Crisis, ed. Helmstadter and Lightman (1990) 15-16. 
As evidenced by the myriad of male and female-authored autobiographies or novels, which 
illustrated crises of faith, and redemption, or compromise, like the fictional The Autobiography of 
Mark Rutherford (1881) by E. Hale White or Robert Elsmere (1888) by Mrs. Humphry Ward, 
which was immensely successful in both Britain and the United States, religion had become a 
focal point. 
8 See both autobiographies addressing the problem of pain. Also Annie Besant, The Use of Evil 
(Benares: Theosophical Publishing Society, 1895) and The Meaning and the Use of Pain 
(London: Theosophical Publishing Society, 1894). Esoteric Christianity (Adyar, Madras: TPH, 
1901) discusses the doctrine of the Atonement and the relationship of pain to sacrifice; 141-142. 
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enable her to serve society as a whole. Both see this responsibility as a 
way of promoting evolution and social redemption. 
Both writers also subscribed to an optimistic doctrine of progress and 
the belief that evolution might be controlled or promoted. Historian 
Hugh McLeod explains that belief in progress prevailed amongst middle 
and upper-middle class Victorians (who often held on to pre-Darwinian 
notions of evolution). Though Darwin personally found the apparent 
randomness of natural selection to be his most profound and disturbing 
conclusion, McLeod explains, 'Yet the popular meaning of evolution, 
for the religious and for the anti-religious, seems to have been the very 
reverse. It meant the process onward and upward, ordered, progressive, 
and in most people's opinion, planned. [sic] It is hard to believe that 
such facile progressism could have been derived from Darwin-more 
probable that a garbled version of Darwinism was used to re-inforce pre- 
existing ideas. '9 The pre-existing ideas McLeod refers to would 
presumably include the Lamarckian theory that acquired characteristics 
may be inherited. 10 Gilman would be forced to wrestle with this 
fallacious but powerful argument. Besant seems to have imbibed it 
9 McLeod 229-230. See also Gillian Beer, Darwin's Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, 
George Eliot, and Nineteenth Century Fiction (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983) 19-21, 
which observes the qualities of narrative inherent in Darwin's writing. Beer stresses that the 
Lamarckian notion of control implied by the inheritance of acquired characteristics persists even 
after it has been discredited. 
'° Robert C. Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979) 21-23. Jean Baptiste de Monet, Chevalier de 
Lamarck (1744-1829) developed principles which were incorporated by Darwin, thus allowing 
confusion to develop over whether Darwinism was a version of Lamarckianism. Lamarck's 
theories 'were rooted in profoundly reactionary scientific assumptions. The laws of use and disuse, 
and the inheritance of acquired characteristics [which Darwin rejected] were corollaries of the 
view that 'living nature' is the only creative force, seeking perfection of organisation through 
progressive differentiation. ' 
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unconsciously, carrying it with her to and from the land of the 
mahatmas. 
It is here where two streams of thought seem to converge in 
McLeod's view. What is variably called the Victorian `crisis of faith' or 
`loss of belief or `crisis of legitimacy' amongst the middle and upper- 
middle classes coincides with the discovery of what may be called the 
religion of Socialism by the working classes, who were converting to the 
new creed in increasing numbers. l l The responsiveness of Sydney and 
Beatrice Webb (as well the younger Besant) to such politics and to ideas 
of social evolution culminated in Fabian Socialism (the Fabian Society 
being founded in 1884) which blended their interests in economic and 
social research in order to promote reform in an anti-Marxian non- 
revolutionary fashion. 12 Besant became particularly intrigued by the 
question of evolution as a (peaceful) solution to social problems. She 
deplored the poverty she saw around her and feared a desperate and 
disorganised revolution. 13 It is ironic that the classes did unite, in a 
sense, in the cause of Socialism, but only to perpetuate hierarchical 
stereotypes, with the middle-class still predominantly in positions of 
"McLeod 256-257. Beatrice Webb, who subscribed more closely to a religion of science, was 
initially just as convinced that `we are at a very early period in man's existence, and that we have 
only just arrived at the true basis of knowledge: and that bright and glorious days are in store for 
our successors on earth' though she later acknowledged a lack of moral purpose in science and 
man's consequent responsibility. 
12 McLeod 256-257. 
13 Taylor 177-179. Taylor describes Besant's interest in the Fabians as rooted in her interest in 
their original, more spiritually-centred organisation, the Fellowship of the New Life. Taylor 
believes Besant then used Socialism as a platform for her millennial vision, beginning with the 
instigation of political turmoil. 
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leadership. Besant, for example, worked very hard as a Socialist in the 
Law and Liberty League, as a Fabian, and later as a red-ribboned 
member of the Social Democratic Federation and the Metropolitan 
Radical Federation to which the National Secular Society was affiliated 
(the Fabians were not as effective as she had hoped), eventually 
organising marches and demonstrations and leading the famous Bryant 
& May matchgirls strike. 14 She would become disheartened by the 
ineffectiveness of Socialist political activism (actively revolutionary or 
otherwise), however. Much later her concern would develop into a 
move toward authoritarianism when she rejected democracy in favour of 
the caste system and Home Rule in India, ironically validating violent 
retaliation on the part of the Government in certain cases and 
maintaining an inconsistent record on passive resistance (though she 
appears to have advocated it long before Mohandas Gandhi). Similarly, 
during a visit to London in 1912 when she observed striking workers in 
the East End, she was not sympathetic. 15 
Gilman also looked for a brand of socialism which would suit her and 
found a similarly non-revolutionary form in Edward Bellamy's version 
of Nationalism (1889-1897), as illustrated in his extremely popular 
utopian novel Looking Backward (1888). She would later retreat from 
14 Taylor 213. 'As a result of events Annie had lived through since Bloody Sunday, the SDF 
[Social Democratic Federation] , which she had found so unacceptably militant at the 
beginning of 
her Socialist career, was more in sympathy with her mood than the Fabian Society. ' One peaceful 
march for free speech and the unemployed led to 'Bloody Sunday (20 November 1887) in 
Trafalgar Square (one man died and 150 were taken to hospital with injuries inflicted by the 
police). 
15 Taylor 314-319. 
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ostensibly working-class causes, however. As Larry Ceplair explains, 
Gilman rejected the German Marxism of the Socialist Labor Party: `she 
was drawn to a variant of native radicalism, combining Protestant 
morality as the goad, a collectivistic utopia as the end, and reason and 
good will as the means, ' which Bellamy's fictional bureaucratic and 
centralised state captured, spawning the movement. 16 Her later 
attraction to British Fabianism (she joined the society in 1896) is also 
well-documented. That Besant's Socialism also reflected support of 
Bellamy has been documented by historian Jill Roe, who describes the 
range of Besant's rhetoric, `which stretched from the authoritarian 
socialism of the Bellamyites across feminism to the spiritualized 
Darwinism of Madame Blavatsky. ' Roe writes that `In her emphasis on 
happiness for all when merit governed, she [Besant] harked back to 
Edward Bellamy and the influential authoritarian socialists of 
America. ' 17 Catherine Tumber, asserting that the broader trend of 
`Gnostic Revival' in the Anglo-American context during the period 
contributes to the ultimate insularity of Bellamy's thought, also cites 
Theosophical influence on Bellamy, as does Bellamy biographer Arthur 
Morgan, who explains that Nationalism owed its origin to Theosophists, 
16 Larry Ceplair, Charlottte Perkins Gilman: A Nonfiction Reader (New York: Columbia UP, 
1991) 29-31. 
Actually, Bellamy's program implied his inherent mistrust of human reason and emotion. The 
industrial army of Looking Backward magically forms after the equally magical public take-over 
of consolidated capitalist industries. Nationalism was not about revolutions for proletarians. 
Ultimately, the Democratic and Republican parties co-opted Bellamy's populist ideas and rhetoric, 
and the extremely idealistic movement splintered and lost its leadership. See Morgan, Edward 
Bellamy, 287-295. 
17 Jill Roe, Beyond Belief., Theosophy in Australia 1879-1939 (Kensington, NSW: New South 
Wales UP, 1986) 96-97,142. 
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many of whom held major offices in the organisation, but that ultimately 
the differences between the two creeds were stark. Bellamy believed 
strongly that men are created by the conditions in which they live, 
whereas Theosophists believed in reincarnation and karma (to be 
discussed later). 18 
In spite of their different methods, therefore, Besant and Gilman 
arrive at similar theories regarding the inevitability of social progress. 
But although this progress, whether through active `conversion' to a 
new state of mind, faith in a political movement, or a series of karmic 
lessons, was assumed to be inevitable, it would occur paradoxically 
through a changing of human nature in a way which would reflect the 
values of brotherhood, self-sacrifice (often equated with the idea of 
service), purity, and perfectibility, all in harmony with a belief in the 
immanence of the divine. This is not necessarily so inconsistent if it is 
believed that human agency is a valid element of the path to progress. 
The active accomplishment of this `race' improvement and 
internalisation of values would be the realisation of an ideal society. 
But both writers realised that at some level the simple application of 
the insights of evolutionary biology through sociology and eugenics was 
not an entirely complete answer. For all of the helpful aura of 
objectivity and factual information it would provide, math, chemistry, 
biology and physics could not answer the most important question of 
18 Morgan 260-268. See also Catherine Tumber, `Edward Bellamy, the Erosion of Public Life, 
and the Gnostic Revival, ' American Literary History Vol. 11,4 (Winter 1999) 610-641: 'Bellamy 
the religious seeker devised a Gnostic spirituality that served to sacralize his impulse to escape the 
world' (614). 
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what the world was to become. Nor could quantitative methods 
determine the moral direction of social and economic policy. For 
Gilman, the social and social conditions were commensurate with virtue 
and ethics; as an individual, man was nothing but an animal subject to 
the needs of self-preservation and race-preservation and would only 
become a savage if he were cut off from society. Moreover, defining 
progress as a duty of society meant that the fact that something was 
`natural' did not make it right or normal: `Monogamy is proven right by 
social evolution: it is the best way to carry on the human race in social 
relation; but it is not yet as `natural' as could be desired. ' 19 As early as 
1874, Besant was ardent, even as an atheist, about creating an Ideal 
humanity with which to motivate people to action: `By the sharp test of 
"the survival of the fittest, " certain actions have been stamped as good, 
others as bad.... Our task now is to correct these "rough and ready" 
views of morality by a just and careful revision. '20 
ED Culture and Anarchy: Reformers, Secularists, Scientists 
Besant and Gilman were certainly not alone in trying to reform 
society. A myriad of leagues and organisations, some spearheaded by 
women and some not, for radicalism and socialism of all varieties as 
well as secularism, evolutionism and eventually also Malthusianism 
19 Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Women and Economics (1898; Berkeley, London: University of 
California Press, 1998) 208-209,319-320; hereafter referred to as WE. 
20 Annie Besant, The True Basis of Morality (London: Freethought, 1874) 12. 
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would spring up during the late Victorian period in England and 
America. Attributing the importance of the `social purity' movement to 
the evangelical movement, Unitarianism, and the Quakers and the fact 
that both nonconformist and Anglican interpretations of women's roles 
implied that women were or should be passionless moral protectors, 
Lucy Bland explains that `social purity' was in fact a euphemistic term 
for sexual purity, applied to both sexes, and that that movement was 
intended to affect change in sexual behaviour. 21 Lesley A. Hall cites 
debates in the publications Shafts, The Adult, and The Freewoman and 
the existence of other discussion groups to make the point, however, 
that involvement with the social purity movement was not the only 
option a late nineteenth-century feminist might choose and that many 
such groups were very much about `policing women who did not 
conform to the requirements of middle-class respectability, censoring 
literature, etc. '22 
Gilman and Besant were also caught up in a tide of proliferating post- 
Darwinian ideologies which stretched across the Atlantic. The inspired 
Gilman and ambitious Besant would obviously digest many of the 
popular ideas of their interrelated cultures. Hugh McLeod explains that 
a striking element of the religious history of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Northern Europe and North America is the fact that there is such 
21 Lucy Bland, Banishing the Beast: Sexuality and the Early Feminists (New York: The New 
Press, 1995) 52. See also Ceplair, 31-33 on the Women's Christian Temperance movement. 
22 Lesley A. Hall, `Feminist Reconfigurations of Heterosexuality in the 1920s, ' Sexology and 
Culture: Labelling Bodies and Desires, ed. Lucy Bland and Laura Doan (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998) 136. 
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a similar chronology of constant change: `The Great Awakenings of 
1800 [the Evangelical Revival in Britain]23 and the years following had 
reached all parts of the Protestant world, while temperance had swept 
across the same countries in the 1830s and the decades following. 
Equally international was the reaction of the 1870s and `80s, marked by 
well-publicised attacks on Christianity, a decline in church attendance 
and Sunday observance, and the development of liberal theology. '24 
Much has been written on the Victorian `angel in the house' (or the 
madwoman in the attic) substantiating her particular predicament as 
protector and representative of the family's spiritual salvation. 
Responding to the Victorian cult of the female, Gilman fights squarely 
against prevailing codes in the interest of economic reform, gender re- 
evaluation, dress reform, etc. Graphically illustrated by the best-known 
or most popular piece of her work, the gothic story `The Yellow 
Wallpaper' (1892), the unequal sexual-economic relation between men 
and women is yet problematic: infantilised and imprisoned by her 
husband in an attic room, the protagonist of this story, nevertheless, may 
additionally reflect a fear of globalization and desire to `reassert what 
Gilman understands as the natural, primordial meaning of 
23 There were two periods of 'Great Awakening' in America, one in the 1740s and one during the 
first third of the nineteenth century, the nature of which evangelical revival influenced antislavery 
rhetoric between the 1820s and 1860s which subsequently affected the women's movement. See 
Eric J. Sundquist, 'The Literature of Slavery and African-American Culture, ' Cambridge History 
of American Literature: Volume Two, Prose Writing 1820-1865, ed. Sacvan Bercovitch 
(Cambridge, New York: CUP, 1995) 272-275. 
24 McLeod 284-285. 
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womanhood. '25 The religion and culture of the isolated women's 
country of Herland (1915) may substantiate this prophecy. Besant, like 
her contemporary, economist Harriet Martineau, is notorious about 
nearly living up to standard but essentially failing to martyr herself. Her 
mother tends to her every girlish need while her governess trains her 
piety, and she becomes devout to the point of morbidity. Her clergyman 
husband is a vicarious substitute, albeit a severe one, for the Christ she 
worships so devoutly; their failed relationship cannot fully 
accommodate her need to serve her religious interests. When religious 
doubt does strike, she is unable to complete her martyrdom, though she 
tries. As a divorced but free woman, she champions birth control and 
marriage reform, but her own choice is ultimately the life of a celibate 
high priestess. 
Women on both sides of the Atlantic also became associated with 
more specifically religious movements such as Christian Evangelism 
(1860s), the Women's Christian Temperance Union (1873), the 
Salvation Army (1875), Christian Science (1880s), and the many 
varieties of Spiritualism in particular. In America, anti-slavery agitation 
coupled with evangelical activity created an atmosphere of exchange. 
White women were able to draw rhetorical and ideological power from 
the abolitionist movement, which would eventually lead to the formal 
25 Thomas Galt Peyser, Utopia and Cosmopolis: Globalization in the era ofAmerican Realism 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998) 74-77. 
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launching of the women's movement in America by Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton (1815-1902) and Lucretia Mott (1793-1880) in 1848.26 
The matter of class should be remembered. That the upper classes 
and intelligentsia experienced the crisis of legitimacy most keenly and 
felt the need to take action has been recorded by many historians of 
feminism and by McLeod, who concurs that a sense of responsibility 
was often encouraged amongst those born to the well-educated and 
moderately well-off. 27 In Life and Labour of the People in London 
(1902), businessman and social historian Charles Booth describes at 
firsthand the sense of duty animating the religious of the upper classes 
of whom the women may `devote their lives to Church work' as well as 
less secure women of the upper-middle classes who are more likely to 
be reactive and `fling themselves into good works, or rush into extremes 
of religious doctrines and practices. '28 Maintaining the status quo, or at 
least stable class relations, was important to the general order and 
forestalling the fear of unrest among the lower classes. 
Into this equation of moral responsibility and middle-class 
Protestantism came the concept of evolution. While the term `social- 
Darwinism' was not prevalent, sociological theory was readily available, 
26 See Sundquist, above, on examples of anti-slavery rhetoric and Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle 
Tom's Cabin (1851; Boston, New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1893). 
27 McLeod, 151-152. In Philippa Levine, Victorian Feminism: 1850-1900 (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1994) the negative historical bias against Victorian activists being 
members of the higher educated classes is challenged with material linking activism with the 
interests of working-class and lower middle-class women. 
28 Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People in London. Third Series: Religious Influences, 
Vol. VII (1902) in ed. Richard J. Helmstadter and Paul T. Phillips, Religion in Victorian Society: 
A Sourcebook of Documents (Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1985) 
252-253. 
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especially in America, where it was absorbed through the writings of 
August Comte (1798-1857), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), and William 
Graham Sumner (1840-1910). Besant studied Comte and Spencer and 
Gilman was familiar with Comte probably at second-hand, studied 
Spencer thoroughly and probably had some familiarity with Sumner, the 
American Spencerian. 29 
Gilman also followed an alternative path interpreting the theory of 
evolution, that championed by Lester Frank Ward (1841-1913) and 
other Reform Darwinists, which would assert the primacy (if not 
necessarily the ascendance) of the female powers in nature. This theory 
had earlier been applied to mythology by Bachofen in the 1850s. 3° 
These two positions, ultimately favouring the paternal and maternal 
respectively, hold similar assumptions regarding evolutionary progress. 
But Ward seems to emphasise the nurturing aspect of the female more 
often than Bachofen, who would argue that the primitive female has 
rightly been usurped by the more advanced masculine intellectual and 
spiritual mission. Ward also seems fascinated, though, by the 
ruthlessness of the female, describing a spider's most efficient murder of 
her husband to demonstrate how the male is not really needed any 
longer. 
29 Ceplair has found no indication that Gilman read Comte, Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881) or 
Fredrich Engels (1820-1895), 29. 
30 Johann Jakob Bachofen, Myth, Religion and Mother Right: Selected Writings of J. J. Bachofen 
(1859-1870), trans. Ralph Mannheim (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1967). 
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Ward's theory is not necessarily pro-feminist, but what is most 
helpful in Ward for his female disciples, like Gilman and the British 
writer Frances Swiney (b. 1847), in addition to his observations of 
inherent female power in nature, is his dualistic separation of mental 
from physical evolution. His incorporation of the aforementioned 
Lamarckian theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics 
challenges monistic ideas about natural law and provides the hope that 
the human mind may have some form of control over the process of 
evolution. By concentrating on motive and intention, Ward created the 
new science of sociology and the insight that human intervention 
through programs of reform could be part of the evolutionary process as 
well. This and his apparent valorisation of inherent female 
characteristics provided the tools for the revision of concepts of gender 
and consequently of gender-relations. 
Besant is similarly attracted by the idea of controlling evolution and 
character and privileging the power of her agency. As a neo-Malthusian 
in The Law of Population: Its Consequences and Its Bearing upon 
Human Conduct and Morals (1889), she advocated `checks' (including 
mechanical methods) to prevent unwanted pregnancies and consequent 
social dissolution in overburdened populations: `the human brain is 
nature's highest product, and all improvements on irrational nature are 
most purely natural: preventive checks are no more unnatural than every 
other custom of civilisation. ' 31 Beyond her campaign for sexual 
31 Besant, The Law of Population (London: Freethought, 1889) 38. 
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morality, she would take the idea of thought-control and purification to 
extremes in collaboration on (occult) chemical research with her 
notorious colleague, Charles Webster Leadbeater (1847-1933). The 
description and discovery of the chemical compositions of various 
elements was deemed possible through the development of higher 
faculties of sight and understanding. This could even happen while 
having picnics in the forests of Germany (i. e. without any special 
equipment! ). On a material level, this meant that science could reach 
new heights of expertise. On an esoteric and spiritual level, as derived 
from study of Gnosticism, the fathers of the Church who espoused 
orthodox Christianity, and from Hinduism, this meant that the higher 
desire for union with God would overpower other bodily desires, forcing 
them into submission and creating a new state of mind in which social 
relations could be conducted. This negative way was nothing new, but 
Besant's approach to it was definitely less travelled. Similarly, Gilman 
expressed conflicting attitudes toward birth control, finally advocating 
the use of sexual activity for reproduction only. 
The debate over female power and the proper state of gender 
relations, which was very much instigated by scientific and pseudo- 
scientific study into the dynamics of population, sexology and 
eventually eugenics, would float about the margins of ostensibly less 
sexually charged reform issues while lending substance to the `woman 
question' and essentially validating the emerging New Women. These 
ladies might then champion the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts 
or advocate birth control and dress reform and generally make 
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themselves heard and known. But the growth of middle-class generated 
reform movements like those mentioned above is also in some ways a 
matter related to the spread of bourgeois imperialist ideology in the 
nineteenth century, which takes a paternal attitude, however 
condescending, racist or even ruthless, to the weak, the less fortunate, 
and the downright `degenerate'; Besant, in fact, disparagingly refers to 
her as yet uneducated `Whiggish' views of early adulthood. 32 How 
much elements of this point of view persisted into the age of reform, 
often validated and encouraged by nationalism, imperialism, 
interpretations of evolution and the work of Francis Galton and other 
eugenicists, may be observed in some part by the theories Gilman and 
Besant come to expound. 
In spite of their often genuinely egalitarian concerns for the 
improvement of society for all, the result of such concern by middle and 
upper-middle class reformers has occasionally been called an `armchair 
activism' of talk and no action, for which some have found fault with 
the Fabians. 33 However, several like General Booth, William Morris, 
Henry Hyndman, and others formed organisations devoted to the 
achievement of new social and economic visions and committed to 
direct practical action, such as the Social Democratic Federation and the 
Salvation Army. Stimulated by the social researches of the Fabians in 
particular, which had led to improved understanding of economic 
conditions in London and the rest of England, the trickle-down notion of 
32 Besant, An Autobiography, 70-71. 
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charity was discredited as inefficient or even demeaning and offensive. 
That the principle of charity derived from a condescending Christian 
establishment was only more fuel for the fire. Accounting for the causes 
of poverty and decay and providing the solution was the goal of such 
investigation, but the lack of cohesion amongst socialists and other 
groups was such that it was impossible to define socialism, much less a 
solution to the many-faceted problem of poverty and the related problem 
of sinister implication: perceived degeneration. The organising 
continued, however, amidst debate about ends and means. But what 
really motivated these people? The crisis of faith and loss of belief, and 
crisis of class-based legitimacy are related issues. Quoting Moncure 
Conway, an American Emersonian disciple, abolitionist, and eclectic 
minister of the formerly Unitarian South Place Chapel in London from 
1864, modem historian Warren Sylvester Smith (who has little to say 
about the place of women in these activities) explains that those who 
opposed orthodoxy, like the Secularists, and who labelled themselves 
materialists were often misunderstood: 
giving up life and fortune in the pursuit of an 
ideal society... such men are fairly followed 
today by the men of science, and the positivists 
and the secularists-men of plain living and high 
thinking, almost ascetic in their self-denial, and 
ever dreaming of higher education, of co- 
33Warren Sylvester Smith, The London Heretics 1870-1914 (London: Constable, 1967). 
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operation, and other schemes for the moral, 
intellectual, or social advancement of mankind. 
Such are the men for whom Christian prelates in 
their palaces sigh, deploring, amid their luxury, 
the gross materialism of the times! 34 
Luxurious Christian palaces, of course, probably belong to the High 
or Catholic churches. The branding `materialist' by those outside the 
circle asserted that spiritual values had been abandoned for material 
ones. Yet Smith asserts these heretical men and women pursued a 
vision: `One must ask to what extent they changed the established mind 
of the Western world, starting with London. It was for this grandiose 
end that they spilled out their vital energies. '35 Through the pragmatic 
and often anti-ecclesiastical aims of such agitation, these reformers were 
beginning to question the very basis of the hierarchical and patriarchal 
organisation of society but not necessarily those traditional Judeo- 
Christian values of asceticism, acceptance of fate as God's will, 
brotherhood, self-sacrifice, almsgiving, purity of life and body, and 
redemption through faith. The women's movement itself, agitating 
against the restraints imposed by a domestic sphere legislated by such 
values, in conjunction with the economic consequences of 
industrialisation which inevitably helped to delimit that separate sphere, 
may be considered a religious one. The values and, in fact, the laws 
prescribing the moral authority and custodianship of women were drawn 
34 Smith 22-23. Quotes Conway in Idols and Ideas (London, 1877) 17. 
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directly from the teachings of the church in an increasingly intimate 
relationship between civic and sexual morality. In the eighteenth 
century, William Blackstone had set out the definition of marriage in 
legal language closely following that of Paul in the New Testament: `By 
marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, 
or at least is incorporated and consolidated in to that of the husband: 
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything. '36 
While the laws on the books reflected an earlier age, the use of scientific 
principles to determine moral value encouraged public discussion of 
what had been essentially private matters, further conflating the 
relationship between public and private, secular and religious. 
This does not mean to say that the reformers approved 
wholeheartedly of science. But however mistaken notions of an 
inevitable progress may have been, it was impossible to ignore the fact 
of human agency and how it could affect change. Human inquiry had 
discovered the evolutionary process, why could it not unlock the 
mechanisms of nature and, in an increasingly godless world, play God? 
The power demonstrated in the practice of vivisection, to which Besant 
first offered limited support that she later recanted, was only the most 
cruel and barbaric manifestation of this tendency of man to wrangle for 
control over the natural world, to penetrate its mysteries and thereby 
3s Smith 25. 
36 Philippa Levine, 134 from K. O'Donovan, `The Male Appendage - Legal Definitions of 
Women', ed. S. Burman, Fit Work for Women (London, 1979) 136. [presumably from 
Blackstone's Commentaries] See also I Corinthians 11: 3,8-12. 
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discover the master key. In the early years of the twentieth century, 
eugenics, the method developed by Sir Frances Galton (1822-1911) for 
classifying and improving inherited human characteristics (chiefly by 
discouraging the `unfit' and encouraging the `fit'), became a preferred 
science. `Making better people' would be Gilman's mantra, as she tried 
to focus attention on the lives of people in this world rather than life in 
some `vague hereafter'. As Besant would explain in her autobiography, 
it was the `religious materialism' of the many which would bother her, 
crushing her mystical imagination, and not the `philosophic materialism' 
of the few37 which came to free her and open her mind to alternatives to 
a religion of fear, good works, and little else. Besant and Gilman often 
tend to make philosophy the handmaid of science in a way that Arthur 
Balfour had already criticised in 1879: 
Whenever any faith is held strongly and 
universally, there is a constant and overpowering 
tendency to convert Philosophy, which should be 
its judge, into its servant. It was so formerly, 
when theology ruled supreme; it is so now that 
Science has usurped its place ... 
38 
Yet Balfour's criticism, trenchant as it is, cannot necessarily resolve the 
question of knowledge and, characteristically of the perception of a state 
37 Besant, An Autobiography, 40-41. 
38 George Levine, 'Scientific Discourse as an Alternative to Faith, ' ed. Helmstadter and Lightman, 
Victorian Faith in Crisis, 231 from Arthur Balfour, A Defence of Philosophic Doubt: Being an 
Essay on the Foundations of Belief (London, 1879) 293-294. 
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of crisis, assumes that theology plays no part in progress while 
correlating science with theology as a faith on its own terms with its 
own bias, the same argument used by science against religion. 9 George 
Levine, like Theodore Roszak, argues that we cannot today think of 
science as a purely rational activity, and that we cannot accept the 
unqualified view that `falsifiability is the determining test of true 
science, ' citing current literary efforts to read science as unprivileged 
discourse while reminding us that science has provided us with a 
mandate to do so 40 Gillian Beer begins Darwin's Plots with the 
understanding that fact was not really fact until it had been demonstrated 
consistently to be true 41 In the meantime, fact-finding was itself a form 
of narrative or myth-making. 
It was important to many mid-century scientists, for example Phillip 
Henry Gosse (1810-1888), zoologist and strict Protestant fundamentalist 
of the Plymouth Brethren sect, that science could accommodate the 
scriptures or at least some idea of a higher power. Moreover, while it is 
easy to see later Victorian scientists as politically conservative figures, 
especially with regard to the ominous portents of Galton's (Charles 
Darwin's cousin, incidentally) ideas on eugenics, this was not 
necessarily the case. The positivists and the scientists were still 
considered radicals, threats to the stability of the reigning order in light 
of the way they seemed to preach anarchy, their affiliation with political 
39 Levine 225,231. 
40 Levine 231. 
41 Beer 1-2. 
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conservatism probably arising as a result of joining forces with 
capitalism (and this begs the question of which came first, scientific 
professionalism or the economic system that demanded it). The 
Metaphysical Society of dissident intellectuals, who generally professed 
agnosticism (T. H. Huxley (1825-1895), John Tyndall (1820-1893), 
Leslie Stephen (1832-1904), James Martineau (1805-1900), Arthur 
Penrhyn Stanley (1815-1881), F. D. Maurice (1805-1872), and others) 
was peopled by individuals who were nevertheless motivated by 
religious concerns. Huxley and Stephen had written that the root of 
religion lay in the "deeps of man's nature" and in "enduring instincts 
which will find expression in one form or another' . 42 Tyndall would 
recognise an "impassable gulf' between man the object and man the 
subject which confounded attempts to interpret the relationship between 
the development of a nervous system and the "parallel phenomena of 
sensation and thought". 43 
The question of semantics is critical in helping us discover the moral 
imperative implicit in so much scientific writing. The fear of science 
and its possible threat to religion and the fabric of daily life was 
probably experienced in the greatest way by Evangelicals and others 
who adhered to a literal interpretation of the Bible 44 The most fatal of 
42 James R. Moore, 'Theodicy and Society: the Crisis of the Intelligentsia' in Helmstadter and 
Lightman, Victorian Faith in Crisis, 173, n. 45,184; T. H. Huxley from Bernard Lightman, 'Pope, 
Huxley and the Church Agnostic: The Religion of Science', Historical Papers (1983) 158 and 
Leslie Stephen, 'Religion as a Fine Art' (1872), Essays in Freethinking and Plainspeaking (1873; 
London, 1907) 81. 
43 Levine 236. 
44 McLeod 229-230 and ed. Helmstadter, Religion in Victorian Society, 367. 
58 
attacks inherent in the concept of evolution would come at the expense 
of textual interpretation. German criticism, treating the Bible as any 
other book, had also provided the groundwork for textual criticism of 
the Bible. Philology applied apparently scientific methods to language 
and to history, disputing Jesus as an historical figure and comparing his 
story to those of other `pagan Christs. '45 Protestant Evangelicalism, 
encouraging direct interpretation of scripture (within certain limits), had 
actually made such investigations possible, thereby weakening the 
textual authority on which its own dogma was based. 
But the actual manner of expressing scientific `truth' was often not 
very far removed from the manner of expressing a religious one. 
Essentially, for Huxley, the most obvious and outspoken example, the 
`true God is nature, the true worship, science. '46 Since Huxley was a 
propagandist for science, his historical and intellectual climate make the 
apparent paradox (the use of language which is empirically inexact and 
subjective in the first place) intelligible. Scientific inquiry (and the 
professional status of science) had to be protected from established 
intellectual authority (the Church), thus its promoters tended to use that 
language most intelligible to that authority. 47 However, it has also been 
45 For more on this vast enterprise see Maurice 01ender, The Languages of Paradise. A useful 
example of the comparative history and mythology published on the figure of Jesus is J. M. 
Robertson, Pagan Christs (1903) (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1993). While Robertson is 
a contemporary of Besant, the essential work for English speakers was probably George Eliot's 
translation in 1865 of David Freidrich Strauss' Life of Jesus, composed for the German people 
(1864). 
46 Levine 225. 
47 Levine 226. 
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urged that Huxley was not simply using such language surreptitiously, 
but that he was in fact expressing his own `scientific Calvinism'. 8 
The mission of the scientist was not necessarily to disprove religion, 
but to discover truth and to verify that which was seen to be true, 
providing the grounds for a 'true' ethics. This verification process, in 
the eyes of empiricists, constituted incontrovertible authority for 
science, usurping that of the church; but anti-positivists would of course 
argue against such assumed moral and intellectual bankruptcy of 
religion. Tyndall's 'gulf', Levine explains, `did not stop naturalists 
from attempting to extend the scientific mythos from inorganic, to 
organic, and finally to human phenomena... they saw not discontinuity 
of the sage-like sort, between material and spiritual. ' So it is not 
necessarily satire we hear when we read such language, rather a 
commitment to find an alternative structure while maintaining the 
values of the religion `whose power is still manifest in his language. '49 
The Metaphysical Society was definitely not alone amongst the 
scores of clubs and organisations dedicated to the study of both science 
and philosophy. These included the Century Club, the Radical Club 
which expanded into the National Liberal Club, and later there was the 
Men's and Women's Club, founded by Karl Pearson, the National 
Secular Society (Besant joined in 1884), and of course those leagues and 
organisations associated with women's interests listed above, among 
many others, perhaps the most interesting being the Society for 
48 Moore, The Post-Darwinian Controversies, 348-349. 
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Psychical Research (SPR), founded in London in 1882. Explicitly 
committed to the project of dealing with the unseen, the SPR was highly 
respected and engaged in the rigorous application of scientific method to 
the investigation of worlds beyond. Prior to World War I, Oppenheim 
explains, the evidence shows that those participating in the 
organisation's researches were committed `To prove the preamble of all 
religions. 50 Twenty years after its founding, William James, a president 
of the society, would continue to lecture on The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (1901-1902) and `The reality of the unseen' as proven by 
individual experience and interpretation. These lectures deal directly 
with the interrelationship between physical and spiritual states of being 
and particularly appeal to the need for direct experience in validation of 
faith. This is admittedly far from a more pragmatic positivism, but it 
attests to the imaginative application of scientific principles to the study 
of life experience while addressing the needs of the soul. Concern 
heightened over that aspect of human experience which cannot be 
quantified, that element of truth which is beyond words, or simply 
beyond normal human perception, and which cannot be reduced to 
physics. According to historian Moore, the `question, therefore, was not 
whether Victorian Britain would have a religion, but merely how it 
would be expressed. '51 The term secularisation should be understood as 
meaning the `continuous displacement of one religion, both 
49 Levine 236. 
50 Oppenheim 111-158. 
51 Moore, `Theodicy and Society, ' 173. 
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ideologically and institutionally, with another. ' And this is the way, 
Moore believes, dissident intellectuals understood what was happening; 
the terms `new doctrines, ' `new revelations, ' `new faith, ' and `new 
gospel' they described added up to a `New Reformation. ' 52 
As for the notion of secularisation, David Nash explains of the late- 
Victorian reformers and converts to new ideologies and organisations 
that `The readiness of others to throw themselves wholesale into new 
forms of slavery [i. e. the organisations and denominations mentioned 
above] was proof that society had not been secularised but rather de- 
Christianised. ' Here, his quality judgement aside, Nash is referring 
specifically to the Leicester Secular Society and what the popular 
conception of secularism was at the time at a local level, which 
interestingly seems to correspond to that of historians who have 
supported the secularisation thesis. 53 The National Secular Society and 
other Freethought organisations were not the death knell of religion or 
even of organised religion or of belief in God in general. The presence 
of churches, sects, cults and other organisations which fulfilled the 
functions formerly assumed by ecclesiastical institutions is corroborated 
by historian Gertrude Himmelfarb, who has argued that unbelief led to 
an intensification of moral pressure and `displacement of religion - 
52 Moore, `Theodicy and Society, ' 174-175. 
53 David Nash, Secularism, Art and Freedom (Leicester, London: Leicester UP, 1992) 141). See 
also S. J. D. Green, Religion in the Age of Decline: Organisation and Experience in Industrial 
Yorkshire, 1870-1920 (CUP, 1996) 8: 'so long as modern religious historians adhered to the 
secularisation thesis, their histories remained wholly compatible with, indeed an integral part of, 
mainstream modern social and economic history. And that was generally understood to be a good 
thing. ' 
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which may explain the fanatical quality of their morality, their need to 
create a Religion of Humanity. '54 Historian Frank Turner also claims an 
intensification of religious activity led to clashes and conflicts, citing the 
French Revolution (separation of church and state) and subsequent 
increase in church-building in London, the expounding of natural 
religion, attacks on the Anglican `confessional state', the resurgence of 
Roman Catholicism, nonconformist expansion and Evangelical Revival 
ss as reasons forcing the theologically minded to define themselves. 
According to religious historian Owen Chadwick, the prevailing 
definition of secularism has been, roughly, `a growing tendency in 
mankind to do without religion, or to try to do without religion. ' 
Conversely, Chadwick's rather ambiguous definition of religion is based 
largely on churchgoing statistics, which method has been disputed. 56 
This definition of doing without religion is found lacking by Chadwick 
as well, but his book ultimately dismisses the whole idea of definition as 
ahistorical, while tying various long questions into a very complicated 
definition. Chadwick's major premise in writing is that the 
Enlightenment of the eighteenth century was addressed by Emile 
Durkheim (1858-1917), and particularly Auguste Comte, in terms of the 
54 Gertrude Hinunelfarb, Victorian Minds (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968) 303. 
55 Frank M. Turner, Contesting Cultural Authority: Essays in Victorian Intellectual Life 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1993) 75. 
56 Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century (CUP, 
1975) 17. This too, is much like Bachofen. Regarding the method of analyzing church-going 
statistics, see the theory of 'sacred relocation' in Green below. Green disputes this theory in so far 
as relocationists have failed to provide exact information regarding the type and extent of such 
relocation but most importantly because they have not established that the relocation has retained 
the significance of the sacred to the same degree (Green 11). 
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actual relationship of religion to society for the first time, with 
Durkheim coming near to inverting the axiom that religion is a social 
phenomenon into the idea that society is a religious phenomenon. 7 
This premise can turn almost any social interaction into a religious one, 
therefore, and is not necessarily helpful, though it is important to see 
how the science of sociology deals with religion. However, the central 
matter, according to religious historian, Warren Wagar, is `the residue of 
religious faith and practice in the faiths and practices of a secularized 
world. '58 The question is what this consists of, it is easy for 
secularisation theorists to dismiss such `residue' as a vestigial 
appendage that will eventually melt away through the process of social 
adaptation and evolution while presupposing some sort of linear 
development to begin with. 
Other interpretations of secularism, like Chadwick's definition, 
describe processes rather than actual static conditions. Challenges to the 
secularisation thesis are inclusive, but are often careful to distinguish 
between the secular as merely secular and the secular as sacred. S. J. D. 
Green describes alternatives to theories of secularisation in the 
introduction to his study of industrial Yorkshire between 1870-1920, 
one of few studies not devoted to the major European city. First, he 
describes the general theory of secularisation as it has been used by 
historians. 
57 Chadwick 6-7. 
58 Warren Wagar, ed., The Secular Mind: Transformations of Faith in Modern Europe (New 
York: Holmes & Meier, 1982) 3. 
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According to Green, the theories themselves focus on the 
transformation of methods of production and economic organisation 
which led to a corresponding change in the structure and organisation of 
members of a society based on division of labour and meritocracy. 59 
The distinction between community and society is also quite important, 
for it is alleged that: `Structural differentiation emphasised the 
fundamental separation of different types of human activity, ensuring 
that work, family, education, and religion, which had once been 
intimately bound up with each other in the life of self-sufficient 
communities, evolved into separate activities, staffed by specialised 
personnel, and discretely practised in complex societies. '60 Thus, the 
separation of these elements is challenged by religious concepts. The 
birth of heterodox society is viewed as another offshoot of 
industrialisation and urbanisation which divides and institutionalises 
activities, diluting their importance, including the importance of 
religion, previously 'the primary socialising agency of mankind' but 
then `little more than one amongst many possible outlets'. 61 
Dismissing religious influence over a divided and diverted society is 
perhaps somewhat foolhardy, though Green explains that the 
secularisation thesis is still highly plausible and is used to explain so 
many forms of institutional change within an overarching theory of 
59 Green 6. 
60 Green 6. 
61 Green 6-7. 
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social and economic change that it has become quite indispensable 62 
Challenges to this thesis have been broached by many historians 
formerly reluctant to voice objections under the aegis of what Green 
calls `a theory of modernisation which neither entails nor requires the 
corollary of secularisation. ' The many theoretical and empirical forms 
of attack on the secularisation thesis are interrelated, but may be 
organised into four types: the theory of transformation, of relocation, of 
divergence, and the theory of spontaneous renewal. 63 
Religious transformation theory is the most radical, arguing that 
religion is not exclusively concerned with non-empirical ends and 
supernatural categories but that religion is no more nor less than the 
sacred bond of society, apparent institutional decline being a process of 
transformation which transfers sacredness from old forms to new. 
Sacred relocation theory acknowledges the commonsense definition of 
religion, but argues that religious beliefs have relocated themselves 
`beyond traditional, declining, ecclesiastical institutions into new 
developing religious and quasi-religious organisations. ' 64 Divergence 
specifies different dimensions of religious commitment, thereby fleshing 
out relocation theory while allowing for the significance of particular 
social contexts. But decline could still be general in spite of specific 
factors and variations. The theory of spontaneous renewal rejects the 
central premise that religion is in decline in the modem world, 
62 Green 7-8. 
63 Green 8-9. 
64 Green 16 
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paradoxically defining and limiting the concept of secularisation by 
`directing attention away from the trials of specific churches and 
towards the concept of a religious economy' and by arguing that `the 
rise of particular organisations to political authority and social 
responsibility necessarily involves a series of institutional and doctrinal 
compromises with worldly power. Inevitably, such compromises render 
those religious organisations more worldly: that is, more secular. '65 
While all of these theories are fascinating and useful, none are entirely 
adequate, but `no fair-minded observer can deny that the question of 
secularisation is now open, where once and not so long ago it seemed 
resolutely closed. '66 
Ultimately, Moore prefers a version of relocation theory, the idea of 
transformation, and the term `naturalisation' to the idea of removal and 
`secularisation': naturalisation meant the transforming of these ideas, 
values, and institutions so that the equivalent religious power and 
authority became vested in natural ideas, naturalistic values, and 
institutions led by professional interpreters of nature. In this process the 
locus of the sacral moved from the noumenal towards the phenomenal, 
from the eternal towards the temporal, from another world towards this 
world. 67 
6s Green 18. 
66 Green 16. 
67 Moore, 'Theodicy and Society, ' 155. 
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This study of Besant and Gilman will tend to verify Moore's idea 
more generally, though again, the issue is to identify what exactly has 
been relocated. To comment on our own century, Wagar prefers Nash's 
more specific term: `de-Christianization is far from absolute, nor is it 
necessarily the same thing as doing without religion. Christianity 
continues to permeate Western high culture.. . The absence of God in a 
Kafka novel or a Beckett play is an absence so conspicuous and 
overwhelming, indeed so God-shaped, that it can do more to awaken 
religious consciousness than whole libraries of theology. '68 Perhaps it is 
this impending absence which prompts naturalists to anticipate the 
relocation, transformation, or other movement of the sacred with such 
rhetoric. 
® The Matter with the Spirit: the intersection of narrative with 
theodicy 
`How far can changes in religious beliefs be attributed to new 
knowledge? ' McLeod asks, warning at the end of his study of class and 
religion in the late-Victorian city, that the terms "industrial society", or 
"secularisation" may be useful as long as it is recognised that they are no 
more than concepts and not `vehicles for a mechanical theory of human 
motivation, in which human thoughts and actions merely reflect their 
68 Wagar 8-9. 
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environment, or those aspects of the environment that the historian 
chooses to select. '69 
In spite of relative economic stability in Britain and America, other 
forces were working for change as well. Socialism created demands for 
better wages and living standards, hence strikes became common; 
economic stability did not mean parity. Public education and agitation 
regarding sexual matters (e. g. Besant's publication of The Law of 
Population (1877) and the highly controversial Fruits of Philosophy 
(1894), Malthusianism, Neo-Malthusianism) empowered women (and 
men) to take control of their reproductive capacities, thus more 
permanently challenging the biblically sanctioned role of sexual activity 
and creating a whole new set of issues. Urbanisation exerted its own 
pressures. 
It was not necessarily new knowledge, but shifts in perspective which 
caused religious change, and these shifts included: intensified awareness 
of the importance and severity of social inequality, an increasing desire 
to be free of `puritan' restraints' and disillusionment, and disgust with 
(Protestant) doctrines of hell which made God seem vindictive and 
cruel. 
Again, this is corroborated by the similar view of Moore that the 
crisis among the intelligentsia was not one of faith per se, but one of 
social responsibility and `legitimation, ' although there were many (like 
69 McLeod 285. 
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Balfour) who felt literal faith was at the root of the issue. 70 That 
pragmatic concerns for social welfare and the like were often primary 
motivations for conversion to new faiths like Socialism is verified by 
the example of reformers like Besant and Gilman. However, it is not 
clear that those pragmatic concerns are not in any way sacred. Wagar 
writes that religious faith has both influenced and been influenced by the 
growth of other belief systems and institutions in a process which raises 
questions about how and when secularisation took place and focuses the 
debate as one between those who see change as a result of events taking 
place in society at large (pragmatic concerns) or the world of ideas 
(science, evolution). 7' Moreover, McLeod appears to represent the view 
criticised by Wagar of `those who would see the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment and progress as "modem"'. 72 Wagar opposes this 
category with those who would see products of Enlightenment thought 
as reworkings of medieval beliefs rooted in a Christian world view and 
view modern civilisation as something `profoundly different'. 73 This 
again raises the knotty question of what is `modern, ' though Wagar is 
presumably referring to what Turner calls the post-modern as that 
"profoundly different" civilisation, and is therefore, like Turner (and 
Luther himself? ) characterising Protestantism as a conservative 
70 Moore 'Theodicy and Society, ' 153: 'Spiritual equipoise, moral rectitude, intellectual integrity 
- not merely these were at stake, but the very order and progress of society. The Victorian crisis 
was a crisis of legitimation. ' 
71 Wagar 6. 
72 Wagar 5. 
73 Wagar 5. 
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(modem) movement, though Wagar does not address the issue of free 
will v. determinism which would perhaps refine this view. 
Moore focuses on a much broader struggle to create a theodicy: to 
`negotiate new doctrines, new beliefs, new vehicles of consent that 
would be seen to maintain continuity with and fulfil the best aspirations 
of older creeds but, at the same time, would serve to order and stabilise 
class relations more effectively by allowing for new patterns of 
expectation in a liberalising and "improving" society. 74 In this sense 
religion is acted upon by the catalyst of change to become something 
different, to adapt to a new use in a re-invented form. With reference to 
the process of `naturalisation' effected by professional interpreters of 
nature and the subsequent relocation of sacredness to the phenomenal 
and things of nature, Moore cites `meliorism' as the best term the 
Victorians had to describe this process. 
`Meliorism' is famously associated with Thomas Hardy, for example 
in the poem `Near Lanivet, 1872' (1917), where the treatment of 
martyrdom is problematic. A woman walking in Cornwall half 
knowingly, half randomly leans against a post, dressed in white with 
palms outstretched. Her partner, the speaker, is at once disturbed by the 
image created, crying out for her to stop, though she does not hear. 
Having loosened herself from the position, she regrets having done it, 
and later explains, `I did not think how `twould look in the shade, /When 
I leant there like one nailed. ' Her companion replies, `lightly, ' `There's 
74 Moore, `Theodicy and Society, ' 154-155. 
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nothing in it. For you, anyhow'. 5 Hardy's (he professed an 
`evolutionary' meliorism) sense of incongruities within the context of an 
experience relevant to the subject of martyrdom and the changing roles 
of women is convenient here. The woman in the poem is aware of the 
unpleasant feeling , but is still attracted to the idea of crucifixion; 
perhaps she does not quite believe in a particular cause strongly enough. 
Perhaps her faith is in transition. In light of the experience of the Great 
War, this memoryjoins two periods in uncertain ambivalence. 
While the notion of secularisation, naturalisation or meliorism leads 
to little resolution, other than to say that the question is open and 
complex, the project of the theodicy is concrete. And the concept of the 
theodicy, which Moore also ascribes to the Victorians originally, is 
particularly important to Besant and Gilman. 76 A theodicy is a solution 
to the problem of evil that justifies the goodness of the (assumed) deity. 
The term was first used in 1710 by Gottfried Leibniz (from Greek theos 
or God and dike or justice) in an essay dedicated to Queen Sophie 
Charlotte of Prussia, which asserted that evil did not predominate over 
good and that God had created the best of all possible worlds; therefore, 
the status quo was sufficient, social inequalities were inevitable, and the 
77 
money and power of the monarchy were justified. This is not to 
75 Thomas Hardy, 'Near Lanivet, 1872, ' The Variorum Edition of the Complete Poems of Thomas 
Hardy, ed. James Gibson (Moments of Vision, 1917; New York: Macmillan, 1978) 436. 
76 The OED attributes the origin of the term `theodicy' to Leibniz in the late eighteenth century: 
'The, or a, vindication of the divine attributes, especially justice and holiness in respect to the 
existence of evil; a writing, doctrine, or theory intended to `justify the ways of God to men. ' The 
New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993) substitutes `divine providence' for `divine 
attributes'. 
77 B. Turner 80-81. 
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suggest that all theodicies, as organised theological solutions to the 
problem of evil, are inherently supportive of the dominant class or some 
sort of oligarchic political situation, but they do, inherently, strive to 
justify evil in the world as it is. As mentioned before, Moore believes 
that this is actually part of the process of naturalisation (a continuation 
of the process of removing sacredness from traditional sources of power 
and reinstalling it elsewhere - the sacred relocation theory of 
secularisation), reinterpreting the problem of evil in worldly and 
naturalistic terms. However, the need to defend God against evil 
necessarily entails justification of that evil; whether this should 
consequently encourage or discourage social action is another question. 
Addressing her initial approaches to dealing with social evil in An 
Autobiography (1893), Besant refers to a particular incident of 1882, her 
first introduction to Theosophy, in which she is asked, as vice president 
of the National Secular Society, whether it is appropriate for members 
of her presumably anti-religious society to join the Theosophists, of 
whom she had heard only that they held theories of apparitions of the 
dead and of some extra-physical existence: 
I replied, judging from these reports, that `while 
Secularists would have no right to refuse to 
enroll Theosophists, if they desired it, among 
their members, there is a radical difference 
between the mysticism of Theosophy and the 
scientific materialism of Secularism. The 
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exclusive devotion to this world implied in the 
profession of Secularism leaves no room for 
other-worldism; and consistent members of our 
body cannot join a society which professes belief 
therein. (AA 280-281; National Reformer, 18 
June 1882) 
At this early stage. Besant was caught off guard. Though she considered 
herself religious, she had not yet considered the implication that being 
an atheist was, in her case, also subscribing to a religion of `this world' 
and humanity. Having responded to the opportunity provided a 
clergyman's recalcitrant and disbelieving wife (she chose expulsion for 
her heresy) by joining the National Secular Society, Besant found 
herself challenged again. In August of 1882, her dictum against 
Secularists joining the Theosophists was answered with a sympathetic 
enticement from the charismatic Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky 
(HPB): 
`Until proofs to the contrary, we prefer to believe 
that the above lines were dictated to Mrs. Besant 
by some crafty misrepresentations from Madras, 
inspired by a mean personal revenge rather than 
a desire to remain consistent with the principles 
of "the scientific materialism of Secularism. " 
We beg to assure the Radical editors of the 
National Reformer that they were both very 
strangely misled by false reports about the as 
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Radical [sic] editors of the Theosophist. The 
term "supematuralists" can no more apply to the 
latter than to Mrs. A. Besant and Mr. C. 
Bradlaugh. ' (AA 281) 
Blavatsky rebuffs materialist criticism by claiming that science is, in 
fact, what the Theosophists are about, that `other-worldism' is not a 
relevant term to describe Theosophy. There is no superstition or 
supernaturalism here, only naturalism, in fact a complete science which 
grants the existence of higher levels of human perception, those 
supposedly exercised in the practice of spiritualism and more besides, 
which essentially takes full material account of the unobservable. 
Therefore, the Theosophical Society is not a conservative, but a 
`Radical' organisation, like the NSS. Standing corrected by Blavatsky's 
suggestion that she had not followed the intellectual argument to the end 
of the road, Besant would begin to feel insecure with her secular and 
materialist convictions and gravitate from Atheism toward Socialism 
and then `Home' to Theosophy, once reassured that membership did not 
simply require "dreamy, emotional, scholarly interest in the religio- 
philosophic fancies of the past. ' , 78 Yet, NSS president, Charles 
Bradlaugh, would also direct new member Besant in her definition of 
Atheist to read one who is `without God', rather than one who believes 
there is no God. Atheism actually provided Besant with a way to God. 
More particularly, it provided her with a theodicy or explanation for evil 
78 Besant, An Autobiography (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1893) 280,338. 
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(in ignorance) and a basis for morality: utility. 79 In `The Gospel of 
Atheism' (1876) she explains: `To the Atheist the terrible problem has in 
it no figure of despair. Evil comes from ignorance, we say; ignorance of 
physical and moral facts. ' The environment, at the time, was the culprit. 
Besant goes on to describe the squalid living conditions of families in 
cities, which lead to `disease lurking in their veins', poorly developed 
brains, children inclining `to the animal rather than to the human', and 
`educated into criminality'. 80 
Eventually, she would renounce the Atheist and Materialist 
components of secularism, but not Secularism or Freethought directly. 81 
Thus, Besant's initial understanding of secularism appears to be that 
definition of non-sacred and this-worldly which historians and others 
have most often adopted and which has not been much-questioned until 
recently. Coloured by Theosophy, Besant's understanding of what is 
religious appears to change dramatically, though she would see little 
discontinuity in her own intellectual development. 
The concept of religion at the end of the nineteenth century seems to 
possess an elasticity which has the potential of encompassing, for 
example, both Christianity and spiritualism at once. 82 The concept of 
79 Besant, The True Basis of Morality (London: Freethought, 1874) 9. 
80 Besant, The Gospel of Atheism (London: Freethought, 1877) 9-11. 
81 Besant, An Autobiography, 194. 
82 Oppenheim discusses at length the similarities between Christian and anti-Christian spiritualists, 
noting `the quest for universality.. . probably derived particular support 
from contemporary 
developments in both religious and social thought... Although spiritualists of different perspectives 
were inclined to argue among themselves whether spiritualism was actually a new religion, a sect, 
or a common religious principle, there was no doubt in their minds that its application was 
universal' (108-109). 
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secularism is equally malleable. Hence the work of Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman, building her utopia, and Annie Besant, searching for Truth, 
justice, and a Universal Brotherhood, might be more readily 
accommodated in this niche as writers who help redefine the terms of 
engagement and create not exactly an alternative, but a `melioristic' re- 
positioning, reforming, and rewriting of religion as previously 
understood. 
While the groups or views Besant and Gilman represent are rather 
particular, their project of rewriting religion includes many women such 
as Anna Kingsford (closely associated with Theosophy, incidentally), 
Frances Swiney (a proponent of the ideas of Lester Ward, like Gilman), 
Matilda Joscelyn Gage, or Elizabeth Cady Stanton and men including 
Arthur Conan Doyle for one, who would also contribute to a literature of 
religious reinterpretations and alternatives, and one might also begin to 
consider modernist novelists or poets like W. B. Yeats and D. H. 
Lawrence. As said before, there is certainly a case for expanding into 
such a vast study. Gilman and Besant are by no means obscure, 
however; they commanded tremendous followings, wrote and lectured 
prodigiously, and only then were largely relegated as curiosities. Their 
didacticism is no longer considered practically useful, but this denies the 
historical possibilities inherent in such writings. 
Using science to create sociological arguments, bolstering ethical 
philosophies of service and self-sacrifice in the interests of forming a 
perfected race and society, Gilman and Besant promoted utopian or 
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post-millenarian projects or even employed `progressive messianism', 
perhaps, in the case of Annie Besant. 83 Gilman validated her own 
conclusions, overcoming any conflict between science and religion by 
reinterpreting utopian tradition to focus on the realisation of a sexual as 
well as social Ideal in this world exclusively. Besant, as a Theosophist, 
similarly ascribed to a doctrine of reconciliation, attacking the goals of a 
science which limited its findings to what was humanly observable 
when `psychical research' could prove otherwise. For Besant, science 
and religion would eventually blend seamlessly in Theosophical 
doctrines of reincarnation and karma. Accomplishing heaven on earth 
required development of extra-physical abilities to enable further 
evolution and a transcendence and reunion of sexual opposites. The 
direction of a World Teacher or messiah who represented all religions 
guided all toward Universal Brotherhood. For neither Gilman nor 
Besant would blind faith be necessary in the face of (apparent) scientific 
fact. The need for a new narrative drives their writing. The patently 
83 See Catherine Lowman Wessinger, Annie Besant and Progressive Messianism (Lewiston, NY: 
E. Mellen Press, 1988). Wessinger identifies as post-millennial [following Peter Toon, Puritans, 
Millenarians, and the Future Israel (Cambridge: CUP, 1970)] the belief that Christian agencies 
would gradually overcome evil so that the millennium would be created on earth following which 
time Christ would return. Pre-millenarianism denotes the idea of degeneracy and the belief that 
nature and the world were decaying and becoming corrupt. Christ was expected to return to earth 
in a catastrophic manner to inhabit it for 1,000 years, following with the Last Judgement. 
Messianism, of course, refers to the Hebrew doctrine presaging the return of a messiah. Besant's 
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material aims, ascetic vocation, and moral indeterminacy of science (if 
there was one) were paradoxically insufficient to the aspirations of two 
women who believed they were motivated by higher powers to change 
human nature and society and help create heaven on earth. 
belief in both post-millennial salvation on earth through progressive evolution and the guidance of 
a World Teacher leads Wessinger to call her philosophy `progressive messianism, ' 24-29. 
II. FROM PROPAGANDA TO PROPHECY 
With all her enthusiasm for the subject, Mrs Besant does not appear to 
have the intuitive perception, the mystic quality of mind which should 
enable her to reach the very heart of the old Vedantic teaching. Her 
intellect, clear and systematic... has little of the poetic or inspirational, 
and it may be doubted whether it has ever quite fathomed the religious 
writing with which it has been so much occupied. Edward 
Carpenter, My Days and Dreams (1916) 
Carpenter's judgement of Annie Besant is not unique, and any new 
reading of her work will make his point clear. However, he also 
believed that she had done great things in reacting to the `smug 
commercialism of the mid-Victorian era' and opening a new world of 
religious thought. ' The majority of Besant's Western biographers, like 
Besterman, Nethercot, and Taylor, take a critical and even slightly 
sarcastic view of her character while vaunting her autobiography of 
1893 as the most admirable piece of her writing. Her other innumerable 
philosophical works have been considered `dull' or lacking the `genuine 
fire of poetry or inspiration or scientific vision' and of all the four 
hundred books and pamphlets and more than five thousand articles she 
produced, Theodore Besterman, writing in 1934, finds 'not one that 
1 Taylor 330. 
80 
seems at all likely to go down to posterity. '2 The life of a prophet has 
never been easy. 
But it is difficult to read Besant's works, in which, as biographer 
Anne Taylor agrees with Carpenter, `She always seems to be repeating 
something, corroborating some preconception, never describing 
something she had perceived'. 3 There is no major industry for Besant 
scholars, it seems, because the body of her work, which could never be 
fully assessed in its massive entirety, is a vast and tedious ocean to 
navigate. But there is a fascination with Besant that persists in Arthur 
H. Nethercot's two volumes of biography of the 1960s (appropriately 
titled The First Five Lives of Annie Besant and The Last Four Lives of 
Annie Besant respectively) and Anne Taylor's biography of 1992 and in 
more recent works on rhetoric and millenarianism. Academic trends 
toward interdisciplinarity and the use of social construction theory and 
an emphasis on historicity allow for interesting and useful combinations 
of historical and literary perspective. 4 It is difficult to decide which tone 
2 Theodore Besterman, Mrs Annie Besant. A Modern Prophet (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner, 1934) 269. 
3 Taylor 332. 
° For example, Susan Martha Dobra, 'Collaboration and Consensus: Constructing a Rhetoric of 
Abnormal Discourse for Composition from the Esoteric Prose of William Butler Yeats and Annie 
Wood Besant, ' diss., U of California at Berkeley, 1993. This attempts to create a rhetoric of 
abnormal discourse for use in the classroom in order to identify helpful challenges to normal or 
established discourse. Cartesian dualism positing an objective knowledge or transcendent 
empiricism as 'the business of philosophy, ' thereby weakened the alliance of rhetoric and 
philosophy. Sixteenth and seventeenth-century philosophy continued to separate rhetoric from 
philosophy, denigrating it to the status of sophistic, decorative elocution. But twentieth-century 
philosophy has overcome this by focusing on the role of language and social construction in the 
work of Dewey, Adorno, Habermas and Foucault, and, in the case of Derrida, 'deconstructing the 
representational nature of knowledge and language'. Such newer epistemological perspectives 
enable us to contextualize rhetoric in more useful ways. Dobra analyses Besant's rhetoric as such 
an alternative discourse. 
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to take when writing about such an amazing life, such extraordinary 
work, such tedious writing. And it is easy to be sarcastic. There is a 
great deal of humour in the adventures and the writings of Annie Besant, 
and a great deal of inspiration, wonder, and sadness. George Bernard 
Shaw, an extremely close and admiring friend, always called her Mrs. 
Besant (as well as dull) and wrote that nothing came to her first as a 
joke, as irony or paradox, but "stirred her to direct and powerful 
indignation and to active resistance. "5 That two famous contemporaries 
thought her work dull makes it even easier to complacently dismiss such 
writing as literarily irrelevant when historical contingencies and 
intellectual histories are ignored. But Shaw and Carpenter, Beatrice 
Webb, and many thousands more were simply awed by Besant's 
presence and rhetorical talents. We do not have the luxury of hearing 
her famous voice and can only read her words. Besant had many 
audiences and wrote for all of them; not being a member of a particular 
audience does not necessarily mean all is lost for the academic. 
Besant's autobiographical writing, the most prized, it seems, is 
nevertheless a good place to start. It is a transitional exercise, in a sense, 
which conveys the true spirit of her convictions and reinforces her 
perceptions of continuity in her own thought while illustrating the 
obviously paradoxical. The tried and true model of Victorian 
autobiography is a natural choice, on the one hand, for it is meant to be 
accessible to a large if sympathetic audience. On the other hand, Besant 
5 George Bernard Shaw: An Autobiography, 1856-1898, Selected from His Writings, ed. S. 
Weintraub (London: Reinhardt, 1969) 139. 
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uses this vehicle to convey not only her own perception of the crisis of 
faith, but the alternative form of belief she has discovered. An 
Autobiography begins to describe the Theosophical outlook within the 
context of a standard genre. 
Of course, in spite of her fascination with Christianity, established 
religious orthodoxy or the popular response to it was thoroughly 
unsatisfactory to Besant. In An Autobiography (1893), the trauma of 
setting herself against prevailing religious and social codes reveals 
personal experience akin to rebirth and conversion, though she says she 
lamented even as a child that she could never look back on one such 
soul-defining moment. There are a few versions of Besant's 
autobiographical writing which include 1875-1891 A Fragment of an 
Autobiography (1917), which was actually delivered as a lecture at the 
Hall of Science in London in 1891, and Autobiographical Sketches 
(1885). This chapter will deal with Besant's most formal version of her 
autobiography, An Autobiography (AA) and also refer to 
Autobiographical Sketches (AS). The 1893 edition, An Autobiography, 
seems to convey a decision that this is possibly a final version of what 
could otherwise simply be autobiographical writing and not 
autobiography. In other words, there is space open for another 
personality perhaps, or perhaps the title can be read metaphorically to 
suggest that the subject is not the whole life, but perhaps one of the nine 
lives Nethercot describes, a few of which include The Christian Wife, 
The Atheist Mother, The Martyr of Science, The Socialist Labour 
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Agitator, and The Chela of the Mahatmas. 6 This is certainly the story of 
several transmutations of Besant as told by the most final version to 
date, but the title also suggests that the author has not quite convinced 
herself that she has written her autobiography and perhaps has written 
rather less, or something more. Biographer, bibliographer (and former 
Theosophist) Besterman comments that the publication of 
Autobiographical Sketches, at the height of Besant's Freethought career 
after she had moved herself away from mentor Charles Bradlaugh into 
Our Corner (her own magazine) must have signalled a change: `can this 
have been the result of some awareness of the approaching end of an 
epoch in her life? ' 7 
As the most complete version of her life to 1893, two and a half years 
after the death of her beloved `HPB'(Madame Helena Petrovna 
Blavatsky) and her ascendance to leadership of the Theosophical 
Society, it also has a distinct purpose, as the Preface explains: 
it may well be that the story of one may help all, 
and that the tale of one soul that went out alone 
into the darkness and on the other side found 
light, that struggled through the Storm and on 
the other side found Peace, may bring some ray 
of light and of peace into the darkness and the 
storm of other lives. (AA 6) 
6 Arthur Nethercot, The First Five Lives of Annie Besant (London: Hart-Davis, 1961) and The 
Last Four Lives of Annie Besant (London: Hart-Davis, 1963). 
7 Theodore Besterman, Mrs. Annie Besant: A Modern Prophet (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner, 1934) 131. 
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Conflating a traditional, if melodramatic, Platonic metaphor of struggle 
for enlightenment with a Theosophically informed contemplation of 
Truth, this framing of her discussion differs significantly in intent from 
the Sketches, which were written `to satisfy friendly questions and to 
serve in some measure as defence against unfriendly attack' rather than 
to convey experience gained on `the other side'(AS 3). There is now a 
moral imperative to tell her story. 
Having thought that she had finally arrived at her spiritual 
destination, Besant may have felt it appropriate, in light of requests for 
information from her followers, to preach. With her Preface, Besant 
explains that her autobiography is intended to convey an inspired answer 
to the religious confusion that persists amongst those of her generation; 
it is an invocation to her congregation of listeners. An Autobiography is 
not intended for readers already familiar with theosophy, but for those 
who are familiar with the famous Besant. Hunching herself down to the 
level of the reader, condemning the vanity of the enterprise, she yields to 
the `only excuse' to write, which is 
that the life, being an average one, reflects many 
others, and in troublous times like ours may give 
the experience of many rather than one. And so 
the autobiographer does his work because he 
thinks that, at the cost of some unpleasantness to 
himself, he may throw light on some of the 
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typical problems that are vexing the souls of his 
contemporaries.... (AA 5) 
At first apocalyptic, the Preface retreats to a self-deprecating tone and 
then moves back to the visionary, incidentally using standard male 
pronouns to generalise about the autobiographer's task. Addressing the 
issue of `de-Christianising' forces and 'troublous times', Besant places 
herself both within and beyond the ken of her contemporaries as a voice 
of reason. For those not advanced enough to speak for themselves, 
Besant will be their martyr and saviour by revealing her struggles and 
faults for their sake. Writing in 1893, Besant has clarified her mission 
and discovered to her own satisfaction the congruities which mark the 
path she has chosen, and it is with this sober conviction that she sets 
before the reader the possibilities entertained by one life subject to the 
same confusions and frustrations as others: 
men and women of this restless and eager 
generation-surrounded by forces we dimly see 
but cannot as yet understand, discontented with 
old ideas and half afraid of new, greedy for the 
material results of the knowledge brought us by 
Science but looking askance at her agnosticism 
as regards the soul, fearful of superstition but 
still more fearful of atheism, turning from the 
husks of outgrown creeds but filled with 
desperate hunger for spiritual ideals.... (AA 5-6) 
86 
Identifying with the liminal perspective of her readers on the one hand, 
while presenting herself as an example to be followed, she begins to 
adopt a simultaneously self-deprecating and authoritative posture, which 
sets the stage for the ensuing narrative. Agnosticism, atheism, but also 
superstition are negatively perceived. Agnosticism, or lack of 
knowledge, professed by scientists was not as unsettling as the 
vagueness or naivetd of `superstition' or outright atheism, but `spiritual 
ideals' might contain any mixture of such ideologies. 
The second page of Chapter I, entitled `Out of the everywhere into 
the here, ' contains Besant's astrological chart (at her birth, 5: 39pm on 1 
October 1847). Here is a second clue to the author's new motivations. 
She makes no comment on the chart, except to say that a friendly 
astrologer has done this and `I know nothing of astrology, so feel no 
wiser as I gaze upon my horoscope'(AA 11). This is disingenuously 
disproved, for the next paragraph correlates the influence of the 
heavenly bodies on the earth and on the human body and how those 
born under the different signs of the zodiac therefore possess 
distinguishing characteristics. `Types' may be recognised by anyone 
who is familiar with the Zodiac and who 'may very easily pick out the 
different types among his own acquaintances ... He will very quickly 
discover that two men of completely opposed types were not born under 
the same sign, and the invariability of the concurrence will convince 
him that law, and not chance, is at work' (AA 11). 
Her real solution to the problem of the compromised faith she has 
confronted and which her readers now face begins to show itself in these 
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opening paragraphs dealing with her horoscope and the truths astrology 
may offer, though she, of course, is no expert on such matters. She 
would merely wish to convey, at the outset, the idea (which is quickly 
dropped) that `law, and not chance, is at work. We are born into earthly 
life under certain conditions, just as we were physically affected by them 
pre-natally, and these will have their bearing on our subsequent physical 
evolution'(AA 13). Here Besant departs from Bellamy's belief that 
environmental causes are the instigators of poverty and ignorance. 
Prophesying the path of Besant's life through the intimation of an 
esoteric influence beyond `earthly life', the horoscope indicates a pre- 
ordained destiny. For Theosophists, this is a strong claim to authority. 
The personal horoscope diagram is also used, for example, by Ebenezer 
Sibly, M. D. (1751-1799), an hermetic scholar and follower of Emanuel 
Swedenborg in A New and Complete Illustration to the Celestial 
Science ofAstrology (1784), which also shows a portrait of Sibly in the 
midst of the zodiacal ring. This work was dedicated to the Freemasons 
and contained a great deal that was plagiarised, but it was quite popular, 
and the only readily available work on the subject at the time. It is one 
of the early examples of what many eighteenth-century minds were 
trying to do: unite alchemical or astrological knowledge and the 
hermetic or occult worlds with that of the most recent science. 8 To 
those Christians and others as yet unaware of this message (but how 
could they not be? ), the suggestion is either an amusing note, or an 
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appeal to reformist ambitions for the promotion of physical evolution 
(which it is) via recognition of the outer influences in the `everywhere'. 
In any case, drawing immediate attention to the practice of astrology, a 
belief system which permeated the ancient world, is a signal that 
Atheism is no longer providing the moral imperative behind the 
exposition; in fact, it would suggest that there are other, older elements 
in control of Besant's destiny. 9 
Initially less willing than Gilman to experiment with her own 
precepts, Besant explains how sensitive she was as a young girl to the 
ideas and beliefs of those around her. A happy early childhood spent in 
idolisation of her mother is interrupted by the death of her father, the 
first major event in the book. Besant is proud that her sceptical father, a 
doctor, and her loyal mother, an Irish Anglican, expelled a priest from 
the father's deathbed in protest against his Roman Catholic mother and 
sister. But she uses the situation to illustrate her own protest against the 
establishment which would restrain her in an orthodox complacency. In 
spite of her loyal action at her husband's bedside, Emily Wood 
8 Joscelyn Godwin, The Theosophical Enlightenment (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1994) 107-109. Godwin traces the history of modern Theosophy to the creative scholarship 
of the eighteenth century. 
9 For a brief but useful discussion of the importance of astrology see Richard Tarnas, The Passion 
of the Western Mind (New York: Ballantine, 1991) 81-84,294-295: 'In the classical 
world... mathematical astronomy was not an entirely secular discipline. For the ancient 
understanding of the heavens as the locus of the gods was inextricably wedded to the rapidly 
developing astronomy to form what was considered the science of astrology, of which Ptolemy 
was the... culminating systematizer. Indeed, a large part of the impetus for the development of 
astronomy derived directly from its ties to astrology... But while its inherent inexactness and 
susceptibility to error left astrology open to criticism, Ptolemy and his era believed it worked. It 
shared with astronomy the same focus on the orderly motions of the heavens... possessed a rational 
foundation and firm principles of operation, which Ptolemy undertook to define..... astrological 
correspondences were interpreted by the Greek and Roman Stoics as signifying the fundamental 
determinism of human life by the celestial bodies. Hence astrology was regarded as the best 
method for interpreting the cosmic will and aligning one's life with the divine reason. ' 
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maintained a sort of lukewarm piety and `was wont to reconcile her own 
piety and his scepticism by holding that "`women ought to be religious, " 
while men had a right to read everything and think as they would, 
provided that they were upright and honourable in their lives' (AA 22- 
23). 
Mrs. Wood did foster some liberal viewpoints as a result of her rather 
superficial perspective, but this was never enough for Annie, who 
explains that `She was of the old regime; I of the stuff from which 
fanatics are made' and that her mother's dying words included the 
comments `you have never made me sad or sorry except for your own 
sake; you have always been too religious' (AA 24). Besant's later 
repudiation of Christianity would be made with religious intensity: `If 
"morality touched by emotion" be religion, then truly was I the most 
religious of Atheists, finding in this dwelling on and glorifying of the 
Ideal full satisfaction for the loftiest emotions' (AA 157). There is a 
note of apology in this emphasis on her religious (and emotional) nature, 
with the word `fanatics' and the slight pathos of 'morality touched by 
emotion, ' for Theosophy, much like Atheism, materialism, positivism, 
and secularism, primarily values the intellect and products of reason, 
and the terms `fanatic' much less `superstition, ' do not apply in what is 
intended as a rational and ecumenical faith; but Besant, beginning with 
her Atheist phase, is also redefining what it means to be religious. 
Being a fanatic in her mother's language is not quite the same as being a 
Theosophist in her own, though she seems to enjoy being an extremist. 
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Being truly religious means doing away with any pretences to 
orthodoxy, in spite of the cliches: `I went out into the darkness alone not 
because religion was too good for me, but because it was not good 
enough... ' (AA 13). That religion has not fulfilled its promise and 
served to its full capacity is an argument that will be used against 
Christianity even when Besant espouses Theosophy. 
Autobiographically, Besant treads a slippery slope between 
conveying the fragility and prophetic insight of a female Victorian 
martyr and the strength of the intellectually and spiritually secure 
Theosophical adept. The author had tried very hard to live up to her 
given role as a woman. She might have been a perfect wife, for 
example, had her chauvinistic husband been less dominating: 
`Harshness roused first incredulous wonder, then a storm of indignant 
tears ... I must have been a very unsatisfactory wife from the 
beginning, 
though I think other treatment might gradually have turned me into a fair 
imitation of the proper conventional article' (AA 81). But it is clear that 
Besant never wanted to be that article, and probably would have never 
written her autobiography `if' things had been different, if she had not 
realised that her socio-economic position was culturally and politically 
determined and if she had not been `too religious. ' She therefore 
attempts to obtain control of her body and her autobiography from the 
domination of her husband and his expectations with the tool of failed 
martyrdom. Placing her destiny beyond the control of others and into 
the `everywhere' (the first chapter is titled 'Out of the Everywhere into 
the Here'; Sketches had no chapter titles) Besant transcends the 
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limitations of earthly authority and is no longer responsible for being 
`the proper conventional article. ' 
Her child's memory, she believes, could supply many of the insights 
she has missed. Memory of a child's first impressions of form derived 
from chaos, the faces of father and mother in her case, would be 
invaluable. This paragraph is present in both later versions, and in these 
separate contexts both materialist and mystical readings are possible: 
If only we could remember how things looked 
when they were first imaged on the retinae; what 
we felt when we first became conscious of the 
outer world; what the feeling was as faces of 
father and mother grew out of the surrounding 
chaos and became familiar things.. . if only 
memory would not become a mist when in later 
years we strive to throw our glances backward 
into the darkness of our infancy, what lessons we 
might learn to help our stumbling psychology, 
how many questions might be solved whose 
answers we are groping for [in the West] in vain. 
(AA 19-20; AS 7) 
The only difference between the two versions is that `in the West' 
modifies the final sentence in the 1893 edition, stating that it is really 
the West which is blind and cannot perceive the answers to questions 
created by a lifetime which assumes that wisdom comes with age, but 
gets no wiser. Looking backward, it is suggested, we may find the 
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truths that elude us. The Theosophical interpretation suggests not only 
that the past contains the superior insight but that the child's vision is 
clearest because the newly born is closest to being familiar with the 
lessons learned in a previous life and has not yet been challenged and 
hindered by the demands and delusions of corporeal life. The ability to 
see and to feel so vividly is not entirely lost in Besant's lifetime, 
however. The event of her father's death also coincides with a 
demonstration of her mother's psychic or `extra-physical' ability. 
Not having attended her husband's funeral out of grief (and never 
having been to Kensal Green before), Mrs. Wood fainted when the 
funeral was over, but later knew exactly where the unmarked grave was, 
suggesting she had, in fact, been there before: 
How she found the grave remained a mystery in 
the family, as no one believed her 
straightforward story that she had been present at 
the funeral. With my present knowledge the 
matter is simple enough, for I now know that the 
consciousness can leave the body, take part in 
events going on at a distance, and, returning, 
impress on the physical brain what it has 
experienced. The very fact that she asked to be 
taken to the chapel is significant, showing that 
she was picking up a memory of a previous 
going from that spot to the grave; she could only 
find the grave if she started from the place from 
93 
which she had started before. (AA 26; Besant's 
italics) 
Autobiographical Sketches narrates this event quite differently in 1885, 
when Besant was still an Atheist and member of the National Secular 
Society: 
Her own explanation was that she had seen all 
the service; what is certain is, that she had never 
been to Kensal Green before, and that she 
walked steadily to the grave from the chapel. 
Whether the spot had been carefully described to 
her, whether she had heard others talking of its 
position or not, we could never ascertain; she 
had no remembrance of any such description and 
the matter always remained to us a problem. But 
after a lapse of years a hundred little things may 
have been forgotten which unconsciously served 
as guides at the time. She must have been, of 
course, at that time, in a state of abnormal 
nervous excitation, a state of which another 
proof was shortly afterwards given. (AS 10-11) 
In the later autobiography, `my present knowledge', knowledge 
possessed by Besant, replaces the `hundred little things' that Mrs. Wood 
might have known and forgotten as she found her way to her husband's 
grave from the chapel. The earlier quantifying of the material facts 
which would logically explain Mrs. Wood's behaviour is admittedly 
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vague, however, and immediately the catch-all feminine malady of 
hysteria is, perhaps not surprisingly, invoked to explain it. The chapel, 
the house of God, a guiding symbol, is singled out in the latter account 
as the point from which Mrs. Wood had started before, but is only a 
landmark in the earlier version. Moving toward her husband's buried 
body in the Theosophically-inspired 1893 narration, Mrs. Wood is no 
longer in a state of `abnormal nervous excitation, ' but rather logically 
proceeds to a place she had been before in a different conscious body, 
having taken the memory of the dress-rehearsal back to her physical 
body for the observed event. This movement between bodies, out of her 
physical body to the body of her husband and then physically from the 
chapel to the grave at once blurs the boundary between worlds and 
(creates) different forms of consciousness while imparting definite 
control over the entire relationship to Mrs. Wood. 
It is therefore significant that Mrs. Wood is no longer considered to 
be in an `abnormal' state. Besant discovers that she had been 
pathologizing a perfectly normal state of mind (or consciousness). She 
no longer has to attribute a moment of dementia or even dishonesty to 
her mother, though this is implied in the first account. Moreover, Mrs. 
Wood's total recall of her experience banishes the possible medical 
interpretation that she had simply been hallucinating, sleepwalking or in 
a state of `fugue' (a state of psychological amnesia during which the 
subject seems to behave in a conscious and rational way' but cannot 
remember the previous period of time when returned to normal 
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consciousness). 10 Rather, beyond the need of diagnosis and treatment, 
Mrs. Wood really needs absolution. Incidentally, Madame Blavatsky 
insisted that she was in complete control of her psychic powers and that 
any materializations or occurrences taking place under her aegis were 
the result of her own highly trained powers of perception and any 
material demonstration of contact with the immaterial world was in any 
case vulgar and discouraged; Besant confirms, regarding Blavatsky, that 
`all the phenomena she had produced were worked by virtue of a 
knowledge of nature deeper than that of average people, and by the force 
of a well-trained mind and will. "' ' Of course, Blavatsky's mediumship 
would become the focus of sustained investigation, and not to her 
benefit, which again begs the question of faith. 
The earlier account of Mrs. Wood's experience at the cemetery 
accentuates the subsequently narrated event as a further `proof of Mrs. 
Wood's nervous state and of the `strain of Celtic superstition' she had 
harboured. Mrs. Wood also prophesied the death of her infant son, a 
black bruise from a kiss to the dead child's forehead being the clearest 
memory for Besant. This description illustrates Besant's sensitivity in 
realising `that the mother's kiss of farewell should have been marked by 
the first sign of corruption on the child's face' and foreshadows the 
many dead babes she would see as a social activist, as well as those 
`dark spots' which would soil her belief in God. But Besant also very 
10 Mady Schutzman, The Real Thing: Performance, Hysteria, and Advertising (Hanover, London: 
Wesleyan University Press and University Press of New England, 1999) 116-117. 
"Washington 41-42 and Besant, An Autobiography, 354. 
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significantly ascribes what may now be considered her mother's psychic 
power (rather than her absent-minded nervousness) to her `Keltic' racial 
heritage in the 1893 account. Chalked up to a mere superstitious `strain' 
in the earlier narrative, there is only the initial reference at the beginning 
to Besant's `Irish' heritage within the context of an historico-political 
reference to the family's `quaint' legendary relationship to ancient 
`Milesian kings' of France. This story is maintained in the later version 
as well, in which an aunt is playfully described as having chastised the 
young Mrs. Wood for behaviour unfitting such a distinguished, if 
dubious, heritage. There is no mention, in the earlier version, of 
visionary abilities possessed by Besant in childhood. 
The element of the unseen is used, in effect, to suggest that there is a 
kind of fate operating in Besant's life and a racial and psychic 
inheritance that continues to provide insight, that the series of confusing 
events that would challenge her materialism to answer without nihilistic 
consequences could suddenly be attributed to some form of causality. It 
is perhaps this discovery which enables Besant to add chapter titles and 
create a more complex narrative in her second autobiography. 
Remembering these occurrences of her mother's foresight twice over the 
course of eight years, Besant sees an opportunity to clarify by 
reinterpreting them, but makes no reference to her previous narration. 
The problems posed by the first account are apparently resolved by the 
second. Readers of both can see that the second narrative creates 
ideological continuity and incorporates the story as an integral piece of 
evidence for Besant's own intellectual and spiritual development, rather 
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than a simple character analysis of Mrs. Wood and observations of past 
times in the family circle. The importance of character development is 
therefore stressed, allowing the autobiography to function in its 
traditional role as confessional vehicle and tool for sage-like 
pronouncement, creating a comfortable and already familiar narrative in 
which to submerge the new radical sub-text. 
Juvenile impressions of the importance of her mystical nature follow 
in discussion of her experience of Evangelicalism and Catholicism. 
After her widowed mother settled in to running a boarding house at 
Harrow, Annie was sent to live with Ellen Marryat, also a model of 
devout womanhood. But she found the Calvinism of Miss Marryat 
depressing, colourless, and not entirely sincere in its effects; she wished 
she had been able to experience a dramatic `conversion' like other 
sinners but instead continued her `dreamy longings', inspired by John 
Milton and her own imagination (unlike Gilman, Besant greatly enjoyed 
Milton and liked to `declaim' the speeches of Satan). This led to the 
dreaming and fairy-tale telling which she attributes to the budding of her 
own mystical sensibilities, an account not found in Autobiographical 
Sketches: 
The dreamy tendency in the child, that on its 
worldly side is fancy, imagination, on its 
religious side is the germ of mysticism... But the 
remorseless materialism of the day-not the 
philosophic materialism of the few, but the 
religious materialism of the many-crushes out 
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all the delicate buddings forth of the childish 
thought, and bandages the eyes that might 
otherwise see. (AA 40) 
Discontent with a literal interpretation of the Bible may be at issue here, 
as well as an unsatisfactory piety (she remembers she too often hoped 
that she had prayed nicely) rather than philosophic materialism, which 
was a different matter possessing merits Besant would later appreciate. 
Materialism, mistaken in not positing a soul or understanding that there 
are kinds of matter unobservable to humans who had not yet developed 
the faculty to see, would become a scourge in the end, in her view, but a 
necessary step towards truth. As a child, though, she would see life in 
everything about her, animate or otherwise, as well as ghosts and fairies: 
`But there was a more serious side to this dreamful fancy when it joined 
hands with religion' (AA 28). Endlessly desiring a grand martyrdom, 
partly because she was so very religious in the true sense - the radical 
Protestantism she found around her was, she explains with anaphoric 
emphasis, `too meagre, too commonplace, too little exacting, too bound 
up with earthly interests, too calculating in its accommodations to social 
conventionalities' (AA 24) - but also because of the intense feeling 
wrought in her by Marryat's Calvinism. The child regretted she was 
`born so late when no suffering for religion was practicable, ' when there 
were no shields to be worn and dragons to slay or lions to be faced. She 
is resentful of how her teaching had affected her, although she was 
permitted by her family to choose any religious denomination (assuming 
a choice of Christian denominations) and she describes her sense of 
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release during a confirmation held in Paris in the spring of 1862, when 
she was fifteen years old (Mrs. Wood attended): 
I could scarcely control myself as I knelt at the 
altar rails, and felt as though the gentle touch of 
the aged bishop, which fluttered for an instant on 
my bowed head, were the very touch of the wing 
of that `Holy Spirit, heavenly Dove, ' whose 
presence had been so earnestly invoked. Is there 
anything easier, I wonder, than to make a young 
and sensitive girl `intensely religious'? (AA 42- 
45) 
Is it paradoxical that the practice of Catholicism should so appeal to one 
who would champion what was then called Freethought? By now it 
should be clear that Besant's patent intention throughout her 
transformations, as she conveys it in her autobiographical writing, is to 
discover the highest truth and morality, ambitious but respectable goals. 
The narrative therefore aims to help us see that radical labels are no 
disguise for sincere intentions. It is much easier to digest emotional 
appeals to abstract ideas about truth and justice than to appreciate the 
intricacies of metaphysical philosophy and cosmologies which lend 
themselves to earthly political agendas. Pale and lacking in 
`cheerfulness, ' she had been told, like Gilman, to stop telling `naughty 
stories. ' But young Annie Wood was immediately `roused' by the 
sensuous ceremony of the Catholic Church in France and responded 
readily to the humanising force of its aesthetic qualities. The 
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metaphoric use of `heavenly Dove' in the touch of the bishop is 
punctuated by the ecstatic phrase `intensely religious'. Through such 
aesthetic means her `Divine Prince' would become transformed into the 
`suffering Saviour of Men', presaging her commitment to a Universal 
Brotherhood and religion of man; the experience of the ritual thrills her, 
the imagery is breathtakingly lustrous (AA 51-52). But the literal 
emphasis of Evangelism has left her cold, indeed, `morbid, ' though her 
mother's `healthier' attitude counteracts this to some degree. 
Autobiographical Sketches is more detailed in this matter of Besant's 
antipathy to Calvinism, and these paragraphs are significantly cut from 
the 1893 version of the autobiography; is this in the spirit of ecumenism 
or would she like to downplay the possibly naive image created by her 
various conversions? Or is she is no longer so convinced that she is not 
a sinner? What is most prominent is Besant's awareness of her own 
impressionability: `I was naturally enthusiastic and fanciful, and was 
apt to throw myself strongly into the current of the emotional life around 
me, and hence I easily reflected the stern and narrow creed which ruled 
over my daily life' (AS 19). The emotional element of religion is held 
above the doctrine itself: `The sense of sin, the contrition for man's 
fallen state, which are required by Evangelism, can never be truly felt by 
any child; but whenever a sensitive, dreamy, and enthusiastic child 
comes under strong Evangelistic influence, it is sure to manifest "signs 
of saving grace"' (AS 20). Ultimately, she cannot bring herself to 
believe that she was a child of sin, and allows her mother's less 
prescriptive beliefs to mediate. But the emotional experiences of both 
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kinds of Christian practice affect her, the incarnation itself being the 
most compelling element. Her mother appears to be the fulcrum upon 
which her experiences turn. In France, it is not the Virgin Besant turns 
to as a symbol of female power, for she already idolises her own mother, 
but to Jesus, the `Ideal Man'. 
Besant wavered over becoming Roman Catholic until she was 
satisfied, having examined the efforts of the Oxford Movement, that 
Anglicanism was truly Catholic enough. She had apparently gone too 
far, in her mother's liberal opinion, by fasting, using the sign of the 
cross, going to weekly communion, and even experimenting with self- 
flagellation. '2 But she finally married a very dull minister with a strict 
Evangelical background, Frank Besant, who would become the Vicar of 
Sibsey, a village south of London. In what she describes as the 
inevitable outcome of the sublimated longings of a young girl ('All girls 
have in them the germ of passion') for union with Jesus 'the one Ideal 
Man' (and she details at length the most explicitly sexualised prayers 
which influenced her sublimation; not, one feels, a particularly unusual 
circumstance for the mystical imagination), she is confronted, in her 
married life with Frank Besant, with the `evil' of conjugal sex and the 
double evil of her own ignorance of such matters (AA 66-72). This 
horror would encourage her future efforts on behalf of women while 
verifying that no human man could compete with her ideals of mother 
and Christ round which `these budding tendrils of passion' were 
12 Taylor 15. 
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entwined (AA 67) and which would resurface much later in her 
Theosophical pairing of World Mother and World Teacher. 
Moreover, doubts arise as to the truth of the Gospels. These are 
quashed by self-condemnation for heresy, inspired by a visit to the 
revered, severe Dr. E. B. Pusey (1800-1882). This realisation of sin 
would also give her a reason to escape her marriage. She would become 
a Theist, an Atheist, break with her marriage as a result of her doubt, 
lose her children as a result of her scandalous beliefs, write and lecture 
prodigiously for the National Secular Society and Socialism, champion 
the causes of free speech, birth control, education and school meals (as 
long-standing member of the London School Board), and against the 
beliefs of her most respected colleague, Charles Bradlaugh, become a 
Theosophist in 1889. None of these conversions are ever considered 
mistakes, but part of a natural development. Butting against her 
mother's edicts, Besant emphasises the dreaminess and emotion of her 
religious temperament while condemning the dogma and orthodoxy of 
her mother and Miss Marryat for their `materialism', oppression, and 
lack of intellectual rigor. The question of Besant's own intellectual 
rigor aside, allusions to hereditary psychic powers and a treasured 
fantasy world rescued by Theosophy signal her conversion to a new 
faith, which `realised the dreams of childhood on the higher plane of 
intellectual womanhood' (AA 345). 
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ED `Saint Athanasius in petticoats' 
Throughout her autobiography, Besant confronts the ideological 
structure which would keep her a pious and pure bourgeois Christian 
wife and mother and a writer of novels, perhaps, of `purely domestic 
interest, ' describing her harrowing struggle through darkness to the light 
of Theosophy (AA 85-86). In the end, as T. L. Broughton has argued, it 
is the description of a failed martyrdom which enables Besant to write 
her autobiography, while both fulfilling expectations of the Victorian 
cult of womanhood and simultaneously subverting those expectations in 
`a series of classically structured (de)conversions. ' 13 As a female 
`convert' to Catholicism, Theism, Atheism, Socialism, or Theosophy, 
Besant's credibility should be steadily eroded by the fact of her writing, 
for as Broughton explains, conversion in the context of Victorian 
autobiographical writing is concomitant with experience, maturity, 
knowledge, hence authority. These qualities are not compatible with a 
construction of the feminine which is against the historical framework 
of the Victorian concept of ideal femininity, which emphasises qualities 
similar to that of martyrdom, such as chastity, youth, and innocence, 
even masochism, as well as moral and physical beauty, silence, and 
restraint. Citing Marina Warner on Joan of Arc, Broughton argues that 
for a woman of Besant's period, change means deterioration. Hence 
13 T. L. Broughton, `Women's Autobiography: The Self at Stake? ' Prose Studies Vol. 14,1 (May 
1991): 79. 
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`Ideal femininity and change are incompatible, ' for if a woman is to 
purchase her identity as an autobiographer at the price of conversion, 
she must martyr herself (which is impossible, if she is to write) in order 
to maintain her credibility. A failed martyrdom enables her to conform 
to historical expectations of her role as female and to perform as 
autobiographer. 
On these grounds, Autobiographical Sketches is much less 
successful, for it will end with the author in the midst of her failing 
custody battle for her daughter, locked in combat against the system 
which defines her and renders her powerless. If we accept the 
assumption that conversion leads to authority and autobiography in a 
traditional male-dominated Victorian formula, then Besant's 
representation of herself in An Autobiography is also inevitably 
compromised unless we refer to the fact that it is as a Theosophist that 
she writes. Theosophy, in theory, accepts members of all religious 
persuasions as long as all submit to continued search and study. 
Besant's many changes may be considered experiences which grant her 
the authority she seeks, following the traditionally male model of 
convert. But Besant's physical, intellectual and rhetorical position 
outside the tradition in which she writes, and partly outside the society 
she addresses, enables her to manipulate convention to her own device, 
using it in the service of protest and reform. Besant thus rescues herself 
from the formula that change equals deterioration by arguing that 
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change is the new ideal and that the evolution of consciousness and 
character are controllable. 
Nevertheless, the earlier Besant is aware of the potential 
consequences of calling herself a Freethinker and Social Reformer. 
especially the possibility of endangering her custody of Mabel, her 
daughter. But she nevertheless continues her activities as a Socialist 
while writing often torrid prose, which in this case would prompt the 
response `St. Athanasius in petticoats': `The Zeitgeist has its mouth in 
those of its children who have brain to understand, voice to proclaim, 
courage to stand alone... Some new truth then peals out.. . Truth 
condemns some hoary Lie... and thus the race makes progress and 
humanity climbs ever upwards towards the perfect life. ' 14 Indulging in 
the language of martyrdom (in An Autobiography), the author engages 
the reader's sympathies and promotes her credibility as a woman, a 
woman who might have been perfect but ends up a sage: 
I counted the cost ere I determined this step ... I 
knew that an Atheist was outside the law, 
obnoxious to its penalties, but deprived of its 
protection... But the desire to spread liberty and 
truer thought among men, to war against bigotry 
and superstition, to make the world freer and 
better than I found it-all this impelled me with 
a force that would not be denied.... Very solemn 
14 Taylor quotes from an essay in Our Corner entitled 'Modern Socialism, ' 178-179. 
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to me is the responsibility of the public teacher, 
standing forth... to partly mould the thought of 
his time, swaying thousands of readers and 
hearers year after year. No weighter [sic] 
responsibility can any take, no more sacred 
charge. The written and the spoken word start 
forces none may measure, set working brain after 
brain, influence numbers unknown.. . work for 
good or evil all down the stream of time. (AA 
188-189) 
Sage writing, described by John Holloway, George P. Landow, Linda 
H. Peterson, and others, includes techniques such as: the use of self- 
deprecating language (the martyr complex) to obtain credibility, attacks 
on the audience which chastise them for neglecting their faith, the use of 
grotesque set-pieces which disturb the reader and provide a point of 
reference for the sage's vast argument, and the satiric and idiosyncratic 
redefinition of terms which make them conform to the sage's particular 
argument. Also significant is the sage's identification of a 'sign of the 
times' as a point of departure, the call to attention of the audience's 
terrible present condition, the promise of further misery should the 
audience fail to return to the ways of God, and the offering of a vision of 
bliss listeners might realise if they do return to the fold. 15 The 
combination of seeking credibility through self-deprecation, the use of 
15 George P. Landow, Elegant Jeremiahs: The Sage from Carlyle to Mailer (Ithaca, London: 
Cornell University Press, 1986) 23-26. 
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the grotesque (the dark spot on the baby's forehead or Besant's father's 
death, brought about because of an infected cut from the breastbone of a 
cadaver who had died from consumption), her redefinition of terms such 
as `religious' and `superstitious' and the emphasis on her hidden life of 
fantasy and dreams which ultimately validate Besant's authority 
characterise her own adaptation of this method. 
Landow's discussion of sage writing, however, with the exception of 
Florence Nightingale, illustrates it primarily through the work of the 
most significant (and male) sages (i. e. Carlyle, Ruskin, Arnold) and it is 
the Victorian sage to which Landow refers as the inventor of the genre, 
though these techniques are also found in the novel and in 
autobiography. Perhaps unconsciously drawn from the tradition of the 
Old Testament prophet, the genre of sage writing is similar to but differs 
from wisdom writing (such as the Book of Proverbs or Book of 
Jeremiah) in the sense that the wisdom writer confidently writes with 
the understanding that the words embody the accepted wisdom of a 
whole society, while `the biblical prophet and Victorian sage begin with 
the assumption that, however traditional their messages may once have 
been, they are now forgotten or actively opposed by society'. 16 The 
perception of the position of wisdom speaker at the social and cultural 
centre is essential to his style, tone and presentation, but the sage is 
outside this centre: 'it is, to use a Ruskinian etymological reminder, an 
eccentric voice, one off center... . When a people can no 
longer follow its 
16 Landow 23 
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own wisdom literature, then it needs the writings of the sage. When a 
people ignores the wisdom that lies at the heart of its society and 
institutions, then the sage recalls that people to it. ' 17 
While discussing the female sage, Florence Nightingale, in her 
Cassandra (1852), Landow further explains that it is important to realise 
that without the intimate understanding of the Bible the Victorians 
possessed, `we miss many allusive gestures toward scripture that not 
only provide so much of Victorian imagery ... but also serve as genre 
signals that tell us how to read. ' 18 This unfortunate circumstance is not 
easily remedied, but our familiarity with biblical and prophetic language 
and rhetorical emphasis can certainly provide those of us who do not 
know our Bible so well with clues for interpretation. Besant's use of 
these signals becomes more obvious in her theosophical writings. 
Besant obviously knew her Bible (and her Milton) well, but found 
herself at tremendous odds with Christianity for many of the same 
reasons as Gilman. The broken promises, the obsession with heaven 
and hell, and the general neglect of this world were all sources of 
injustice, in her view. Indeed, McLeod urges that the concept of hell 
was one of the most important factors in all incidences of attrition from 
the Christian fold during the nineteenth century and which ultimately led 
to a more optimistic view and direct criticism of Christianity: 'In the late 
'7 Landow 23 
1$ George P. Landow, 'Aggressive (Re) interpretations of the Female Sage: Florence Nightingale's 
Cassandra' in ed. Thais E. Morgan, Victorian Sages and Cultural Discourse: Renegotiating 
Gender and Power in the Nineteenth Century (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, 1990) 32-45. 
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nineteenth century both human and natural sciences were, indeed, 
making spectacular progress. But the criticism of Christianity depended 
less on new discoveries than on arguments of an a priori nature, often 
current for a century or more. ' 19 Besant's natural idealism would be 
disappointed in a creed which never delivered its messiah and justified 
as predetermined the most horrible evils in death and destruction; and 
Christian faith also brought her into a miserable marriage. The injustice 
of it all, particularly after the near death of her child Mabel from 
whooping cough, from which Besant rescued her, prompted the 
conversion to Atheism: `It was not a desire for moral licence which gave 
me the impulse that finally landed me in Atheism, ' she explains, `it was 
the sense of outraged justice and insulted right. I was a wife and 
mother, blameless in moral life, with a deep sense of duty and a proud 
self-respect; it was while I was this that doubt struck me... ' (AA 100). 
Rising from the stain of her doubt, Besant assumes a new authority. 
Besant would also question the deity of Christ, the existence of God, 
and the immortality of the soul (AA 99). These were inevitable 
outcomes, but she wants her readers to see that she is blameless. She 
was not the only person asking theological questions, but she also 
clearly sees the challenge this presents to public perception of her 
19 McLeod 228: 'The foundations of this humanitarian optimism lay more in new unargucd 
assumptions than in new knowledge. H. R. Murphy and Susan Budd have shown relatively 
isolated individuals questioning 'orthodox' tenets that conflicted with their ethical assumptions, 
and only subsequently discovering the scientific basis for an alternative system. ' No reference for 
H. R. Murphy is to be found in the bibliography or notes, however Susan Budd is referenced: 
'The British Humanist Movement, c. 1860-1966, ' diss., University of Oxford, 1969. Also Susan 
Budd, 'The Loss of Faith, ' Past and Present 36 (April 1967). See also Max Weber's discussion 
of German workers who lost faith not as a result of scientific arguments against the idea of God, 
but through an inability to reconcile immediate suffering with the power of God. 
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womanhood. Her references and biblical allusions to the images of 
martyrs, of herself as a beleaguered Jonah, serve to bolster her image as 
a pious Anglican in her youth. But her prose is equally zealous 
throughout her period as Atheist, in which fold she believed she had 
found a higher morality. Later she would recant her diatribes against 
Christianity. In Esoteric Christianity or The Lesser Mysteries (1901) 
she recovers and reasserts a mystical interpretation of Christian doctrine 
to substantiate the essential truths of Christianity and the way they relate 
to Theosophy, at once an eccentric and traditional allegorical reading of 
the Bible and the doctrines of Christianity, but one which will hopefully 
help her readers recognise lost but universal truths. Looking back to the 
moral high ground of Gnosticism would remind believers of the truths 
of Christianity (never mind that gnosticism was considered a heresy, 
adherents were privy to more universal truths). Likewise, looking 
forward would be easier and pain in this world could be shunted off as a 
necessary portion of evolutionary growing pain. Theosophy will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
Another obvious feature of sage writing, very much like the Victorian 
novel, is that it concerns public matters. With regard to Victorian 
women, who were not supposed to have voices (the entrance of a 
woman into the public forum indicated that she had abandoned domestic 
responsibilities, amongst other proprieties), Landow cites the vast 
amount of publishing and speaking out that was done by women in 
various forms such as poetry, devotional works, children's literature, 
and even intellectual periodicals and at what great cost in anonymity. 
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Surely the breakthrough of women Evangelist preachers during the 
earlier part of the century had something to do with promoting this 
enterprise, but it was still unorthodox behaviour, and those writers who 
appropriated this tradition, like Elizabeth Gaskell or George Eliot, have 
also been found at fault for their own reactionary tendencies. 20 As 
Christine L. Krueger explains, the ethos of prophecy and the ethos of 
simplicity were the two main strategies employed by women preachers 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, two extremes difficult to 
modulate: `She had to sound sincere, but not enthusiastic; simple, but 
not inspired.... Prophecy generally implies an authoritarian, exclusionary 
discourse, the prophet's unequivocal condemnation of the sins of the 
age and demand for reform. Paradoxically, women assumed prophetic 
authority to call for the liberation of silenced voices. '21 Annie Besant's 
first Freethought and Atheist publications were signed by the 'wife of a 
beneficed clergyman', and her first contributions to the National 
Reformer were made under the pseudonym 'Ajax'. After Besant found 
her voice and her mission, a distressed Beatrice Webb (1858-1943), in 
fact, commented on one of Besant's that 'It is only on great occasions 
when religious feeling or morality demand it that a woman has a right to 
lift up her voice and call aloud to her fellow mortals. '22 Indeed, great 
20 Christine L. Krueger, The Reader's Repentance: Women Preachers, Women Writers, and 
Nineteenth-Century Social Discourse (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1992) 
passim., 16-19. 
21 Krueger 61. 
22 Taylor 223; Beatrice Webb, Diary (N. and J. Mackenzie, ed., London: Virago/LSE, 1980-85) i. 
223: 'I heard her speak, the only woman I have ever known who is a real orator, who has the gift 
of public persuasion. But to see her speak made me shudder. It is not womanly to thrust yourself 
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occasions were Besant's life, and her sense of morality made 
extraordinary demands on her. But for a woman, actually speaking out 
was subversive, and perhaps most extremely so from a pulpit, in spite of 
the partial freedoms won by Evangelical women preachers. 
Nevertheless, with her determination Besant became perhaps the 
most famous female voice of her age in Britain and other parts of the 
world. Gilman would record in her diary, in characteristic hopping 
phrases, her attendance at one of Besant's lectures in Oakland, 
California in 1893 as a positive and inspiring experience, probably the 
only moment they were ever nearly face to face: `very interesting... Joy 
in life-Get up! It is time to begin! Plenty of time ahead-glorious 
world-let's start. '23 The subject of Besant's lecture that day is 
unknown, but very likely something Theosophical, for this was the year 
she would go to India. 24 
Aside from her comparison chart of the Gospels, which demonstrate 
their inconsistencies and caused grave doubt (doubt which incidentally 
coincided with the meeting of her future husband during Easter 1866), 
Besant's first 'serious' attempts at writing, take place in 1868 during her 
marriage, when doubt weighs more heavily upon her. First she tried 
before the world. A woman in all relations of life should be sought. ' It was also said that Besant 
seemed to `unsex herself when she spoke in this way. 
23 Mary Hill, Charlotte Perkins Gilman: The Making of a Radical Feminist 1860-1896 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980) 199-200. Gilman's diaries have now been 
published under editorship of Denise Knight, The Diaries of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 2 Vols. 
(Charlottesville, London: University Press of Virginia, 1994). 
24 It appears that not much was published that year, aside from Besant's final autobiography and a 
third and revised edition of Blavatsky's The Secret Doctrine (1888), the bible of Theosophy. 
Besant was still editing the Theosophical monthly Lucifer (1887-1909) at the time, but neither 
Besterman nor her other biographers offer information. 
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some short stories, then a catalogue of the unheralded 'Black Letter' 
saints, saints for whom no special services were provided by the church 
and whose days were printed in black as opposed to red on the Calendar 
of the Church of England. She had the most luck with the short stories, 
earning her first check, but a novel was unsuccessful for being `too 
political. '25 Instead, she turned her attention (with both angst and 
mocking amusement? ) to theology: `I contributed further to the 
literature of my country a theological pamphlet, of which I forget the 
exact title, but it dealt with the duty of fasting incumbent on all faithful 
Christians, and was very patristic in its tone. '26 While it is often 
difficult to engage with the high-strung grandiosity of Besant's prose, 
her occasional sarcasm can be entertaining, and she here suggests a keen 
awareness of what she is doing. 
Her more resistant voice would be challenged by Pusey, who advised 
a form of `rest cure, ' telling her to stop reading, to pray only. and 
ordering never to speak of her doubt. Yet she had already met the 
soothing Theism of well-known Arian heretic Rev. Charles Voysey 
(1857-1941). While exploring other possibilities, she discovered the 
Eastern idea of the avatar, which challenged the uniqueness of the 
incarnate Christ, the business of comparative mythology adding fuel to 
her fire. Writing an essay, `On the Deity of Jesus of Nazareth' (1873) 
u The short stories submitted to the Family Herald and this novel are not mentioned whatsoever 
in Besterman's bibliography, though they are probably to be found, if the periodical can be found, 
in the Family Herald for 1868-1869, located at Colindale. 
26 Besant, An Autobiography, 86. Besterman acknowledges that he has not seen this item and has 
no reference for it. 
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for new publisher friend, Thomas Scott, Besant again played the 
motherly saint while trying to save children from typhoid fever in 
Sibsey. During a quiet moment alone in the Sibsey Church (she had 
pretended she was going to practice on the organ) she would begin to 
speak with confidence on the `Inspiration of the Bible': 'I shall never 
forget the feeling of power and delight-but especially of power-that 
came upon me as I sent my voice ringing down the aisles... as the 
sentences flowed unbidden from my lips and my own tones echoed back 
to me from the pillars of the ancient church, I knew of a verity that the 
gift of speech was mine... ' (AA 116). 
Though Besant was lucky enough to have a chance to preach, even 
without an audience, in the realm of actual sage writing, according to 
Landow, the task was even more difficult. For the sage traditionally 
presents himself as an authority on biblical interpretation and uses the 
techniques of typology, allegory, and apocalyptics, to which women 
were not supposed to have access. Moreover, autobiography is a 
particularly difficult form because it often borrows its structuring 
patterns from scripture, the models are derived from men's writing, with 
the lives of Jesus and Paul being obvious templates, and `the application 
of these biblical figures to one's own life required interpretation of the 
Bible. ' Of course preaching itself would be another hurdle not to be 
crossed by women. 27 Thus sage writing possesses overlapping qualities, 
which may be found in the novel and autobiography, and is associated 
27 Landow, `Nightingale, ' 40. 
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with a religion historically oppressive of women. Original sources of 
the genre are found in the `patristic' tradition of the prophet, and it 
emphasises the speaker's original acts of interpretation as well as 
eccentricity and the irrational. 
Besant and Gilman, however, were particularly keen to appear 
rational and objective throughout their respective pilgrimages and 
Gilman certainly makes short shrift of many potentially emotional or 
ambiguous moments in her own often unhelpful autobiography (what 
may be regarded as the antidote to Besant's). The ideologies of 
millenarianism and utopia, which both writers would ascribe to and 
practice in one degree or another generally have similar problems, 
though, which will be addressed more specifically during discussion of 
Gilman's utopias. Theosophy is Besant's way to utopia. But what of 
Theosophy? And what kind of sage is Besant if she is an eccentric, ex- 
Christian woman? 
Until her near attempt at suicide, during her marriage and period of 
religious doubt, she portrays herself as a pure specimen of girlhood and 
womanhood. The first third of her account deals with her innocent and 
dreamy childhood and education, as well as some of her frustrations 
with the effects of that education. Painting herself as a `darling' and a 
`dot, ' devoted to her mother, but intensely religious and mystical in 
nature, with some extra-physical ability, Besant alludes to finding her 
future `Home' as a Theosophist in 1889 (AA 40-41,338). She was 
always able to read, it seems. And she became a gifted young woman 
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who was always studying and prided herself on being a member of the 
Church, the Church Fathers being constant study companions. Her 
adorable-ness seems to deter any thought that this child was in any way 
odd. Her one hope is that she may be of service, like Joan of Arc: 
Looking back to-day over my life, I see that its 
keynote-through all the blunders, and the blind 
mistakes, and clumsy follies-has been this 
longing for sacrifice to something felt as greater 
than the self. It has been so strong and so 
persistent that I recognise it now as a tendency 
brought over from a previous life and 
dominating the present one; and this is shown by 
the fact that to follow it is not the act of a 
deliberate and conscious will, forcing self into 
submission and giving up with pain something 
the heart desires, but the following it is a joyous 
springing forward along the easiest path, the 
`sacrifice' being the supremely attractive thing, 
not to make which would be to deny the deepest 
longings of the soul, and to feel oneself polluted 
and dishonoured. (AA 57-58) 
She now tells that she is obeying voices heard from the `everywhere', 
that influences from `a previous life' render her will incontestable, yet 
she maintains her connection to the cult of Victorian womanhood and 
the ideal of sacrifice. She is unable to achieve such sacrifice, however, 
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if she ever does, until the right conditions arise. During mental anguish 
on the road to Atheism, she considers taking chloroform: 
I heard: `O coward, coward, who used to dream 
of martyrdom, and cannot bear a few short years 
of pain! ' A rush of shame swept over me, and I 
flung the bottle far away among the shrubs in the 
garden at my feet, and for a moment I felt strong 
as for a struggle, and then fell fainting on the 
floor. Only once again [we are not told when] in 
all the strifes of my career did the thought of 
suicide recur, and then it was but for a moment, 
to be put aside as unworthy a strong soul. (AA 
94) 
The strain of all her deliberating finally produces physical illness, but 
her doctor saves the `helpless, bewildered child-woman, beaten down by 
the cyclone of doubt and misery' by bringing her back to reasonable life 
with books on science and anatomy (AA 97). Patient appeals only to 
Besant's emotion on the part of a kindly clergyman were not able to 
convince the mind of the impending Atheist of the possibility of God's 
justice amidst the human suffering she observed, first in her child's 
illness and then around her, breaking `her heart over misery here and 
hell hereafter' (AA 98). Catering to her intellect (and in effect 
distracting her attention from her emotional confusion) in order to cure 
her body, this doctor corrects a situation which Gilman, Edith Wharton, 
and Virginia Woolf also suffered. 
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Besant's account of this particular illness (there would be others) 
both confirms the purity and passivity of the 'child-woman' and 
acknowledges her weakness and suffering as punishment for doubt 
while supporting her dire intellectual needs. This personal crisis also 
illustrates the essential conflict between the domesticated sphere of 
woman and the world beyond. In an age when illness was not yet 
commodified and hospitalisation far less common, particularly for the 
kind of unobservable pain Besant experienced in her head, which caused 
her to lie prostrate (apparently a migraine-like condition lasting many 
weeks), confinement to bed at home was the only answer. This 
intensified the claustrophobia and grief created by questionings which 
threatened the already precarious marriage bed. That formal medicine 
and the elements of `reasonable life' (the doctor took time to explain 
`knotty points on physiology', a Besant-like version of the talking cure, 
it seems) should be welcomed into this environment (the opium 
administered on one attempt to heal drove her mad, she says) is 
therefore not surprising, while it also validates her perception of her 
material impermanence and the application of scientific principles to the 
management of human life. The opium and other administrations, 
indeed the chloroform Besant might have used to commit suicide, are 
only effective on the body, however, for her soul was too strong for 
suicide and her intellect too strong for illness. In a similar fashion, 
Theosophy rationalises the sacrifice Besant's temperament and initial 
commitment to Christianity demands by incorporating science in a 
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redefined union of opposites which makes that sacrifice the means to 
moral and intellectual as well as physical evolution and improvement. 
Autobiographical Sketches carries a very different, more brief 
account of this illness, which suggests that the retreat of her condition 
was the direct result of the doctor's 'mental diversion'. In the midst of 
several pages of correspondence with the kindly clergyman noted above, 
she exclaims here more specifically that: 'The thought of Hell was 
torturing me... my whole brain and heart revolted from the unutterable 
cruelty of a creating and destroying God' (AA 52). The unidentified 
clergyman (probably Edward Walker, rector of Sibsey parish church, 
according to Taylor)28 recommends reading Rev. F. D. Maurice (founder 
of Christian Socialism with Charles Kingsley) and encourages a 
willingness not to judge Christ by religions but to judge religions by 
Christ. Besant's subsequent illness assumes a far more mundane 
dimension in Autobiographical Sketches: `On these lines weary strife 
went on for months, until at last brain and health gave way completely, 
and for weeks I lay prostrate and helpless, in terrible ceaseless head- 
pain, unable to find relief in sleep' (AS 52). But An Autobiography 
elaborates: 'at last I broke down completely, and lay for weeks helpless 
and prostrate, in raging and unceasing head-pain, unable to sleep, unable 
to bear the light, lying like a log on the bed, not unconscious, but 
indifferent to everything, consciousness centred, as it were, in the 
ceaseless pain' (AA 97). In Autobiographical Sketches, it is the doctor's 
28 Taylor 37-38. 
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giving up every other method and trying to divert her that actually 
works: `At last he gave up the attempt to cure physically, and tried 
mental diversion' (AS 53). In An Autobiography, the implication is 
quite different: `Finally the pain wore itself out, and the moment he 
dared to do so, he tried mental diversion' (AA 97). The pain is 
remembered in the former account to have subsided as a result of the 
doctor's admittedly unorthodox approach, the more recent memory is 
coloured more intensely by the pain itself and her experience of its 
effects on her consciousness, a pain which leaves of its own will, and is 
then merely prevented from returning by the doctor's interventions. 
Metaphorically, science literally answers to religious doubt in the first 
instance, ministering to the intellect and saving the subject. In the 
second, science aids the treatment of a pain that `wore itself out, ' a pain 
that is both psychological and physical. Traditional medicine does not 
work in either recollection, though there is the assumption in the first 
that `mental diversion' was an effective cure. As with her diagnosis of 
her mother's mental condition at the death of her father, Besant re- 
assesses her own need for medical analysis. 
She then decides (in both versions) on a lengthy reading list and a 
systematic examination of Christian dogma: the eternity of punishment 
after death, the problem of evil, the nature of the atonement, the 
meaning of `inspiration'. But in the latter account, her memory of the 
illness is understood as part of an intellectual and spiritual progression, 
an inevitable experience for one unenlightened by any sort of valid 
theodicy, including that provided by the clergyman: 
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It will be seen that the deeper problems of 
religion-the deity of Christ, the existence of 
God, the immortality of the soul-were not yet 
brought into question, and, looking back, I 
cannot but see how orderly was the progression 
of thought, how steady the growth, after that first 
terrible earthquake, and the first wild swirl of 
agony. The points that I set myself to study were 
those which would naturally be first faced by any 
one whose first rebellion against the dogmas of 
the Churches was a rebellion of the moral nature 
rather than of the intellectual. (AA 99-100) 
That such a crisis should converge on physical territory is not unique in 
the history of women's autobiography (Harriet Martineau (1802-1876) 
provides one famous example). Besant associates such physical 
deterioration with enlightenment, such as the `feeling of deadly 
sickness' which nearly overcomes her as she leaves the Sibsey church 
for the first time before communion. Confronting the fact of her 
physical weakness with her intellectual strength metaphorically 
illustrates the problem of writing her autobiography, but in this way she 
also sacrifices the self which could not speak in order to enable her 
voice as a convert both to Atheism and to Theosophy (for better or 
worse) and to rescue her destiny from the proscriptions of material life: 
What Religion has to face in the controversies of 
to-day is not the unbelief of the sty, but the 
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unbelief of the educated conscience and of the 
soaring intellect; and unless it can arm itself with 
a loftier ethic and a grander philosophy than its 
opponent, it will lose its hold over the purest and 
the strongest of the younger generation. (AA 
100) 
In other words, the system of morality which religious authority 
attempts to impose cannot stand if it merely punishes those who 
question it for desiring to commit vice and evil, just as Besant had been 
punished during the Knowlton Trial (over publication of The Fruits of 
Philosophy (1832), a birth control pamphlet by the American doctor 
Charles Knowlton) and during her custody battle for her daughter, 
Mabel. Of course, this also implies that unbelievers of the 'sty' will 
have little effect one way or the other on religious institutions in favour 
of those educated upper class unbeliever who are necessarily more 
powerful. Religious authority must answer to questions of justice or 
'Materialism' will succeed it (AA 100). 29 
Nevertheless, passage through Materialism was necessary for Besant. 
The principles of Atheism Besant understood are critical, as the 
29 See also Taylor, 130-132: Besant had been accused of denying Mabel access to the Bible and 
intending to pollute the minds of children through sex education (the publication of Fruits of 
Philosophy), and the Custody of Infants Act of 1873 put Frank Besant in sole custody of the 
children and their education, whether or not the Deed of Separation between the Besants were 
enforced, which it was not (they could not prove that Annie was in fear of her husband, in spite of 
evidence to the contrary). The Master of the Rolls, George Jessel (Besant would later attack his 
Jewish heritage), explained Besant's publication of her lack of belief in religion and an obscene 
book made her morally repugnant, cutting her off from the rest of her sex such that modest women 
could not be expected to associate with her. Edward Royle's account of the trial is the standard 
version: Radicals, Secularists and Republicans. Popular Freethought in Britain 1866-1915 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980). 
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comments above suggest, if one is to understand her move toward 
Theosophy or her need to reunite doctrine and ethics. The first of these 
principles is monism (later augmented by certain dualisms of Theosophy 
and then the trinity of neo-Theosophy), which here asserts, in a 
framework of scientific materialism, that all things are made of matter, 
including thoughts. Therefore, those thoughts we may have of God are 
simply the effect of arrangements of matter; as they cannot be 
differentiated from anything else there can be no belief in the God others 
describe, for God cannot be verified (AA 141-142). Other precepts 
include the refusal to believe without evidence and that anything behind 
phenomena is simply unknowable (AA 143-144). Additionally, the 
Atheist ascribes to the belief that life is a property and not an entity, 
therefore there is no soul, 'a matter of cold, calm reasoning' Besant 
admits, though she now has proof for the existence of the soul (AA 147- 
150). This is pure positivism, but it is important to observe that a value 
system does inhere. Besant did not approve of the hierarchical system 
of stringent controls Comte delineated for the Positivist ideal state; it 
would be, she felt, the death of individualism and therefore of liberty 
and life. 30 The main motivation for Besant's move toward Atheism is 
the need to fill the space left by uncertainty about God and religion with 
a moral imperative. Besant does not distinguish between morals and 
ethics the way Gilman does but she does struggle with the issue of 
separating doctrine from ethics. As an Atheist and `woman of my 
30 Taylor 91. 
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temperament', she explains, `a lofty system of ethics was of even more 
importance than a logical, intellectual conception of the universe' (AA 
153). Besant dutifully attempted to remove morality from a religious 
basis, determining that `the true basis of morality' was utility: `the 
adaptation of our actions to the promotion of the general welfare and 
happiness; the endeavour so to rule our lives that we may serve and 
bless mankind. 01 Utility is equated with happiness and with virtue: 
`Virtue is an indispensable part of all true and solid happiness. 32 The 
cause of evil is simply ignorance. But this separation would not hold for 
long. 
ED Muscular Atheism and Socialist propaganda 
Besant does not alter her faith in Atheism. But the utility of `virtue 
as its own reward' was not quite adequate for the task of real reform. 
Besant needed a motivating concept, an ideal. This ideal, in addition to 
that of the pursuit of Truth through material evidence, is the 
perfectibility of man, and here Besant, as Atheist, touts the Greek ideal 
of Hercules as the example to emulate, to `stir the emotions and impel to 
action, and a clear understanding of the sources of evil and of the 
methods by which they might be drained' (AA 156-157). For the 
Atheist, the contemplation of the Ideal is prayer, she decided. Several 
31 Besant, The True Basis of Morality (London: Freethought, 1874) 9. 
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times, Besant refers to the great Orphan Humanity, which she turns into 
a collective Christ-figure and over which she frets. But Christ's 
humanity is no longer adequate: `Beautiful with a certain pathetic 
beauty, telling of the long travail of earth, eloquent of the sufferings of 
humanity, but not the model type to which men should conform their 
lives, if they would make humanity glorious' (AA 157). Christ's 
horoscope has not yet been consulted. 
The sources of evil to be exposed and `drained' convey tension 
between external and internal causes of evil, however, but for which 
religion is blamed: 
It may be frankly acknowledged that man 
inherits from his brute progenitors various 
bestial tendencies which are in the course of 
elimination. The wild beast desire to fight is one 
of these, and this has been encouraged, not 
checked, by religion... Another bestial tendency 
is the lust of the male for the female apart from 
love, duty, and loyalty; this again has been 
encouraged by religion, as witness the polygamy 
and concubinage [sic] of the Hebrews... not to 
mention the precepts of the Mosaic laws-the 
bands of male and female prostitutes in 
connection with Pagan temples, and the curious 
32 Besant, The True Basis of Morality, 11. 
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outbursts of sexual passion in connection with 
religious revivals and missions. Another bestial 
tendency is greed .... All these bestial tendencies 
will be eradicated only by the recognition of 
human duty, of the social bond. (AA 164-165) 
This sounds like a page out of Gilman. Moreover: 'Evil comes from 
ignorance, we say; ignorance of physical and of moral facts. Primarily 
from ignorance of physical order' (AA 166-167). Vanquishing the beast 
within through simple recognition of the social bond sounds fancifully 
quixotic. While such 'bestial' tendencies (lust and sex appear most 
pernicious) are already in the course of elimination we might assist 
evolution by incorporating the ideals of Hercules and of virtue (even 
'virile virtue'). But even such virtue, conventional enough, could not 
expunge evil from the world if men (and women) would not act. The 
physical order holds the key to morality. 
Besant continues, in apocalyptic tones, to attack the social structure 
through grotesque accounts of the poor, articulating for those who 
cannot speak, and metaphorically describing social disease. The slums 
of Edinburgh reveal the corpse of a mother surrounded by her children, 
and another woman `shrunken and yellow, crouched over a glimmer of 
fire; "I am dying of cancer of the womb, " she said, with that pathetic 
resignation to the inevitable so common among the poor' (AA 308). 
Besant's article expands this metaphorically: 
And so, year after year, the misery grows, and 
every great city has on its womb a cancer, 
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sapping its vitality, poisoning its life-blood. 
Every great city is breeding in its slums a race 
which is reverting through the savage to the 
brute-- a brute more dangerous in that degraded 
humanity has possibilities of evil in it beyond the 
reach of the mere wild beast. (AA 309-310) (my 
emphasis) 
Besant clearly saw a division of evolutionary potential between the `sty' 
and its physical effects on the inner constitution and the `educated 
conscience' and `soaring intellect' of those in power. The notion of 
degeneration runs counter to her optimistic theory of inevitable progress. 
But the economic forces which should have corrected environmental 
situations (as in the dire but successful case of the Bryant and May 
match-girls strike in 1888) within the Socialist program did not seem to 
be working to regenerate society. 33 That she was unable to see positive 
results in Socialism troubles Besant, driving her to find the source of the 
disease, particularly after the carnage during what was supposed to be a 
peaceful demonstration in Trafalgar Square: `Our efforts to really 
33 The concept of degeneration, proposed by French royalist Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) in 
opposition to what he felt were absurd ideas of inevitable progress, became a more prominent 
theme in nineteenth-century social science. Besant notes that the criminologist Professor 
Lombroso attended at least one of her lectures in Italy and she recasts his conclusions in a 
Theosophical light in her Australian lectures, explaining that degeneracy could be avoided: 'lt is 
only fair to admit that at the present time the genius, the artist of the highest kind, the great 
religious leader, the seer, the prophet, the revealer, has often a brain too delicate to bear the rough 
vibrations of the outer world. ' Australian Lectures (Sydney: George Robertson & Coy, 1908) 156- 
158; Roe, 146-147. Gilman advocated that all mothers take courses in eugenics: 'We require, to 
do our organized fighting, a picked lot of vigorous young males, the fittest we can find. The too 
old or too young; the sick, crippled, defective; are all left behind, to marry and be fathers; while 
the pick of the country, physically, is sent off to oppose the pick of another country ... this steady 
elimination of the fit leaves an ever lowering standard of parentage at home. ' The Man-Made 
World; or, OurAndrocentric Culture (New York: Charlton, 1910) 208-226. 
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organise bands of unselfish workers had failed.... there was not a real 
movement of self-sacrificing devotion, in which men worked for Love's 
sake only, and asked but to give, not to take. Where was the material 
for the nobler Social Order, where the hewn stones for the building of 
the Temple of Man? A great despair would oppress me as I sought for 
such a movement and found it not' (AA 338-339). 
As if in answer to the question `what kind of sage is she', during the 
last chapter of her autobiography, in 1888, Besant starts looking for a 
new church and talking to Rev. S. D. Headlam and journalist W. T. 
Stead (1849-1912). She finally shows her command of the vocabulary 
and ideas of what Peter Washington has called the `Western guru', who 
provides the answer to the problem of evil (in the guise of a neo- 
Platonist): `Eastern Science uses as its scientific instrument the 
penetrating faculties of mind alone, and regarding the material plane as 
Maya-illusion-seeks in the mental and spiritual planes of being the 
causes of the material effects; there the true existence of which the 
visible universe is but the shadow' (AA 347). 
Speaking as this Western guru of sorts, Besant confirms that the 
causes and effects of conditions on the material plane are to be found 
elsewhere. When humans begin to understand how to communicate in 
the higher realms of matter they can begin to repair the damage to 
society. `Spirit', moreover, is a `misleading word' which `connotes 
immateriality and a supernatural kind of existence. The Theosophist 
believes neither in the one nor the other. For the Theosophist, all living 
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things act in and through a material basis, and "matter" and "spirit" are 
not found dissociated, hence there is continuity with Atheistic 
philosophy. But the Theosophist also 'alleges that matter exists in states 
other than those at present known to science' (AA 357). In fact science 
has the power to bestow such knowledge, having recently (according to 
Besant) caught some glimpses of Occult Doctrines. However, as Besant 
explains in her review of The Secret Doctrine (1888) such knowledge is 
only suitable in the minds of the wise few, for it is this knowledge that 
will continue to cause division if used improperly: `hence the wisdom of 
those 'Masters, ' in whose name Madame Blavatsky speaks, has ever 
denied the knowledge which is power until Love's lesson has been 
learned, and has given only into the hands of the selfless the control of 
those natural forces which, misused, would wreck society' (AA 350). 
`Love's lesson'; is it the rationalisation of sacrifice? This is not clear. 
`Life's lesson' is first that man is not the only living form in the 
universe and that all the universe is charged with life. Most importantly, 
man is a sevenfold being, three parts of which form his Ego, the 
intangible (if not immaterial) self which works out its own redemption, 
though she hints that Karma and Reincarnation are the doctrines which 
must be understood and that there are many incarnations of man during 
which he may attempt to atone for his wrongs (it is significant that she 
does not use these terms within the context of the more traditional genre 
of the autobiography): `within the limits of an inexorable law, sowing 
seeds of which it ever reaps the harvest, building its own fate with 
tireless fingers, and finding nowhere in the measureless time and space 
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around it that can lift for it one weight it has created, one burden it has 
gathered, unravel for it one tangle it has twisted, close for it one gulf it 
has digged' (AA 349). Thus matter and spirit are no longer in 
opposition, as they have been throughout the history of religion and 
philosophy, but incarnation is simply the engendering of another body 
which will eventually be discarded and the mental plane is the 
permanent and primary level of existence. 
Not only does Theosophy preserve Besant's childhood dreams, it 
saves her from her body. The asceticism and self-discipline required of 
the Theosophical adept aside for a moment, the wisdom Theosophy 
teaches promises the ability to improve one's own future in another 
body through the development of transcendental powers in this one 
(although such knowledge is not given except to those ready to receive 
it). Through the transformation of her consciousness, Besant is able to 
escape from the cycle of disappointment. Towards the end of the 
autobiography, the freedom Besant finds in Theosophy becomes more 
apparent: `I know, by personal experiment that the Soul exists, and that 
my Soul, not my body, is myself; that it can leave the body at will; that 
it can, disembodied, reach and learn from living human teachers, and 
bring back and impress on the physical brain that which it has learned; 
that this process of transferring consciousness from one range of being, 
as it were, to another, is a very slow process, during which the body and 
the brain are gradually correlated with the subtler form which is 
essentially that of the Soul' (AA 345-346). 
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With such freedom, history is lengthened and Besant's biography 
becomes ever more elaborate as she and her colleagues cultivate the 
ability to see past lives and discover previously unknown identities in 
different bodies and different ages of the earth. Besterman charts more 
than fifty incarnations of `Mrs. Besant' or 'The Lives of Herakles' 
spanning from 70,000 B. C. to 1847 A. D. 34 While Besant is identified 
generally as Herakles, she also appears as the `White Lady' in Norway, 
Hypatia in Alexandria, and Giordano Bruno in Italy. Many of these 
incarnations also involved relationships with well-known personalities 
of Western European or Aryan civilisation. She was sometimes male, 
sometimes female, was usually married (the names of parents and 
spouse are given) held many powerful positions in whichever ancient 
society she inhabited (e. g. Gobi Sea, New Zealand, Mississippi, Central 
Asia, Mysore, Egypt) and had various familial or conjugal relationships 
with other members of the Theosophical Society in their past lives. 
Many whose past lives were identified were considered to be ideal 
types, those who would be responsible for bringing in the `nobler Social 
Order' and governing it. The ideal type, later to be discussed in 
Theosophical works lauding `The Aryan Type' (1895), Superhuman 
Men in History and in Religion (1913), and `The Coming Race' (1917), 
includes Christ, who comes to figure prominently in this regard after the 
death of Col. Olcott, the ascendance of Leadbeater, and the grooming of 
Krishnamurti for his eventual role as World Teacher. It is to be 
34 Besterman 219-221. 
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wondered if, by de-centring her identity this way, Besant was not able to 
retain some aura of earthly divinity. Clad always in white saris with 
long sleeves and Victorian ruffled collar and cuffs (they look like togas) 
she stands in contrast to the grimy, `badly wrapped and glittering parcel' 
that was Blavatsky, whose earthly presence seems to have been of little 
concern to her. 35 Later, Besant's ribbons, medals and other symbols of 
esoteric knowledge further decorate her as a properly unconventional 
article. 
35 Washington 41. 
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ED Re-veiling the body 
Before becoming a Theosophical sage, Besant was quite absorbed 
with pressing concerns regarding population and poverty. Her 
conversion to the celibacy of Theosophy prompts her (in An 
Autobiography) to admit what she seems to feel is her only major 
mistake, which is that she had encouraged the practice of birth control as 
secretary of the Malthusian League in 1877. Her eminent colleague, the 
attorney and eventual member of Parliament, Charles Bradlaugh, had 
been president of the league in the 1860s and continued to support its 
goals in removing hindrances to public discussion of the population 
question, which was legally considered a misdemeanour. Inevitably, 
Bradlaugh and Besant fell afoul of the law when they published 
American doctor Charles Knowlton's Fruits of Philosophy (1832) 
(originally issued in England in the 1850s) but decided to incite 
prosecution under the Obscene Publications Act (1857) and thereby 
attempt to protect the freedom to publish. 
While Malthusianism advocated the right to speak about matters of 
population in public, neo-Malthusianism was more directly sensitive to 
the social aspects of the issue and prescribed specific remedies. 
Knowlton's manner (in the pamphlet) has been described as perfunctory 
and unsympathetic, 36 and suggests the more condescending purpose of 
36 Taylor 109. 
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discussing the `population' question as opposed to the social question of 
sexual freedom, which was definitely scandalous and perhaps not the 
main issue for those who would promote the consumption of such 
literature by the poor and working classes. While Charles Darwin 
objected to neo-Malthusianism on the grounds that the most gifted 
should be allowed to reproduce themselves at will, Besant believed 
(with others) that it would be the least capable who would propagate 
because they were unaware or inconsiderate of the consequences. 37 
Speaking of Malthus' prescription of late marriage (in order that 
children are certain to be supported) which would lead to the poor 
marrying and reproducing far less than the more wealthy, Besant writes: 
`the best of the people, the more careful, the most provident, the most 
intelligent, would remain celibate and barren while the careless, 
thoughtless, thriftless ones would marry and produce large families. 
This evil is found to prevail to some extent even now'. 38 
Bradlaugh and Besant were convicted of depraving public morals 
during the infamous trial, in which Darwin declined to participate due to 
poor health, but they were released on their own recognisance at the 
very last minute with a fine of one hundred pounds. Lord Justice 
Cockburn also ignored the fact that Besant, as a married woman, could 
not enter into her own recognisance, while Bradlaugh paid the fine for 
both of them. 
37 Taylor 116. 
38 Besant, The Law of Population (London: Freethought, 1889) 29-30. 
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This experience did not stop Besant from publishing her own 
Malthusian tract, The Law of Population: Its Consequences, and its 
Bearing on Human Conduct and Morals (1877), first as installments in 
The National Reformer and then as a pamphlet. This would precipitate 
action for the removal of her daughter Mabel from her custody in 1878. 
Using the example of current famine in India (Bradlaugh and Besant 
had frequently turned to India to castigate the Tory establishment for the 
consequences of imperialism and Christian missionary work), which 
neatly coincided with Queen Victoria's assumption of the title of 
Empress of India (1876), Besant challenges the `positive checks' 
(disease, war, famine, death) posed by Malthus' law of population with 
the equally scientific response of preventive checks: 'Is it possible to sit 
down with folded hands and calmly contemplate the recurrence at 
regular intervals [Lord Derby noted the predictable periods of distress 
for such a country] of such a famine as lately slew its tens of 
thousands? '39 She recommends a fine sponge dipped in a solution of 
alum, Dr. Palfrey's powder, quinine, or a primitive rhythm method and 
even justifies abortion in certain life-threatening cases. Celibacy is 
denounced as unnatural and in one blow Besant reduces Victorian 
morality to a mask: 
The asceticism which despises the body is a 
contempt of nature, and a revolt against her; the 
morality which upholds virginity as the type of 
39 Besant, The Law of Population, 24-25. 
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womanly perfection is unnatural; to be in 
harmony with nature, men and women should be 
husbands and wives, fathers and mothers, and 
until nature evolves a neuter sex celibacy will 
ever be a mark of imperfection. 0 
Here we should recall that for the Victorian woman, birth control did 
not generally mean freedom for sex, rather freedom front sex and its 
consequences. Besant's position, which encouraged health and sexual 
freedom for women, is reversed due to new Theosophical insight which 
characterises the `bestial' sex motive as a disease or primitive vestige. 
In light of her awful experience with Frank Besant, it is particularly 
ironic that Besant would so wholeheartedly defend heterosexual practice 
in the first place; her later retraction in An Autobiography is therefore 
the more startling: 
I brought a material cure to a disease which 
appeared to me to be of material origin.. . we see 
in sexual love not only a passion which man has 
in common with the brute, and which forms, at 
the present stage of evolution, a necessary part of 
human nature, but an animal passion that may be 
trained and purified into a human emotion, 
which may be used as one of the levers in human 
progress... instead of this.. . the abnormal 
40 Besant, The Law of Population, 28. 
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development of the sexual instinct in man... is 
due to the mingling with it of the intellectual 
element... giving rise to continual demand.... 
(AA 241-242) 
Paradoxically, it later emerges that Besant's Socialist and Atheist 
statement on earthly celibacy being unnatural and the sarcastic jibe 
about nature evolving a neuter sex were not so far off the mark, in a 
more esoteric sense. A clear reference to her thinking on this theme 
occurs during lectures on The War and its Lessons in 1919 in which she 
describes the ultimate stages of human evolution as a union of 
masculine and feminine love: 
More and more in the highest types of 
humankind, you find blending the qualities 
called masculine and feminine into one nobler 
type of human being, approaching human 
perfection. But in the intermediate stage the 
difference was wanted.. . when these qualities are 
developed, then the blending process 
begins... and you find the qualities of the saint, 
with the qualities of the hero, blended into one 
special specimen of humanity. 41 
Theosophy apparently proposes to deal with the current evil through a 
careful blend of scientific language and esoteric insight. The 
41 Besant, The War and its Lessons on Equality (London: Theosophical Publishing house, 1920) 
9. 
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development of the sexual instinct has become `abnormal' in the 
physical world and the disease it causes must be remedied by dealing 
directly with the `subtler' source whence it comes. 
III. SOME PROGRESS TOWARD UTOPIA: A TIIEOSOPIIICAL TIIE(ODYSSEY) 
G) Logos spermatikos: the generative word 
Besant came under the direct influence of Madame Helena Petrovna 
Blavatsky (1831-1891), also affectionately known as IlPB, in 1889, 
after being given The Secret Doctrine: the Synthesis of Science, 
Religion, and Philosophy (1888) to read for review (it is in dispute over 
who actually gave her the book, W. T. Stead or George Bernard Shaw), 
but she had also recently become interested in spiritualism, having read 
A. P. Sinnett's The Occult World (1881). Her immediate conversion to 
Theosophy, after meeting HPB and reading the discrediting reports of 
the Society for Psychical Research (which studied the phenomena 
supposedly produced by HPB in her capacity as medium), prompted 
concern on the part of her colleagues and friends. Just before IIPB died 
unexpectedly of influenza in 1891, she gave orders for Besant to 
succeed her as leader of the Inner Group of the Esoteric Section of the 
Theosophical Society. 
HPB's fellow founder, American William Quan Judge, in a scandal 
now generally validated (except, perhaps, by Theosophists), forged 
letters from the Masters (introduced in a moment) indicating that he and 
Besant would share leadership of the exclusive and politically powerful 
Esoteric Section, while the amiable Olcott would be a figurehead 
President. Besant accepted and presented these `Mahatma Letters' as 
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evidence (all were horrified) in front of her usual crowd of workmen at 
the Hall of Science in which she gave the lecture `1847-1891: A 
Fragment of Autobiography, ' her last lecture in memory of Charles 
Bradlaugh whose death the same year (he had been in very poor health) 
devastated her. The letters, written on rice paper in coloured crayon (in 
Judge's hand) would be the source of long and complicated controversy, 
entailing the very essence of validity of the society, which is belief in 
the aforementioned Masters, `Great Ones' who `voluntarily incarnate in 
human bodies in order to form the connecting link between human and 
superhuman beings'. ' The affair ultimately ended with Besant's 
founding of a new section in Australia and the expulsion of Judge from 
the society. At that point, an ideological split had been established and 
Judge's supporter in America seceded, forming a separate organisation 
headquartered at Point Loma, California and headed by `the Purple 
Mother' (and Besant's permanent rival) Katherine Tingley. 
For two years Besant travelled and lectured in Europe and America. 
In 1893, the year she published her An Autobiography, Besant also 
attended the Parliament of World Religions in Chicago (a conference 
adjunct to the World's Fair) at which allegations of the influence of fifty 
year-old Brahmin mystic and mathematician Gyanandra Chakaravarti 
were advanced by newspapers eager to reveal a new side to Besant's 
exploits. Indeed, allegations of the influence of her male colleagues and 
idols (Jesus Christ, Frank Besant, Bradlaugh, Chakravarti, Leadbcater) 
1 Besant, The Ancient Wisdom (1897; Adyar, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1997) 325. 
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are prominent in accounts of her biographers. Nevertheless, 
`comparative religion came before the public for the first time on this 
grand scale. Years of literary and biblical scholarship, of tales by 
travellers of the calibre of Richard Burton and Laurence Oliphant, of 
popular poetry like Arnold's `Light of Asia, ' of romances like Rider 
Haggard's She, were beginning to transform Western attitudes to non- 
Christian religion; ignorance and suspicion were giving way to 
sympathetic interest... Hinduism took this Parliament of Religions by 
storm. '2 Presumably such years of scholarship and literary creativity 
had also fomented many myths, but it all served to further the cause of 
Theosophy. Besant believed Hinduism (religion of the first Aryans, 
delivered by the Grand Lodge of Central Asia from which all religions 
emanated) was supreme among the religions of the world and that India 
had suffered under the agnostic influence of Western materialism and 
the patronising treatment of imperial rule (which deprived it of its 
traditional and excellent village-based system of education). But it was 
necessary for India to be under England's rule temporarily in order for 
the English language to become the language of Hindu evangelism. 
Briefly, Hinduism strongly emphasises unity (as opposed to 
individualism) and oneness with an immanent God, tolerance and 
patience. The ideas most relevant to the current needs of society 
included reincarnation and karma (the law of action and reaction or that 
what is sown is reaped), dharma (duty), and self-sacrifice. Believing 
2 Taylor 264. 
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that Hinduism most truly expressed the insights of the universal 
religion, the Divine Wisdom or Theosophy, Besant wanted to revive it 
for the world and would directly connect such efforts to her own 
political agenda for an Indian National Congress and an independent 
India (allied with Britain), based on the principle of the family and a 
millennial `aristocratic socialism' characterised by `mutual co- 
operation' and the government of the wise for the benefit of all. 3 
Together, India and Britain would begin to bring the rest of the countries 
of the world into a world government. 
Just after the Chicago conference, in October of 1893, Besant 
travelled to India where Col. Olcott would meet her and take her to 
Adyar, the headquarters of the Theosophical Society then (after IIPB 
and Olcott had settled there in the 1870s) and now. Besant would later 
travel to Australia from India to deal with the Judge scandal. There, in 
India, she would truly claim the mantle of Blavatsky as head of the inner 
Esoteric Section of the Theosophical Society, the group in which 
practical occultism was most likely taught. In opposition to Olcott, who 
had determined that Buddhism was the most appropriate and closest 
faith for a true Theosophist to study, Besant would begin her exhaustive 
work for the recovery of ancient Hindu faith and traditions. She adopted 
Indian dress, her famous white sari and robes with gold embroidery and 
beads. She washed in the Ganges (Ganga). Olcott called her 'Annabai'. 
3 Wessinger, 242-243. 
4 Besant, The New Civilisation (London: Theosophical Publishing House, 1927) 88-89: 'Why 
should we not have a United States of Europe as well as a United States of America? Why should 
not war be outlawed between European nations? ' 
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As explained above, her appeal to Hindu tradition would ultimately 
serve (some believe as a cloak) a political agenda to establish Indian 
Home Rule on the Irish example, for as her sphere of influence 
increased, so did her political activity. But what is Theosophy or Divine 
Wisdom, exactly, that it should have become a breeding ground for 
Indian Nationalism and that so many women should have taken part in 
its development and activities? The issues from which Theosophy 
draws its strength have hopefully been illustrated, but it may be useful to 
demonstrate. 
Regarding sex, all religions attempt to conceptualise reproduction 
and provide a strategy to counteract what are perceived as the evil social 
effects of sexual behaviour when the link between sex and reproduction 
is broken. According to the Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, the 
strategy of selection and the biological construction of the family, the 
fundamental unit of society which religion strives to protect, is 
jeopardised when reproduction and sex become separate issues. This 
view assumes, on the basis of the religions about which it is trying to 
generalise, that the process of selection and reproduction is inevitable 
and operative at any level. Reproduction enables the society to 
continue, and the unruliness and inconvenience of sexual desire can lead 
to an unregulated reproduction which threatens order and stability. This 
is why religions have been so important: they are the earliest cultural 
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creations of which we have evidence which supply contexts of security 
and controls over human behaviours and evaluations of them. They 
have extended the unit of selection beyond the family and the kinship 
group... Sexual variance may thus be harnessed or prohibited. '5 While a 
tremendous diversity of approaches have been formulated by religions 
with regard to moral codes, designation of mating choices, techniques, 
education, and also the protection of women and children, the 
`consequence has been strong male control of women, in which have 
been combined reverence for women and subordination of them. '6 
Textually and historically, the position of woman in Judeo-Christian, 
Islamic and Hindu religion is directly determined by her very difference. 
However often women are revered or respected, this attention is given 
separately from the fact that in doctrinal terms they are generally 
considered unfit for like forms of participation in these particular 
religions or societies with men. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
woman's apparent transgression in having caused original sin is the 
source of all strife and suffering. Her apparent bodily density or 
uncleanness is a contaminant inhibiting pursuit of higher spiritual 
knowledge. She is revered as domestic labourer and despised or 
dismissed as religious aspirant. In Islamic law women are considered 
spiritually equal and allowed to have access to education and property, 
but this is belied by actual practice in many countries where the hiding 
S Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, ed. John Bowker (Oxford: OUP, 1997), entry for 'Sex 
and religion, ' 879. 
6 'Sex and religion, ' Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, 879. 
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of the woman's body, for example, is considered so essential to the 
maintenance of society that, in some extreme cases, the woman may be 
killed for violating this injunction. In Hinduism, women are considered 
inherently incapable of achieving absolute devotion to God and must 
wait until they are reincarnated as men. 7 It is therefore doubly 
surprising that Besant eventually subscribes most fully to the theological 
influence of Hinduism in her interpretation of Theosophy, though she 
was concerned to raise the status and expand the role of Indian women 
in society within the context of Indian culture. 8 These are obviously 
broad generalisations pulled from a reference book, and they do not 
reflect dissenting belief or reformed interpretation, but are based on 
historical and doctrinal precedent. 
As explained in the Introduction, sociologist Bryan S. Turner has 
contended that the intention of religion is to legislate for the body. 
Turner applies a `materialist' critique to the concept of body as property 
within the Western patriarchal economic and social system. Christianity 
is problematic in particular, Turner argues, because `Christianity 
elaborated a strong theory of evil as a consequence of Man's fall from 
7 'Women, ' Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, 1041-1044. 
8 Nancy Fix Anderson, 'Bridging Cross-cultural Feminisms: Annie Besant and women's rights in 
England and India, 1874-1933' Women's History Review Vol. 3,4 (1994) 563-580. Of Besant's 
initial refusal to criticise Hindu culture, which in fact created an obstacle for indigenous reformers 
who wanted to improve women's education, employment training for widows, and an end to child 
marriage, Anderson notes 'The secularist Kaliprasanna Kavyabisharad, for example, pointed out 
in 1894 the irony of Besant's praise of the Vedas, for under Hindu law as a woman she would not 
be permitted to read them. ' (569) Besant does advocate for the return of women to their proper 
positions of reverence in society (but only in fulfilment of the domestic ideal) and does express 
meagre concern for the education of girls, but overall, her attitude as a Western feminist in India is 
at the least ambiguous and usually quite conservative until 1913 when she decides that India 
cannot succeed politically on the world stage or be free until it is reformed because 'the laws of 
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grace. Since this fall from grace was deeply associated with the 
problematic nature of human sexuality, Christianity institutionalised a 
strongly ascetic response to the problem of the body .... the world, that is, 
the profane regions of life, was defined essentially by the nature of the 
human body' and the negative impact of human sexuality had to be 
resolved through a system of regulation which would lead directly to 
salvation .9 The relationship between regulation of the body and 
salvation in Christian tradition seems almost too mundane to mention, 
yet in spite of increasing numbers of ordained women in non-Roman 
Catholic or Orthodox churches, and alternative approaches to traditional 
religion, one need only recall more recent issues such as controversy 
over the film The Last Temptation of Christ (1988) to realise just how 
tedious and complicated the notion of an incarnate deity has been to deal 
with, particularly with regard to the possibility that Jesus (historical or 
otherwise) may have desired an earthly life and the apparently polluting 
influence of women. 10 The thought that Jesus could possess sexual 
desire is anathema to notions of his purity. This is to say nothing of the 
problem posed by the anthropologists who brought an understanding of 
totemism to Western society, which led to comparisons with Christian 
tradition. It is striking that asceticism seems to prevail when divinity is 
invoked in Christianity. Though the union of man and woman (and 
Nature.. . to me are more sacred than any writing, 
however ancient. ' Wake Up, India: a plan for 
social reform (Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1913) 57. 
9Turner xiv-xv. 
10 Nikos Kazantzakis suffered excommunication from the Orthodox church after publication of his 
novel, The Last Temptation of Christ (1955). 
147 
some would argue for same-sex relationships in this regard) is often 
considered the closest we can come to union with God in some religions 
(such as Hinduism), the view of the official Church, particularly in the 
West, has preached asceticism as a means to unqualified love for God, 
that earthly marriage may symbolise a higher union, but is impermanent 
and base: `That means it became the voice of men, since only men have 
control and authority in the Church... . Thus the subordination of sex, 
and the attempt to make it in effect synonymous either with sin or with 
reproduction, became, within Christianity, a particular strategy through 
which men kept control and gave to control a new meaning. " 1 
Centuries of debate within Christianity have tried to determine the 
meaning of Christ's apparent embodiment, which at the very least unites 
human and divine on some level. The example of an ascetic and 
(therefore) moral life is the apparent answer if one wishes to imitate 
Christ from desire or duty. 
The concept of the messiah is integral to both Jewish and Christian 
faith, and the incarnation of Jesus is the foundation of Christian belief. 
Whether or not a Christian accepts the notion of the 'Word made flesh' 
and the deity of Christ, contending with the example of Jesus' life and 
with his teachings in particular is inevitable, for it is often believed that 
the intrinsic purpose of the Gospels contained in the New Testament is 
to ground apostolic interpretation of those teachings in law. As the 
apostles re-interpret Jesus, who never speaks directly but through the 
'Sex and religion, ' Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, 880. 
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writings of the apostles, Christians are faced with the difficulty of 
interpreting the meaning of such writings for themselves, either through 
the edict of a particular church or, in a more evangelical fashion, 
individually. 
Christians therefore address the notion of what it means to be human 
with their own brand of ethics, although the source of Christian ethics 
and morality is, as suggested above, notoriously slippery. According to 
Alasdair Maclntyre, `What bishops and journalists suppose to exist 
somewhere-if not on tables of stone, at least in materials of undoubted 
durability-turns out to be almost as elusive as the snark. ' 12 However, 
Maclntyre believes certain themes persist. Primary to the Christian 
ethical equation is the idea that original sin against the father (for which 
woman is responsible) requires reconciliation. This is particularly 
associated with the previously mentioned idea of Gnosis, union with the 
divine, and knowledge of God. That God's goodness stems from His 
omnipotence, therefore from His moral authority, and that obedience to 
God in appreciation of His goodness will create happiness on earth, is 
central to the point of belief. As Alasdair Maclntyre explains: 'It would 
be absurd to deny that the world religions, and more especially 
Christianity, have been the bearers of new values. But these new values 
have to commend themselves by reason of the role that they can have in 
human life. ' 13 
12 Alasdair Maclntyre, A Short History of Ethics (Oxford: Alden Press, 1967) 111. 
13 Maclntyre 114. 
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Another element of Christian ethical belief is equality before God, 
the sanctifying of which idea MacIntyre describes as the means of 
maintaining the vision of equality in the face of an apparent inability to 
resolve inequalities except within small, separate communities (hence 
the drive to create utopian communities, one supposes): `The paradox of 
Christian ethics is precisely that it has always tried to devise a code for 
society as a whole from pronouncements which were addressed to 
individuals or small communities to separate themselves off from the 
rest of society. ' 14 The point, however, is that Paul and Jesus both 
preached an interim variety of ethics which appealed to inherent human 
selfishness and self-love ('Love thy brother as thyself') and relied on the 
imminent Second Coming, the kingdom of God on earth, and the end of 
history. Of course, the `Messianic kingdom did not come, and... the 
Christian church ever since has been preaching an ethics which could 
not find application in a world where history had not come to an end. ' 15 
And it his here that the borrowings from other systems begins, according 
to Maclntyre: `It is therefore not surprising that insofar as Christianity 
has propounded moral beliefs and elaborated moral concepts for 
ordinary human life, it has been content to accept conceptual 
frameworks from elsewhere. ' 16 
These frameworks historically depend on the model of feudal social 
life as well as medieval understandings of Plato (c. 427-347 BCE ), and 
14 Maclntyre 115. 
15 MacIntyre 116. 
16 MacIntyre 116. 
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Aristotle (c. 384-322 BCE). It is very important to realise that these 
borrowings are made possible through the works of the `fathers of the 
Church' such as Irenaeus (c. 120/140-c. 203), St. Augustine (350-430), 
St. Anselm (c. 1033-1109), Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), etc. Through 
these interpreters of the apostles, themselves interpreters of Jesus, and 
eventually the earlier theologians themselves, we obtain formal social 
direction and law. Of course, the Reformation and Evangelical 
Christianity made it possible for the common believer to read and 
interpret for himself (please be mindful that the literacy and education of 
women was practically non-existent on any significant scale until the 
eighteenth century). 
But more than this, the Protestant Reformation helped create the 
problem or idea of ethics in the first place, and the relatively new notion 
that doctrine and ethics might be separate, as Stanley Hauerwas 
demonstrates. Faith, not works were to determine the Christian's 
relationship to god, and works became associated with ethics, or a 
means of forestalling complete dependence on God's grace. Therefore 
there has ever since been a tension between law and grace: `The law is 
needed, but we can never attain salvation through the law and the works 
of the law'; hence the removal of penance , for example, entailed the 
loss of casuistry (i. e. close attention to particular cases) on the part of 
moral theologians and left the question of what it meant to be Christian 
open to wider and wider interpretation and denominational separation. 
15J 
As a result, `there have increasingly been attempts to "do" ethics. ' 17 
The problem of moral relativism has caused ethics to become an 
autonomous discipline taught in universities. As mentioned, Besant 
studied the church fathers thoroughly in her youth, which was a rather 
unusual thing for a young girl to be doing when only professional 
theologians and scholars would normally be engaged in such work. The 
tone and occupation of such apologetic and exegetical writings is surely 
a great influence on her early beliefs, but it is also apparent that such 
writings have influenced her Theosophical views as well. Her need to 
reconcile doctrine and ethics or prescriptions for social behaviour is 
apparent at every step of her theological journey. 
To put Besant's work in perspective, we should remember that the 
feminist approach to religion and the reinterpretation of teaching of the 
church fathers is not so recent. Women preachers of the Evangelical 
movement have already been noted. 'Britain's lady novelists arc our 
great Evangelists of Reconciliation, ' quotes a reviewer of Elizabeth 
Gaskell's Ruth (1853). 18 Matilda Joslyn Gage would publish, also in 
1893, her diatribe against Christianity and organised religion, Woman, 
Church and State. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and a large group of women 
activists and scholars published The Woman's Bible in 1895. Also a 
political rather than scholarly work, it is a compendium of extracts of 
contentious material from each book of the Bible along with variously 
17 Stanley Hauerwas, 'On Doctrine and Ethics, ' Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1997) 28. 
18 Krueger, 3. 
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contributed commentary and interpretation. In 1913, Theosophist 
Charlotte Despard published Theosophy and the Women's Movement, a 
work finally linking Theosophy with the subject that seemed to come so 
naturally to it, a feminist approach to ethics and religion. Despard 
makes practical what HPB and Besant preach. 19 
Curiously, the Oxford Dictionary of World Religions has no entry for 
`Theosophy, ' rather a brief entry for the `Theosophical Society' as 
founded by Mrs. H. P. Blavatsky and Colonel H. S. Olcott in New York 
City in 1875. It explains that their purpose was `to derive from ancient 
wisdom and from the insights of evolution a world ethical code. '20 This 
is an extrapolation, and quite correct. But it does not discuss the 
provenance of the idea of theosophy or its development (or mention the 
third founder, Irish-American attorney W. Q. Judge). What the founders 
originally listed as their objectives changed order. Originally focused on 
the discovery of unobservable powers latent in man, the forming of the 
nucleus of a Universal Brotherhood, and the study of Aryan religious 
traditions (Blavatsky was vehemently anti-Christian), the Theosophists 
came to concern themselves with the survival of their organisation and 
with its impact on society as a whole. Thus the objectives were changed 
a few more times, notably in 1886 to remove rules about initiation and 
secrecy and to reject distinctions of race, creed, class or sex: 
19 Charlotte Despard, Theosophy and the Woman's Movement (London: Theosophical Publishing 
Society, 1913) 1-2: 'How has it all come about and why is the movement so strong? Because it is 
in the direct line of spiritual evolution.... The present relations between man and woman, with the 
effect of those relations upon society... we may find that, before any real progress can be made. 
these will have to be radically changed. ' 
20 'Theosophical Society, ' Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, 970. 
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1. To form the nucleus of a Universal Brotherhood of Humanity, 
without distinction of race, colour, or creed. 
2. To promote the study of Aryan and other Scriptures, of the world's 
religions and sciences, and to vindicate the importance of old Asiatic 
literature, namely, of the Brahmanical, Buddhist, and Zoroastrian 
philosophies. 
3. To investigate the hidden mysteries of Nature under every aspect 
possible, and the psychic and spiritual powers latent in man especially. 
By the 1930s the objectives had been reworded again to read: 
1. To form a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of humanity, 
without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or colour. 
2. To encourage the study of comparative Religion, Philosophy and 
Science 
3. To investigate unexplained laws of Nature and the powers latent in 
man. 21 
What Blavatsky intended to accomplish, besides the 
institutionalisation of herself and her beliefs (she had been struggling to 
recover her lost reputation as medium after being investigated by the 
SPR and found fraudulent in 1887), cannot simply be equated with the 
use to which Besant put Theosophy. The albeit unconscious feminism 
of the work of HPB has received almost no attention. She was Besant's 
2! The first list is found in Blavatsky, The Key to Theosophy (1889) (Pasadena, California: 
Theosophical UP, 1972) 39. The second list is cited in Josephine Ransom, A Short History of the 
Theosophical Society (Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1938) 81. 
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revered teacher and held sway until her death in 1891, two years after 
Besant joined the organisation. 
The current Theosophical Society's theological foundation consists of 
the tomes written by Blavatsky from her researches, experiences, 
revelations and imaginings (as well as Besant's less hermetic reform- 
oriented work). First, there is Isis Unveiled: A Master-key to the 
Mysteries of Ancient and Modern Science and Theology (1877), a two- 
volume work ('Science' and `Theology' respectively) establishing the 
antiquity of Theosophy and its Eastern beginnings, starting with the 
ancient Indian Vedas (18`h-4`h centuries BCE. ), the body of sacred 
knowledge through which the knower `contacts the divinities, or 
discovers the universal foundation of things, thereby attaining to his 
desires and overcoming all that is undesirable, ' and which had been 
discovered by Europeans in the early nineteenth century, notably the 
scholar Max Müller. 22 The Western figures Ammonius Saccas (d. after 
242) and Plotinus (205-170) carry on in the Platonic tradition. There is 
also the influence of the little-known Pythagoras (c. 582-507 BCE), who 
was driven to synthesising religion and reason, relating the forms of the 
natural world in mathematics, music, and cosmology to a higher order 
leading to spiritual illumination. 23 
Blavatsky's second successful publication, The Secret Doctrine 
(1888), also in two volumes, 'Cosmogenesis' and 'Anthropogenesis', is 
her grandest and most thorough, some would say dense, explication. 
22 'Vedas, ' Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, 1018. 
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The Secret Doctrine ought to take its place alongside Frazer's The 
Golden Bough (1890-1915) and Marx's Das Kapital (Vol. 1,1867) as a 
seminal nineteenth-century work of history and synthesis, though it 
never does, probably because it has been so largely discredited by 
historians and others for its inaccuracies, while the political objectives 
of Marx and the motives for Frazer's agenda go without much comment. 
However inaccurate may be some of the information (and it is not 
simply a cataloguing project like Frazer's), there is a grand mythological 
and theological system being teased out of the torrent of facts. It is 
pointedly anti-Darwinist. Considering the ape a lower creature, as 
probably all nineteenth and most twentieth-century minds have done, 
Blavatsky is incensed by the denigrating idea that man is a descendant 
(or is it ascendant? ) of baboons (whether this is true or not) and retorts 
that, in fact, evolution occurs but not in the way that Darwin thinks it 
does, as implied in The Origin of Species (1859) and more directly in 
The Descent of Man (1871). 
Rather, evolution works not from the ground upward, but from the 
empyrean downward. Through an hierarchical system of manifestation 
from the Logos, the many bodies of man emanate. The source of 
Oneness provides the essence of each individual that travels into 
successively more advanced material forms (through the `lower' 
animals) until it is a human, and as a human certain things can be 
understood. The laws of Karma, Dharma, and Reincarnation are critical 
23 Tarnas 22-23. 
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to the cosmology, for the purpose of life on earth is to strive to attain an 
even higher life of union with the divine. The incarnation itself of 
divinity in matter, in order that other souls may be improved, is 
therefore the great sacrifice, not the crucifixion or sacrifice of matter. 
The goal is to escape from the `cycle of generation' which traps the 
unenlightened in a series of karmic lessons and dharmic duties. 
The critical concept linking the Eastern and Western worlds of 
thought is the Logos. The notion of the `Word' and the search for 
Adam's original tongue, the words given him by God, preoccupies many 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philologists and corresponds most 
intimately with the project of finding the Master-key. These parallel 
searches for the Truth, the origin, the genesis of what has become 
Western history, religion, and science are corroborated by the labours of 
Theosophy. St. Justin Martyr (c. 100-165), one of the first pagan 
converts to Christianity to record his experience, argues against the 
Romans in his First Apology (c. 155) that traces of the truth can be found 
in pagan thinkers, since all, including Christianity, shared in the 
`generative word' (logos spermatikos): 
When, indeed, we assert that the Word, our 
Teacher Jesus Christ, who is the first-begotten of 
God the Father, was not born as the result of 
sexual relations, and that He was crucified, died, 
arose from the dead, and ascended into Heaven, 
we propose nothing new or different from that 
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which you say about the so-called son(s) of 
Jupiter. (Chp. 21, p56) 
The sons of Jupiter do not possess the goodness of Christ, however. 
Moreover, Justin Martyr asserts that Plato borrowed from Moses and 
other Prophets. Suggesting that Plato borrowed the 'X, ' symbolising 
spirit embodied in matter, from the brass cross Moses fashioned at 
God's instigation to protect his people from the poisonous beasts of the 
desert, he tries to discredit the originality of pagan thought 24 In any 
case the `seminal' word indicates human reason, which is implanted in 
all men. The wise employment of this reason may enable one to attain 
some knowledge of the Perfect Logos. But the Perfect Word or Word of 
God (ho pas logos) can only be attained by Christians through 
Revelation. 5 
Christianity, Justin Martyr believed, is solely credible because of the 
incarnation, in spite of similar comparisons to Jupiter's sons: `Jesus 
Christ alone is properly the son of God, since He is His Word, First- 
begotten, and Power, and that, having become man by His will, He 
taught us these doctrines for the conversion and restoration of 
mankind'. 6 Nevertheless, Justin Martyr asserts that the kingdom of 
which Christians speak is not a kingdom on earth, but a kingdom in 
heaven, and that the Romans are mistaken to think that the Christians 
24 Thomas B. Falls, Trans., 'The First Apology', The Writings of Saint Justin Martyr (New York: 
Christian Heritage, 1948) Chap. 59-60 
25 Chap. 5,38n. 
26 St. Justin Martyr, 'The First Apology', Chap 21-23,56-59. 
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entertain the notion of creating an earthly kingdom, or that they hold 
allegiance to another kingdom, thereby inviting accusations of treason, 
though it has been suggested that this was done for political reasons 
only. 27 
Justin Martyr's reference to the Logos as a common thread in a sense 
justifies Theosophy's project of recovering the past and a pantheon of 
similar ancient truths in order to restore the one true religion. Moreover 
his apologetics are drawn on by Besant in Esoteric Christianity to 
demonstrate the validity of Christianity. 28 However, while Blavatksy 
uses Justin Martyr to draw attention to his understanding of the common 
teachings of world religions as evidence for the project of recovery, she 
blasts the Christian apology as yet another source of the contamination 
of Gnostic teachings: `And thus, one by one, perished the Gnostics, the 
only heirs to whose share had fallen a few stray crumbs of the 
unadulterated truth of primitive Christianity. ' 29 Indeed, Blavatsky 
claims, Philo depicts the Logos, now identified with Christ, as male and 
female, the word petra (which Philo first used for the Logos) meaning 
rock, but also `interpreter' in Chaldaic and Phoenician. 0 It is true that 
Besant believes that `true' Christianity has been neglected, but as a 
result of contemporary teachings and not apologists like Justin Martyr or 
27 St. Justin Martyr, `The First Apology', Chap. 11,43. 
28 Besant, Esoteric Christianity, 103-105. 
29 H. P. Blavatsky, Isis Unveiled (1877; Pasadena, CA: Theosophical University Press, 1998) 249. 
30 Blavatsky, Isis Unveiled, 246; The Secret Doctrine: The Synthesis of Science, Religion, and 
Philosophy, Vol. II: Anthropogenesis (1888; Adyar, Madras; Wheaton, IL; London: The 
Theosophical Publishing House, 1993) 489. 
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the church fathers, who understood the privileged esoteric discourse 
hidden behind the veil. 
With regard to Christianity more generally, the relationship between 
Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy is helpfully fleshed out by 
MacIntyre and Richard Tarnas. Essentially, the division of worlds 
between that of Forms and that of sense perception is reinterpreted by 
Neoplatonist St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) to imply division 
between the world of desires of the body for earthly things, and the 
desire of the soul for the world of heaven: cupiditas v. caritas. The 
`Platonic anticipation, the Form of the Good' becomes God, the reward 
for the expulsion of earthly desire and rational enquiry leading to 
illumination. This dichotomy creates the tension between earthly and 
heavenly cities in Augustine's City of God (412-427), which helps to 
form the genre of utopian writing. Stanley Hauerwas comments, `How 
properly to understand the relation between the two cities becomes the 
central issue for the development of what comes to be called Christian 
social ethics. Of course Augustine would have found the modern 
distinction between personal and social ethics at the very least 
questionable and more likely theologically a mistake. 31 
This sort of dualism within a greater unity (as well as the Neoplatonic 
system of intermediaries between God and the material) is critical for 
Theosophy as Besant understands it. Origen (c. 185-254) should also be 
added to the list of church fathers Besant follows. Origen, whom she 
31 Hauerwas 25. 
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often cites, believed that everything has a dual nature with both bodily 
and spiritual aspects. Moreover, he determined there were two classes 
of Christian as well, the simple and the perfect, and that a spiritual 
hierarchy was determined by the development of spirits through free 
will. He also believed that the Son was God, that the godhead was a 
unified trinity, and that creation was eternal. Views attributed to Origen 
(Origenism) include the pre-existence of souls and distinction between 
the mortal and resurrection bodies, and metempsychosis, all essential to 
an understanding of Theosophy. 
Aristotle provides, through St. Thomas (1225-1274) Aquinas, two 
laws, natural and supernatural, a vision of God as the goal of human 
desire, and a list of virtues (but this list is problematic). Self- 
preservation is the first principle of natural law (one Gilman recognises 
as operative in society and one she would wish to change to 'race- 
preservation'), `but the self which has to be preserved is the self of an 
immortal soul whose nature is violated by irrational slavery to 
impulse. '32 Aquinas' belief in original sin prevents him from accepting 
human nature as it is and simply describing the virtues of the polis, as 
Aristotle does, but he does accept the equation of virtue and happiness. 
Importantly, `Aquinas' theological ethics is such as to preserve that 
nontheological meaning of the word good and man's ability to 
determine goodness. "Good is that to which desire tends. " To call God 
32 MacIntyre 118. 
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good is to name him as the goal of desire. '33 This suggests the degree to 
which secularisation of the idea of the good life is possible, and even 
begins to substantiate the nineteenth-century equation between evolution 
and correct development constituting goodness. Hauerwas also makes 
the argument that Aquinas, who focuses on the idea of God as creator, 
would find doctrine and ethics indistinguishable. Through Christ and 
the sacraments, creation would return to God, however, somehow the 
second part of Summa Theologiae (1266-73), which part deals with 
matters of morality more specifically, was separated from the first and 
anthologised, thus allowing for the later interpretation that natural law is 
at the heart of Aquinas' account rather than the virtues. 34 Perhaps this is 
why, in the Middle Ages, MacIntyre asserts, the distance between finite 
man and God was increased dramatically and this meant seeking 
individual salvation outside the human community in an afterlife 
through mystical experience and divine revelation. God's power, rather 
than his goodness, becomes the focus. Whereas Aquinas allows a 
certain rationalist emphasis, later theology determines that our desires 
have no effect on determining goodness, 'the opposition between rules 
and desires becomes paramount. Asceticism and 
overasceticism... become prominent in religion. '35 Therefore, Christian 
ethics becomes a nebulous region where classical, Hebraic, and 
Christian theologies merge. 
33 MacIntyre 118. 
34 Hauerwas 27-28. 
35 MacIntyre 119. 
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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), desiring to place morality on a rational 
basis, affirms the test of universality in the categorical imperative. 36 
Kant's focus on personal experience, the postulation that man could 
view himself both objectively (as phenomenon) and subjectively (as 
noumenon) and that he must believe in God in order to act morally helps 
Besant to place Theosophy in a more contemporary context. For Besant, 
the rule of external law is the measure of man's imperfection: 
We need the categorical imperative, not the 
conditional... Is it not true that Nature sounds the 
categorical imperative? Humans, ignorant and 
foolish, not knowing the laws that surround 
them, desire to follow the promptings of their 
own untrained will.. . Nature mandates sternly, 
"Thou shalt. " The human will, able to choose, 
answers "I will not. " Then the two words fall 
upon the silence: 'Then suffer. "... If to you law 
seems cruel and death soulless, you do not 
understand the universe. Law is but the Will of 
the Divine, and the Divine desires your 
happiness. 37 
36 Murray MacBeath, 'Kant, ' Philosophers of the Enlightenment, ed. Peter Gilmour (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1989) 96-97. 
37 Besant, 'Theosophy and Ethics, ' The Spiritual Life (1893; Wheaton, 111: Quest, 1991) 87-88. 
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The Vale of Soul-making: Besant's utopia 
For Theosophy to the Christian world is a re-presentation of 
fundamental truths clothed in that scientific garment which makes 
them more acceptable to the mind of the modern man, and is also 
an explanation of the doctrines drawn from mystic truth too much 
forgotten in popular presentation, unveiling unknown depths of 
thought, unveiling unknown heights of mystic interpretation. 
Annie Besant, `Is Theosophy Anti-Christian? An Explanation 
addressed to the Bishop of London, ' 1 July 1904 
Theosophy asserts that the ancient wisdom and original religions 
were revealed in their most exalted teachings to a few select initiates, 
and that the rest was given, in selectively contrived doses, to the masses 
and those who were becoming sufficiently advanced in their intellectual 
and spiritual progress to withstand and use wisely such knowledge. 
This implies, of course, that certain groups have been denied such 
access due to their evolutionary inferiority. The goal of Theosophy is to 
recover those ancient teachings which would be common to all 
religions, the ancient stem of religious revelation which provided the 
foundation for all subsequent religious development, and to distribute 
these teachings in the appropriate doses to people at all stages of 
spiritual evolution, thus hastening development. 
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Theosophy as interpreted by Besant considers many current religious 
practices as degenerate forms of the original teachings. Thus it is 
Besant's duty as sage to recall the world to the truth of religion. This 
truth takes the forms of several eastern teachings, but they only become 
relevant as they are interpreted in a Western context through the lens of 
Christianity. 
First of all, Theosophy functions as a theodicy. That the difficulties 
of material life on earth should have a provenance in a subtler sphere, 
whether by decree of God or gods, or via the cycle of reincarnation and 
karma, is the contention of most religions. The aforementioned 
concepts of dharma, karma, and reincarnation are critical to Theosophy 
as a means of explaining evil and the needed human response to it. 
Dharma is, in Besant's terms (though she does not indicate the source of 
quotation, Blavatsky or otherwise): `the "inner nature of a thing at any 
given stage of evolution, and the law of the next stage of its 
unfolding"'. 38 
Dharma is inseparable from morality and from individual character: 
`morality is not, as the simple-minded think, one and the same for all; 
because it varies with the Dharma of the individual. What is right for 
one is wrong for another. '39 Yet, this does not imply any sort of free 
will, for Dharma is predetermined by Karma and vice-versa. Moreover, 
38 Besant, Dharma: Three Lectures delivered at the eighth annual convention of the Indian 
Section held at Benares on October 25'x', 26`h, and 27' , 
1898 (Benares and London: Theosophical 
Publishing Society, 1910) 19. Please note that Besant is lecturing in India here; her explanations 
to a London audience may be differently phrased or explicated. 
39 Besant, Dharma, 7 
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`There is one life in all, but the stage of enfoldment of a particular life 
depends upon the time through which it has been separately evolving. 940 
This necessitates leaving each individual in his or her place, to grapple 
with Dharma as they are intended to in order to evolve. The ends are 
necessarily the survival of the karmic fittest. Lecturing to an audience 
in India, Besant delicately broaches the subject of child-marriage, albeit 
without disturbing in the slightest the traditional role of the female, in 
this example of the fruit of her philosophy: 
Take a child. There is no doubt that if you take a 
woman-child, she has before her a future nobler, 
higher, and more beautiful than the present when 
she is playing with her dolls; she will be a 
mother with a baby in her arms instead of a doll; 
for that is the ideal of perfect womanhood-the 
mother with the child. But to grasp at that ideal 
before the time is ripe will do harm and not 
good .... that motherhood should be grasped 
before its time, and a child be born from a child, 
the babe suffers, the mother suffers, the nation 
suffers ... A11 sorts of suffering arise 
from 
grasping the fruit, ere the fruit is ripe. 1 
A rare instance of Besant advocating in favour of education for 
women, as well as family planning, this conveys the meaning of Dharma 
40 Besant, Dharma, 19. 
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in practical life, as well as the implicit morality of the teaching, which 
seems to have little to do with outwardly observable facts. Karma is 
similarly used. Literally meaning `action' in Sanskrit, Besant explains, 
`karma, is therefore used for causation, or for the unbroken linked series 
of causes and effects that make up all human activity... . No one life is 
isolated ; it is the child of all the lives before it, the parent of all the lives 
that follow it, in the total aggregate of lives that make up the continuing 
existence of the individual. '42 Karma is therefore made by each 
individual (particularly by thought, thought control and purification 
being major planks in Besant's platform) who is in turn controlled by 
the karma made in a previous life. Certain yogas or mental and physical 
forms of meditation may be used to foster self-knowledge and promote 
spiritual evolution. It is here that a sort of free will may be perceived, 
though individual development is nevertheless predetermined by 
Dharma. 
Reincarnation, through the Monadic descent, verifies the eternal cycle 
of the previous two ideas, although Theosophy also posits bodies 
beyond the physical in which these processes also occur. The Monad, a 
difficult concept, is essentially a storehouse, on a different plane, for all 
the energies created on lower planes. These energies in turn redistribute 
those qualities to souls which have been developed in other lives, thus 
flouting the claims of science that mental and moral qualities (acquired 
characteristics) are not transmitted from parents to offspring: 
41 Besant, Dharma, 21. 
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Modern science is proving more and more 
clearly that heredity plays an ever-decreasing 
part in the evolution of the higher creatures, that 
mental and moral qualities are not transmitted 
from parents to offspring, and that the higher the 
qualities the more patent is this fact;... A 
continuing substratum there must be, in which 
mental and moral qualities inhere, else would 
Nature... show erratic uncaused production 
instead of orderly continuity. On this science is 
dumb, but the Ancient Wisdom teaches that this 
continuing substratum is the Monad, which is 
the receptacle of all results 43 
Evil is therefore justified on the grounds that it is created by humans and 
that it inheres in one's character, development, and actions, all of which 
are predetermined. 
Besant's utopia depends, therefore, on predetermined conditions 
which are beyond the apparent physical causes observable by 
conventional science. Science at the Theosophical level attributes 
individual qualities, positive and negative, to sources unseen and 
uncontrollable only to the untrained. There are many opportunities to 
understand and improve this world and others beyond through occult 
practice, but good works, altruism and self-sacrifice, while valuable, are 
42 Besant, The Ancient Wisdom, 267. 
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not the way to escape the cycle of generation. Escape is to be found 
only through Mysticism and penetrating the veil, attaining gnosis, and 
following the path of the initiate . 
44 In the meantime, the world requires 
a means of beginning to achieve some higher level of social and 
spiritual awareness. Besant discovers her teaching not only in Christian 
ethics, but in the Christian narrative as a whole. 
In June 1916, Besant proclaims the need for a natural law that will 
compel social reconstruction and conduct by forcing religious belief to 
develop character. 45 This law, `working around us, below, above us, a 
law from which we cannot escape, and to which we must conform 
ourselves - or suffer' is the law of love: `the forces born of love are 
those which join together, and only a Society which is built on love, and 
cemented by love, can endure through the ages of the future. 946 In 
August 1912, Besant told her `fairy-tale' of The Future Socialism, an 
`aristocratic socialism' administrated by the wise few in which anti- 
social individualism had passed away, spiritual intelligence or the `real 
nature' of man was recognised, and all contributed and received 
according to their capabilities and needs, but this story of the `Fairy- 
State' offers no specific means to its end. 47 Doctrines common to all 
43 Besant, The Ancient Wisdom, 202. 
44 Besant, How a World Teacher Comes (London: Unwin Brothers, 1926) 75-76. 
45 Besant, The Bearing of Religious Ideals on Social Reconstruction (Adyar, Madras: 
Theosophical Publishing House, 1916) 3,12. 
46 Besant, Religious Ideals, 12-13. 
47 Besant, The Future Socialism (Adyar, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1912) 4,10, 
22. 
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religions, in the interest of forming a `World Religion' were discussed 
in February 1913 to include: 1) the Unity of God, 2) The Trinity of 
Divine Manifestation (a tradition in all religions), 3) the super-physical 
Hierarchies and their worlds, 4) The Nature of Man (a divine spirit), 5) 
Man's evolution (the perfectibility of man), and 6) the great Laws 
(Karma and Sacrifice). 8 
Elements of the natural law, according to the demands made in 1916, 
must be discovered by reason, which naturally sees what is good for 
Society and that what is evil is anti-social. 49 The unchangeable religious 
Ideals `rooted in natural law' which will regenerate Society include: 1) 
One Life or the immanence of God or universal Consciousness, 2) `the 
law of Brotherhood' or the `sense of true Solidarity', and 3) `Self- 
Sacrifice' or `the joy and glory of Sacrifice' as demonstrated not by the 
mistaken teaching of individuality in Christianity, but by the Christian 
ideal of the family. 50 But what is to be the path to the fulfilment of 
these laws of nature or religious ideals? By December 1916, Besant is 
discussing history and the need to recognise patterns and the working 
out of a grand plan in the apparently Indian fashion of seeing `events on 
earth as the projections thrown down on to the earth of spiritual realities 
in higher and mightier worlds. '5' Still the question of how to see such 
48 Besant, The Brotherhood of Religions (Adyar, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1913) 
14-24. 
49 Besant, Religious Ideals, 13. 
so Besant, Religious Ideals, 7,11,13-18. 
51 Besant, A World Religion (Adyar, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1916) 2. 
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patterns as spiritual realities is not resolved except by reference to the 
gradual enlightenment and learning of history, the recognition of ideals 
and the ability to `develop the spiritual faculties' which may lead man to 
the truth of such providence. 52 But the development of faculties for the 
perception of truths in worlds beyond this has been addressed before; 
the question of applying such abilities in the service of some conception 
of the ideal world or life soon becomes clearer. 
In 1917, Besant begins discussing The Coining Race, and how this 
race, currently being discovered in sub-race form in the colonial regions 
of America (Western America in particular), Australia, and New 
Zealand are possessed of a notably Greek-style physiognomy (as drawn 
from the principles of creating composite photos of criminals, for 
example, to identify `types') and the special attribute, as Henri 
Bergson's insight had demonstrated, of intuition. 53 The current or `fifth' 
race, in an historical hierarchy of seven races and sub-races based on 
physical and mental characteristics, is meant to consolidate, beginning 
with England and India, an empire of peace. The coming `sixth' race, 
after a series of apocalyptic events including earthquakes (in the Pacific 
Rim), floods and the rising of the continent of Lemuria in the Pacific 
Ocean, will then prevail in the realisation of Universal Brotherhood 54 
These people are in fact to be reincarnations of those dying in World 
52 Besant, A World Religion, 18. 
53 Besant, The Coming Race (Adyar, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1917) 14-16. 
54 Besant, The Coming Race, 8. 
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War. 1 . 
55 This will happen because `the science of the soul' will be 
learned by all who dare to muster it, thus earning the more ready 
guidance of the Masters. As mentioned before, the entire validity of 
Theosophical teaching depends on the existence of the Masters. But 
unlike Blavatsky, Besant makes the coming of the World-Teacher (a 
manifestation of a Master) synonymous with the founding of a new 
religion for the new race based on Theosophy. S6 The concept of the 
avatar, superhuman man, or messiah justifies her vision even as it 
controls it. 
The practice of Occultism, it is said, will develop the higher powers 
of perception: `man, if he will, may leave the prison of the body, may 
unlock this prison-house whilst still the flesh is about him, may learn the 
secrets of the other worlds, may meet the Master and bow at his blessed 
feet. 07 Such practice, that can verify the reflections of earthly realities 
in the higher spheres, is needed to expand consciousness (in four stages) 
and learn the ancient Mysteries, already known to fathers of the Church 
and other great teachers of all religions, to the point where 'liberation or 
salvation... the escape from the power of death' is achieved S8 After 
this, the higher Mysteries of the `Inner Government of the 
world.. . which 
is ever watching over the world and taking advantage of 
every opportunity in which man may be helped and evolution may not 
55 Besant, The Coming Race, 18. 
56 Wessinger 278-279. 
57 Besant, How a World Teacher Comes, 85. 
58 Besant, How a World Teacher Comes, 85. 
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be retarded in its course' may be discovered. 59 To this end Jeddu 
Krishnamurti was chosen, or so it was believed, as the new vehicle for 
the World-Teacher. 
In 1929, Krishnamurti would renounce the Order of the Star, a 
section of his own followers within the Theosophical Society, because 
these members were too dependent on his authority. Such authority 
could only engender another organisation and more religious 
bureaucracy and therefore, believing that spiritual evolution could not be 
dependent on authority, he `absolutely refused to have anything to do 
with Besant's dream of founding a new world religion. '60 His 
subsequent career and fame cannot be addressed here, but his reasons 
for departure illustrate the mix of tensions between free will and 
determinism and faith and doctrine with which Besant's religion 
attempted to grapple. 
59 Besant, How a World Teacher Comes, 85. 
60 Wessinger 289. 
IV. 'WHOSO DOETH THE WILL SHALL KNOW OF TILE DOCTRINE': GOD'S 
IMMANENCE AND HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY 
There are those who write as artists, real ones; they often find it 
difficult to consider what the editor wants. There are those who write to 
earn a living, they, if they succeed, must please the editor. The editor, 
having his living to earn, must please his purchasers, the public, so we 
have this great trade of literary catering. But if one writes to express 
important truths, needed yet unpopular, the market is necessarily 
limited. The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman (304) 
That men have essentially ruled the world for thousands of years 
through their language and their institutions is an assumption which has 
frequently been made throughout the history of feminism. Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman is a vocal antecedent of critics such as Dale Spender, 
Sandra Gilbert, Susan Gubar, and Elaine Showalter who have often 
echoed her parody of accepted wisdom in The Man Made World (1911): 
`Men are people! Women, being "the sex, " have their limited feminine 
interests. -Men however, are not restricted -- to them 
belongs the world's 
literature! ' She later affirms this: `Yes, it has belonged to them -- ever 
since there was any. " While it is difficult to thoroughly assess the 
progress of literacy in women in the Western world, it is quite clear that 
widespread literacy among women not of the upper classes was not 
'Charlotte Perkins Gilman, The Man Made World (London and Leipsic: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911) 
91-92; subsequently abbreviated as MMW.. 
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achieved until relatively recently, to say nothing of their right to read 
(and write) whatever they would like. 2 Gilman is still largely 
responsible for the view that we live in a man-made world, even if it 
generally fails to consider the intricacies of language acquisition, 
linguistic development and models of feminist linguistic approaches. 
To be fair, these disciplines did not exist to any significant degree in 
Gilman's day and it has taken quite some time for such research to come 
of age and build credibility. Nonetheless, linguistic research, post- 
Freudian theory, and the large field of current theory used to account for 
issues of gender now help to characterise views which are more 
complicated and less rigidly defensive. 3 Boundaries are far more 
permeable as well, and the kind of interdisciplinary approach that 
Gilman used in her work is now often applied to literary studies, 
challenging previous methods and reinventing the discipline. Using a 
2 The quality of what can be determined literacy also weighs heavily on the assessment of how 
many women were capable of reading, writing, and disseminating independent thought through 
written media. In describing the extent and quality of literacy in women, A History of Women in 
the West, Volume IV, ed. Genveieve Fraisse and Michelle Perrot (Cambridge, Mass. and London: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1993), asserts that most gains were made in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (pages 117,145-52,164,220-22,233-6). Also helpful is 
Eileen Power, Medieval Women, ed. M. M. Postan (Cambridge: CUP, 1975). 
3 See Deborah Cameron, 'Rethinking language and gender studies: some issues for the 1990s' in 
Sara Mills, ed., Language and Gender: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (London and New York: 
Longman, 1995) 31-44. Cameron compares the reception of Spender's Man Made Language 
(1980) and Deborah Tannen's You Just Don't Understand (1990). She determines that the 
popularity of these two very different approaches to gender and language issues is due to 
ideological changes in feminist linguistics which have left it in an impasse regarding how to move 
away from the extremes (the deficit and dominance model of Spender or the cultural difference 
emphasis of Cameron) exemplified by the two aforementioned authors. 
Gilman's solutions or lack thereof aside, Cameron describes recent theory which stresses 
that gender is being continuously constructed relative to time and place and cannot be generalised 
or accepted in a particular case as a norm. As we will see, it is just this question of what is normal 
that is Gilman's concern. 
See also Camille Roman, Suzanne Juhasz, Cristanne Miller, eds., The Women and Language 
Debate: A Sourcebook (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1994). 
175 
scientific as well as moral basis, Gilman founded a "`sociology" of 
women'4 which drew from the rhetoric and ideology of the Judeo- 
Christian tradition in order to convert the minds of her readers to a new 
way of thinking about the role of sex and sexuality in their lives. 
The social construction of gender, in which literature (religious or 
otherwise) plays a key role, is, in Gilman's theory, the basis of economic 
and social inequality between the sexes, though the term `gender' 
probably never appeared in her vocabulary. Other differences are 
genetic and providential and, unlike Besant's Theosophical position, 
they are set in stone, for Gilman's utopia is far less dependent on a 
grand cosmology. It is, however, similarly dependent on the existence 
of two sexes for the attainment of the ideal utopian condition. Current 
theorists will see problems with her method, as well as paradoxes, even 
hypocrisy in her conclusions: her assignment of male and female 
designations, for example, to various qualities and occupations risks 
undermining her program for a society based on `human' (rather than 
exclusively male) qualities, particularly without the help of Besant's 
grand synthesis. But though her methods sometimes seem questionable 
and she speaks primarily to an audience of her own particular social 
class and race, she reaches toward a philosophy which aims to 
encompass the essential belief systems which permeate society, and, in 
doing this, to change them. Like Besant during most of her life, Gilman 
4 Bland, Lucy, Banishing the Beast: English Feminism and Sexual Morality 1885-1914 (London: 
Penguin, 1995) 48-49. 
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is above all an activist concerned with producing tangible results for the 
daily lives of women, men, and children. 
In spite of her many comments and explorations of the effects of 
religion, and her belief that `[r]eligion is the strongest modifying 
influence in our conscious behavior's, Gilman's focus on religion, the 
Judeo-Christian tradition in particular, is not generally recognised as 
being a driving force behind most of her work, even though this impulse 
is often associated with the tradition of utopian writing and thinking, of 
millenarian and other proportions, in which Gilman is increasingly 
found. An understanding of the development of Gilman's religious 
views is essential to the study of all of her work, utopian or otherwise, 
for these beliefs undergird her constant but variegated attempts to 
communicate a relatively consistent philosophy in which social and 
religious concerns merge. 
Has so much really changed since Gilman proposed that we do away 
with private kitchens, with indulgence in non-procreative sex and with 
fashion and create a new, more egalitarian world? We now have daycare 
funded by public and private companies, household conveniences that 
supposedly reduce labour, and, in the United States, an Equal 
Opportunity Commission which dubiously guarantees hiring practices 
blind to race, sex, sexual orientation, or age. But these material 
measures belie the question. Does practice indicate the absorption of the 
theory behind it? We have already seen that with regard to Besant, the 
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adoption of external regulation is no substitute or effective measure for 
the re-orientation of intention, that is, for conversion. Gilman's 
pragmatic vision was not concerned merely with material improvement 
of society, although this is clearly the aim of her proposed economic 
enfranchisement of women. She believed that the minds of people could 
be fundamentally changed. With the right sort of education and training 
their ideologies could be completely transformed through conversion to 
new insights and concepts of thinking and, ultimately, behaviour. 
`We live, humanly, only through our power of communication, ' she 
further explains in The Man Made World, in a tone which must be 
described as passionately objective and typically didactic. If women 
were to obtain the same opportunities as men, people had to agree, 
universally, about why they should have them; they could not be 
grudgingly handed over in an atmosphere of suspicion and guilt to 
women by whom men secretly felt threatened or towards whom they felt 
inclined to patronise. Rather, to guarantee the genuine 'value of those 
social and legal opportunities, a consensus admitting complete and open 
reception of basic values regarding the equality of the sexes and the re- 
interpretation of social and political codes in non-gendered, that is, 
human, terms, was required, or so Gilman believed. To create a society 
based on general human values rather than those constructed by gender 
and power relationships sounds almost impossible in some ways to this 
generation, accustomed as it is to the understanding of the profound 
5 His Religion and Hers: A Study of the Faith of Our Fathers and the Work of Our Mothers (New 
York, London: The Century Co., 1923; Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1976) v, subsequently 
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influence of such relationships, but Gilman, perceiving that this was 
both necessary and possible, decided to start at the beginning. Religion 
and its corresponding system of belief, organising our souls and 
consequently our lives, is in great need of change, Gilman writes, but 
this must occur through nothing less than the total `conversion' of 
society, as described in His Religion and Hers (1923). Here, she echoes 
Besant in terms more pertinent to her practical approach: 
Our thronging troubles, when studied in such new light, are 
seen to be due to mere false attitudes in our minds, false 
ideas, theories, beliefs. These things do not require 
centuries for removal. Nothing is more sweepingly sudden 
than a religious "conversion, " or more miraculously 
productive of changed conduct. (HH 257) 
While conversion reflected emotional and spiritual crisis for Besant, 
Gilman attempts to simplify the process. Gilman's objective is a 
conversion of thought of religious import with the moral power of 
women in the vanguard. A specifically woman-authored morality is the 
means by which conduct in daily life, which is the critical factor, may be 
altered for the better. Communication, therefore, is the main functionary 
of change. Describing the importance of literature in The Man Made 
World, Gilman explains how we can live `humanly': 
Speech gives us this power laterally, as it were, in 
immediate personal contact. For permanent use speech 
referred to as HH. 
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becomes oral tradition -- a poor dependence. Literature not 
only gives an infinite multiplication to the lateral spread of 
communion but adds the vertical reach. Through it we 
know the past, govern the present, and influence the future. 
In its serviceable common forms it is the indispensable daily 
servant of our lives; in its nobler flights as a great art no 
means of human interchange goes so far. (MMW 93) 
Preaching about literature, Gilman moves from a scientific modular 
evaluation of how speech functions within the social organism to 
suspicion of the oral tradition to grand rhetoric over its preferred 
evolutionary stage, its inspirational propensities as communication in 
written literary form. Unlike Besant, Gilman intends her literary efforts 
themselves to perform the task. She does not need an organisation to 
lead, but her ambitions are nonetheless extensive. She does not explain 
what she means by `vertical reach' , but 
in light of her beliefs in the 
power of literature to effect change and in progress generally, it seems 
logical to expect this verticality to refer not only to the improvement of 
communication generally, but also to progress in the future, constant 
movement forward, and the ability to control history. Having control 
over language is essential, therefore, especially for women who will 
need to account for half of the world's history while structuring its 
future. When language is controlled, morality and behaviour can be 
controlled as well. 
The 'Effect of Literature Upon the Mind' is examined in a serial 
entitled'Our Brains and What Ails Them' (1912), from Gilman's 
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magazine The Forerunner. Carol Farley Kessler sees similar purposes in 
Gilman's article and the discussion by Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar 
of a `mother tongue' theory of language and of the mother as first 
language teacher. 6 Here Gilman aims to account for the relation 
'between the brain and preserved speech'. She relies on Otis Mason's 
chapter on `The Linguist' in his book Woman's Share in Primitive 
Culture (1899) to explain how men invented words for the acts and 
emotions of hunting and warfare, though they generally had to remain 
silent most of the time while stalking prey. 7 The words for all other 
human industries were, according to this theory, invented by women. 
Much later, His Religion and Hers (1923) would describe language 
anthropologically, as a means of communication emerging through 
woman's own activities, though Gilman is vague at best in accounting 
for her sources, perhaps another strategy in itself. Men were the first 
tellers of tales, she asserts, in an oral tradition. 8 As for literature, this 
was not properly established until the `pastoral time, and is found well- 
rooted in the later period of agriculture': 
No priesthood was secure enough to develop a religious 
literature till after a steady supply of the firstlings of the 
flock was assured them; and such literature did not grow 
6 Kessler, Charlotte Perkins Gilman: Iler Progress Toward Utopia (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse 
UP, 1995) 111-112. Gilbert and Gubar, No Man's Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the 
Twentieth Century. Vol. 1, The War of the Words (New Haven, London: Yale UP, 1988) 262-271. 
7 Otis Tufton Mason, Woman's Share in Primitive Culture (New York: Appleton, 1899). 
S Our Brains and What Ails Them, `Effect of Literature Upon the Mind, ' The Forerunner Vol. 3, 
#5 (May 1912) 133. 
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great until agriculture gave settled homes at last, and the 
temple was established with the village. All human 
productivity is conditioned on surplus time and surplus 
energy. ('Effect of Literature Upon the Mind', 133) 
Telling her narrative as though it were fact, she grows dimly aware that 
she may be hypothesising and quickly inserts her Veblen-style point. 
Why Gilman ascribes the creation of stories to men may be answered by 
her theory of the inherent tendency of men toward self-expression; her 
attribution to men of the facility for telling `tales' thus enables her to lay 
the responsibility for the negative effects of stories, indeed of religious 
superstitions, on the shoulders of those who created them. As for the 
establishment of literature and art, this required leisure and economic 
stability, which most women did not enjoy even in Gilman's day. 
In this early article, Gilman describes literature as `an external brain', 
a `vast secondary storage battery', and also `the brain of society' by 
which all individual brains are in turn modified, because it contains 
more power, memory, and ability to transmit than any individual brain. 
Presumably literature is thus modified as well, causing continuous 
change as understanding proliferates, within a highly organic scene of 
literary osmosis: `Our social evolution... began, from the first sporadic 
groups, to transmit pulsing waves of thought and feeling from brain to 
brain, developing common action and common sensation; and its 
amazing speed of growth... is due... to the formation of this permanent 
9 'Effect of Literature Upon the Mind, ' 133-139. 
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9 'Effect of Literature Upon the Mind, ' 133-139. 
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and illimitable complex of cells'. 10 As with Besant, intellectual 
evolution is depended upon. Priest included, the writer is a `book filler'. 
What concerns Gilman, aside from the fact that man has been in control 
of language, is the actual moral effect of literature and whether the art 
form we take for granted has been good for us or bad for us. ' 1 Besant 
never seemed to question the possible perniciousness of this in spite of 
her controversial publishing activities (though she was concerned that 
Hindu children learn the works of their own tradition). Language, in 
Gilman's view, is a socialising force of which we are all products; the 
priesthood first developed and guarded this `paper brain', the influence 
of which they well understood. The priest kept the common people in 
ignorance, a tradition which continues amongst those following the `cult 
of literature', Gilman urges. 12. But the claims to ownership of the social 
organ of literature are in dispute. After describing the effect male 
control (priestly and otherwise) of language has had on history and 
fiction in The Man Made World, Gilman explains: 
The thought of the world is made and handed out to us in 
the main. The makers of books are the makers of thoughts 
10 'Effect of Literature Upon the Mind, ' 133-134 
11 'We have to-day the un-literary moralists, who want no books written but pious ones; and the 
un-moral literary craftsmen, who hold that literature is an Art-and exists for its own sake, 
knowing no laws of use or ethics. Waving aside both the moralist and the artist, let us look at the 
real relation of literature to the brain ... The contents of the race mind 
is very largely composed of 
"that which is written. "' ('Effect of Literature Upon the Mind, ' 133) 
12 `Effect of Literature Upon the Mind, ' 135. It is worth explaining here that Gilman had problems 
with artistic modernism, though she does not refer to it as such, and she later writes in 1913 
regarding the ghastly 'elephantiasis of the soul' she diagnoses in some current art. In 1916 she 
again proclaims that egoism is the disease of modern art. See 'On Some Recent Art, ' The 
Forerunner 4 (April 1913) 112. Also 'Painting via Literature, ' The Forerunner? (July 1916) 
186. 
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and feelings for the people in general. Fiction is the most 
popular form in which this world-food is taken. If it were 
true, it would teach us life easily, swiftly, truly; teach not by 
preaching but by truly representing; and we should grow up 
becoming acquainted with a far wider range of life in books 
than could even be ours in person. Then meeting life in 
reality we should be wise -- and not be disappointed. 
(MMW 103) 
The trouble has been twofold, due to the object of preserving a past 
authority established by `custom' and habit; first, we have stored all of 
our memories in books, second, we have sought to carry all of our books 
in our memories, thus denying the possibility of improvement and 
growth, however often religion and philosophy have tried to aid us. For 
Gilman, difficulty of the relationship of doctrine to ethics is, as with 
Besant, that there is such a relationship. She suggests, like Besant, that 
the original version was the best. The `Arthurian Legends' were once 
`healthy and new-born' and `voiced the ideals of a rude age. They were 
mystic, sensuous, vital, full of the beauty of their time --jewelled velvet 
over an unwashed nakedness. ' 13 Yet Tennyson has ruined them with the 
`power of his fancy', appealing to adolescents going through `the period 
of individual growth comparable to the race-period when such tales were 
born. ' Thus, the repetition of a primitive tale preserves a primitive state 
of mind, individual growth is correlated with historic evolutionary 
13 `Effect of Literature Upon the Mind, ' 138-139. 
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process, producing a poetaster obsessed, for instance, with a `fling at a 
pulse-stirring Guinevere! ' 
Fiction and the novel, however, are of a more fluid medium, which 
has been more responsive and helpful to the needs of its age. Writing 
which re-visualises and reinterprets actual parts of life in order to convey 
experience and information to others is what ought to be read, she 
explains. Nicholas Nickleby is a far-reaching example of what literature 
ought to do. England saw in fiction what it could not see in fact, and 
therefore made improvements in the schooling of boys. Uncle Tom's 
Cabin (1851), written by Gilman's aunt, Harriet Beecher Stowe, 
provides another example of the social effect of writing. '4 
Teaching society is the essential project of literature, according to 
Gilman. Having a noble and powerful enterprise, the artist acts to 
`enlarge our world of feeling' and hears, sees, and speaks where others 
cannot. But the artist must respond to what Gilman calls the science of 
Ethics, the artist cannot simply be an artist because that person likes to 
do something (like telling objectionable stories in `a supremely 
objectionable manner' for instance) : `If Art of any sort is part of Human 
Conduct it is in the range of Ethics. Ethics is not morality-- Morality 
rests on custom; Ethics is a science. There may be no morals in 
literature, save in the accumulating habits of writers, quite as likely to be 
wrong as right; but Ethics there is. ' 
15 These statements will be rephrased 
14 `Effect of Literature Upon the Mind, ' 138. 
15 'Effect of Literature Upon the Mind, ' 138. 
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from time to time, but their import will not vary. Morality is that version 
of what we will call the business of determining right human behaviour 
that is based on tradition, written or oral, and which needs to be changed 
in favour of a business of determining right human behaviour which is 
based on Gilman's world view, starting with internalised conversion to 
particular principles which might be based in literature. 
How can ethical writing be restored to the canon of literature? 
Gilman provides an example. The short story'Bee Wise' (1913) 
attempts to teach the value of an alternative to male-centred society by 
offering to the reader the mythical woman and child-centred California 
communities of Beewise, a town in a coastal valley, and Herways, a 
nearby port. The title is taken from Proverbs 6.6: `Go to the ant, thou 
sluggard; consider her ways and be wise. ' A gift of ten million dollars 
from a long-lost gold-mining uncle allows a group of college women to 
begin an experiment in female-controlled capitalism which relies on 
textiles and agricultural products. This brief venture prefigures the 
woman-centred society of Herland (1915). The craft-oriented form of 
self-sustenance (albeit through a hearty and unusually efficient 
capitalism) employed by Beewise also recalls William Morris' ideal 
society of News from Nowhere (1890) in its sanctification of the creative 
impulse. Illustrating the idea of a'true fiction' in this earlier and more 
concrete vein than either that of Morris' novel or that which would later 
emerge in her own writing, while alluding also to the biologically-based 
social theory she developed and expanded through her prose works, 
Gilman instructs readers to 'be wise', like the industrious society of the 
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honeycomb, and take heed from the truths nature provides (which they 
should understand if they've read their Proverbs). 
Beewise and Herways would not have been possible without the gift 
of a long lost uncle's money. The extraordinary sum necessary to begin 
the experiment rather undercuts the purpose of the narrative, which is to 
make the reader appreciate the possibilities inherent in productive 
(female) labour. Each of the founders of the community also has a title 
corresponding to a particular talent and task-- the 'Manager', the 
'Teacher', the 'Nurse', the 'Doctor', the 'Minister', the 'Statesman' [sic], the 
'Artist', the 'Engineer'. These titles, too, suggest those natural qualities 
Gilman will later attribute to women in general, qualities which are 
ostensibly human, but which have been perfected primarily by men 
(except perhaps in the case of 'Nurse') and are later to be taken up again 
by women. The ethical nature of a story like `Beewise' thus inheres in 
its didactic description of female initiative and industry, though it 
assumes some problematic preconditions which will haunt Gilman's 
later fiction and theory generally, preconditions that foretell Gilman's 
return to an existing model of society which the revisionist work of her 
writing would attempt to transform. 
`Beewise' also metaphorically illustrates the paradigm for human 
development that Gilman employs. The particular truth nature provides 
for Gilman, in the form of Lester Frank Ward's `gynaecocentric' theory 
of inherent female dominance becomes fused with a belief in the 
morality of her application of scientific knowledge: a belief in progress, 
in determinism (an ordered world), gradualism (there will be continuous 
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evolutionary growth), and adaptationism (everything fits and works). 
These are basic invalid biases many people hold today, according to 
scientist Stephen Jay Gould, who insists that neither science nor nature 
can provide moral messages. 16 Gilman knows that we invent our own 
morality, but needs to validate the ethical system she is striving to 
develop. Unlike Besant, who sees morality as inseparable from the 
tradition which made it, Gilman distinguishes morality (a matter of 
tradition, which will include Biblical tradition) and ethics ('the science 
of social relation' and more generally of human conduct); so she turns to 
the language of science and the eminence of the Queen Bee, and to 
literature, new formal principles, new morals, new ethics. That Gilman 
can separate tradition from `scientifically' derived morality makes it 
possible for her to take more imaginative steps toward reform. Like 
Besant, she tries to disassociate emotion from the process as well, which 
Besant's mysticism ultimately could not tolerate; yet both finally 
proclaim that love is the answer. 
As explained in The Man Made World, the effect of having literature 
in the hands of men for so long, unfortunately, has been to skew its real 
purpose. Men have written history as the story of heroes and their 
accomplishments, repeated war and conquest; Gilman is vituperatively 
direct in her attribution of this kind of writing to the quality of 
combativeness she sees in men. Fiction and poetry, too, she says, are 
outlandish examples of the lengths to which men carry their inherent 
16 Ann J. Lane, To Herland and Beyond: The life and work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman (New 
York: Pantheon, 1990) 294-295. Lane applies Gould's insights from Ever Since Darwin: 
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propensities for desire, combat, and self-expression, writing of love, 
adventure, fighting, and death endlessly. 17 The Bible, and the male Jews 
who wrote it, will also be attacked in With Her in Ourland (1916). 
However, `the artist, if great enough, has transcended sex' and the `real 
masters' (such as Balzac and Dickens) deal with `life, life in general, in 
all its complex relationships'. 18 
Perhaps transcendence of sex enables the great writer to focus on the 
fundamental relationships of 'life in general, ' but what does this mean 
for the love story? This curious amalgamation of scientific analysis and 
passionate moralising, so typical of Gilman's prose, leads to (or perhaps 
requires) her increasingly deployed proclamation of a boundary between 
what is normative and right and what is not. The nineteenth-century 
novel in general, she believes, is a very poor thing which encapsulates 
and promotes forms of relation that are detrimental to society, but 
occasionally the socially conscious mind of a great writer shines through 
a purposeful narrative. 
In keeping with her ideals, Gilman therefore advocates changes in the 
way fiction is written, describing, in The Man Made World, a series of 
new plots and a new emphasis on the psychological relations of 
characters to each other and to society. These include the position of a 
young woman who must give up her career for marriage, the socially 
starved middle-aged woman who wants `more business in life', the inter- 
Reflections in Natural History (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1979). 
17 MMW 33-34 for exposition of male qualities later to be discussed. 
18 MMW 98-103. 
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relation of women with women (as in `Bee Wise'), the interaction 
between mothers and children, and the `new attitude of the full-grown 
woman, who faces the demands of love with the high standards of 
conscious motherhood. '19 She would make another list of'Coming 
Changes in Literature' during the publication of her utopian novel 
Herland (1915) in The Forerunner. These included the shift of focus to 
the depiction of motherhood and `the mother-love story', `the story of 
the common child', the effect of woman's new position upon war and 
industry, women and men as co-workers, and the story of the new man 
as `mothered, sistered and wived by adequate normal women'. 20 These 
changes shift the focus to women and away from life in general. 
Attempting to balance the scales, Gilman suggests these other subjects 
for literature, as though they regarded 'life in general', but they are 
almost exclusively concerned with women's roles, including the `new 
man' who is defined by his relationship to women. These subjects will 
largely be the concern of later stories and novels, to varying degrees of 
intensity as Gilman tries to find the formula that will make her fictitious 
world seem possible in the mind of the reader. 
The irony, of course, is that Gilman did not attempt to be her own 
Balzac or Dickens or a local hero like William Dean Howells. Like 
Besant, Gilman has many detractors. Her writing does not lend itself to 
the kind of close reading which peels away layers of allusions and 
19 MMW 107. 
20 Gilman, The Forerunner 6.9 (1915) 230-236 as quoted in previous Kessler, 113. 
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literary word-play in order to discover the key to the (in)coherence of a 
particular piece. In his biography of Gilman, Gary Schamhorst explains 
that Gilman's literary theory was `an unapologetic defense of 
didacticism'? ' Or, as Lillian S. Robinson puts it in her discussion of 
Gilman's last piece of fiction, the murder mystery Unpunished (c. 1929): 
`in order to reach a wide audience with the ideas that she deemed most 
essential, she was prepared to compromise almost everything else. '22 As 
disparaging as these comments may seem, Gilman's work is intended to 
teach, to show a better way of "doing" (doing is superior to being, 
presumably being idle) and is opposed to Walter Pater's version of 
"being", for example. 23 One of Gilman's poems, 'The Purpose' (1904), 
may helpfully be compared to Yeats' excerpted and versified 'Mona 
Lisa' from Pater's essay `Leonardo da Vinci'(1869). 24 Gilman's 
madonna-figure is `full grown in human power, /Established in the 
service of the world/... Wise with the womanhood of centuries' and has 
beauty `which the study of a life /Would fail to measure- beauty as of 
hills/or the heart-stilling wonder of the sea. ' Similes about her beauty 
aside, however, she fulfils her purpose in ensuring that 'The Child' will 
be glorified by actively choosing the one who will be her mate: `For this 
was she made woman-- not for him. ' While possessing some of the 
21 Gary Scharnhorst, Charlotte Perkins Gilman (Boston: Twayne, 1985) 11. 
22 Lillian S. Robinson, "Killing Patriarchy: Charlotte Perkins Gilman, the Murder Mystery and 
Post-Feminist Propaganda, " Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature Vol. 10, pt. 2 (1991): 277. 
23 His Religion and Hers 98, hereafter referred to as HH.. 
24 `The Purpose, ' Woman's Journal 9 (April 1904): 114, as printed in The Later Poetry of 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, ed. Denise D. Knight (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1996). 
'Mona Lisa', The Oxford Book of Modern Verse, ed. W. B. Yeats (New York: OUP, 1937). 
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timeless qualities of Pater's figure, the deep eyes of Gilman's madonna 
are clearly burning with the 'fire of inextinguishable love' and she is 
anything but enigmatic, insisting on participating fully and carefully in 
her life's mission as a virgin who must choose best in order to build the 
race. Men are dismissed as lovers bearing the single gift of `manhood', 
and in selecting she might very well be choosing her prey. Yet it is clear 
that in making an extremely practical commitment, this mother's 
conception will be impeccable; she is not an object of allusive 
ambiguity, but a living, breathing goddess with her own social vision 
versus Pater's object. 
But Gilman did not believe her fiction or copious poetry (she wrote 
over 1,200 poems), however purposeful, were nearly as important as her 
non-fiction prose, which, aside from Women and Economics, has rarely 
been considered until recently. Gilman's apparent "compromise" in 
literary terms has nonetheless earned her a late entry into the canon of 
women's literature. Since Carl Degler re-published Women and 
Economics (1898) in 1966 (including an introduction which contains its 
own gentle denunciations of the quality of Gilman's writing) in quiet 
rediscovery of Gilman, `The Yellow Wall-paper' (1892) had been her 
best known work (it is also her earliest and most personal) possibly 
because of views like the following: `To her credit, however, she crafted 
the tale with care. ' 25 . More recent interest 
in Gilman at conferences, a 
new book of essays with the subtitle `Optimist Reformer, ' and a very 
25 Scharnhorst 17. 
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interesting critical edition and history of the publication of `The Yellow 
Wall-paper' may alter this sort of reception for better (and more 
accurate) understanding. 26 Fortunately, there is now widespread critical 
interest in Gilman 
Though she called herself a humanist, preferring this to 'feminist' as 
a label, Gilman is gendered and grouped with `women's studies' or 
feminist theory by default, probably owing to the fact that her books 
were out of print until the late 1970s. In spite of the literary fame of 
`The Yellow Wall-paper', a chilling gothic story of the psychological 
illness and transformation of an infantilized wife (a woman playing the 
reality as opposed to the ideal of the madonna in 'The Purpose'), Gilman 
did not even consider her talent to be literary. Of her reaction to 
William Dean Howells' request that she allow the story to be 
anthologised, she explains in her autobiography, `I was more than 
willing, but assured him that it was no more "literature" than my other 
stuff, being definitely written "with a purpose. " In my judgement it is a 
pretty poor thing to write, to talk, without a purpose', the purpose here 
being to prevent the notorious Dr. S. Weir Mitchell from inflicting his 
rest cure treatment on women suffering from depression or other nervous 
26 Jill Rudd, Val Gough, ed., Charlotte Perkins Gilman: Optimist Reformer (Iowa City: University 
of Iowa Press, 1999). Julie Bates Dock, compiler and ed., `The Yellow Wall-paper' and the 
History of Its Publication and Reception: A Critical Edition and Documentary Casebook 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1998). 
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ailments in the future, a `cure' undertaken by Gilman after the birth of 
her daughter. 27 
In spite of some successes, Gilman's dissatisfaction with women's 
lives and social relations was never assuaged. She acknowledged some 
concrete progress: suffrage was not a particularly great victory, but 
increasing numbers of working women pleased her, as did improvements 
such as those of Maria Montessori (1870-1952) and Friedrich Froebel 
(1782-1852) in childhood education (which are also mentioned in `Bee 
Wise'). But, believing ideas were stronger than facts in influencing 
behaviour, she would continue to be troubled by the problem of `an idea, 
a concept, a theory'. 28 It was not enough to simply illustrate possible 
ways of living; there had to be a reason deeper than the scientific one to 
motivate people to act on her social vision. Gilman finally realised that 
there was a more effective motivating force than scientific truth in 
determining the rightness and efficacy of conduct. She would struggle to 
present her vision, her own version of the application of religious truth, 
again and again, emphasising some qualities more than others from time 
to time, trying to get the right balance, in poetry, narrative, and non- 
fiction. 
27 The Living of Charlotte Perkins Oilman 121, hereafter as Living. Howells, editor of the 
Atlantic Monthly from 1871 and established novelist (A Modern Instance (1882), A Traveler from 
Altruria (1894)) supported Gilman and her work throughout her life even though he often believed 
her frankness would imperil her success (Lane 144-146). Of Dr. Mitchell, Gilman explains 
(Living 121) that she heard through friends of his years later that he had changed his treatment of 
`nervous prostration' since reading 'The Yellow Wallpaper': 'If that is a fact, I have not lived in 
vain. ' 
28 HH 4. 
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While Gilman is not usually recognised as a philosopher, much less 
proto-feminist theologian, some recent research also attempts to recover 
her history and importance in this area. As she was not classically 
trained in philosophy, Gilman was not included in the canon of 
American Pragmatism to which at least two authors, Charlene Haddock 
Siegfried and Maureen L. Egan, believe she belongs. 29 Thomas Peyser, 
however, believes these critics are mistaken and that Gilman has more in 
common with German historian Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) 3° In 
fact, the precocious Charlotte Anna Perkins had very little schooling 
herself (four years was the average in the 1870s, even after the Civil 
War) and only one unproductive year at the Rhode Island School of 
Design. 31 This shortfall came to be compensated for by the large 
network of educated and influential friends she developed throughout 
her extraordinary career, and by her own unique energies. Biographer 
Mary Hill asserts: `She would always stay on the fringes of academia. 
But she was well-read enough, intellectual and political enough, and also 
close enough to academic renegades -- [Edward] Ross, [David Starr] 
29 On women in the American classical tradition of philosophy, or Pragmatism see Charlene 
Haddock Siegfried, Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1996) and Maureen L. Egan, 'Evolutionary Theory in the 
Social Philosophy of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, ' Ilypatia Vol. 4,1 (Spring 1989): 102-119. Frank 
Kirkpatrick emphasises Gilman's Unitarian background in 'Begin Again! The Cutting Social 
Edge of Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Gentle Religious Optimism', Critical Essays on Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman, ed. Joanne B. Karpinski (New York: G. K. Hall, 1992). 
30 Thomas Peyser, Utopia and Cosmopolis: Globalization in the Era of American Realism 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998) 68. 
31 Hill 51. 
195 
Jordan, and later John Dewey as well -- to formulate some astute, 
sometimes fiery educational proclamations of her own. '32 
We have seen that Gilman also intended her vision to be practicable. 
Primarily concerned with the function of her writing, she experimented 
widely. Today, her affinity with the thought and practice of utopian 
writing is generally what identifies her work. Her utopias are often seen 
as encapsulations of her views. Keeping in mind the consistency of her 
work, this is possibly a fair estimation. But what is to be the purpose of 
the printed account of the unrealisable yet imaginable perfection of 
humanity in Gilman's hands? Regarding Gilman as a writer and activist, 
as a sociologist and, indeed, as a humanist, it needs to be asked why she 
turned to utopia and utopian thought in order to achieve her purpose. 
The influence of her famous and famously eccentric family and her 
eclectic education certainly created an atmosphere fostering intellectual 
experimentation. Beginning with her philosophy of religion, which 
quickly dispenses with the problem of evil, Gilman's thought culminates 
in a belief in religion as a fundamental source of power and inspiration. 
Her God is a more Unitarian one, a 'Force' or immanent 'Power' or even 
`Life' itself, a view which attempts to reconcile theology and science 
while redressing the social ills caused by the continued uncertainties of a 
`book-derived God'. 3 Convinced of the positive effect of women's 
32 Hill 41,51. Ross was a Populist-Progressive Stanford economist (trade unions, free silver), 
Jordan was Stanford president (also a Populist). Hill is certain Gilman read Dewey but gives no 
evidence for this, though deems it probable that she met and talked with Dewey at Hull House in 
Chicago, where he spent much time (245-247). 
33 HH 12. 
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views of religion, which would emphasise life rather than life after 
death, and confidently demanding the use of human reason to establish 
the right evolutionary path for the species within a framework of 
inevitable progress, Gilman's apparent optimism and simplistic solutions 
are tempered by a shrewd pragmatism and desire to confront reality with 
viable programs for reform. 
While her adoption of sociology by method and profession, through 
the avenues of Darwinian biology and eugenic theory, is both a natural 
outcome of Gilman's pragmatism and a testament to her commitment to 
a way of perceiving (or enforcing? ) order in the natural world, she is not 
a secularist. Belief in an immanent God is joined with faith in the 
inevitable, positive evolution of humanity, apparently contradicting her 
developmental theory of evil as mere perception and suggesting a more 
permanent belief in natural law. A self-consciously non-Marxian 
National Socialism also encourages her ambition for an all- 
encompassing theory and vision of the future. Concern that the over- 
development of the sex instinct has led to moral decay as well as 
economic and social disparity between the sexes leads to a solution that 
will enforce morality through religious channels. 
Ultimately, like Besant, Gilman faces a dilemma over the sort of 
government she would choose. Although she speaks out against 
prejudice, her rigid adherence to some views which are racist, anti- 
Semitic, or simply arrogant often results in disappointing reflections of 
dominant patriarchal ideology and narratives that are often amusing but 
don't always provide solutions to the problems they present. The 
197 
founding of abolitionist and anti-defamation movements long before 
much writing of the high modern period, a period during which Gilman 
was also writing, testifies to the social recognition of these problems. 
Regardless of whether racist and anti-Semitic views were 'common', 
they often serve to undermine the very logic of Gilman's work, in 
particular, for she seems to have failed or at least equivocated in her 
understanding of the relationship between the oppression of women and 
that of other races and creeds. This leads to an authoritarian slant even 
when democratic freedom is desirable. 
Gilman's defence of Christianity, which for many feminists today 
constitutes a paradigm of patriarchy, is somewhat confusing in light of 
her criticism of male-authored religions. Her use of the widely popular 
utopian novel also indicates similar formal concerns. What exactly are 
utopia and utopians and in what way does Gilman appropriate this field? 
Focusing on the concept of utopia, the problematic terms of its 
definition and its place in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
social history and millenarian movements will provide the proper 
context for discussion of Gilman's own utopias as attempts to 
demonstrate the possibilities of her religious vision of society. She 
developed a world view and a plan to change the world that 
encompassed nearly every aspect of life. The essence of this plan is 
active change or conversion, the primary change taking place in the 
mind. Coming to terms with Gilman's recognition that the concept of 
religion and its social prescription are the axis upon which society has 
been organised and upon which it might efficiently re-align itself can 
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hopefully provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
the motivating forces behind the reform movements of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries and the relative value of intellectual and 
cultural obstacles reformers like Besant and Gilman had to contend with. 
ED The family model 
Gilman's concern with the problem of evil was rooted in her 
upbringing. Membership in the well-established, outspoken, highly 
religious, emphatically Protestant Beecher family of New England 
certainly provided role models of strong and unorthodox women and 
men, all of whom 'were driven to question, to examine, to analyze, and 
then to communicate publicly the results of their investigations. i34 John 
Beecher came to Boston, presumably from England, in 1637. Her 
famous great-grandfather, Lyman Beecher (1775-1863), was still alive 
when she was born. Gilman begins her autobiography, The Living of 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, with a haphazard survey of her distant 
connection to English royalty through most of European culture and of 
course she is annoyed: `131,072 ancestors -- and only one king! '35 
Written as her popularity seriously waned, the autobiography is 
notoriously vague about the personal struggles the author suffered to 
make her living, making short shrift of her trials and tribulations. 
34 Living 2. 
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Gilman is quite critical of herself nonetheless, but emphasises ambition 
and over-achievement in an effort to inspire her readers. The ethnic 
heritage of which she was so proud would ground her thinking in the 
North-eastern establishment tradition, but also add unwholesomeness to 
her attitudes toward blacks, Jews, and immigrants and her so-called 
solutions, which are at best ignorant and at worst outrageous, including 
leper colonies for blacks and abstention from Judaism in the interest of 
eliminating it. 36 
Henry Ward Beecher of the Brooklyn Plymouth Church is notable for 
having freed himself from the yoke of Lyman's Puritanism by making a 
distinction between `the science of theology and the art of religion', 
whereby `theology would be corrected, enlarged, and liberated by 
evolution' but religion, as an ineradicable element of character, would 
not be altered; he considered himself a 'cordial Christian evolutionist'. 37 
His contribution to the incorporation of the Darwinian theory of 
evolution into Protestant theology asserted the necessarily religious 
nature of man (hopefully in the generic sense). Beecher was an 
instrumental participant, as Richard Hofstadter explains, in a great 
change in American thought: `... evolution had been translated into divine 
35 Living 2-3. 
36 See, for example, 'A Suggestion on the Negro Problem' [originally published in The American 
Journal of Sociology 14 (July 1908) 78-85] ed. Larry Ceplair, 176-183. Publication in this major 
journal illustrates Gilman's desire to formally speak the language of the social scientist but also 
illustrates the extent to which such racism was common in academic circles as well as society. 
37 Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944) 29. 
See Henry Ward Beecher, Evolution and Religion (New York, 1885). Also see Jon H. Roberts, 
Darwinism and the Divine in America (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988) 156-157. 
Roberts asserts that for 'most American Protestant intellectuals, the question of biblical authority 
was subsumed in the larger problem of religious knowledge. ' 
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purpose, and in the hands of skillful preachers religion was livened and 
refreshed by the infusion of an authoritative idea from the field of 
science. '38 Writing to Herbert Spencer in 1866, Beecher would explain 
that the `peculiar condition of American society' related to the `cause of 
emancipation and enlightenment of the human mind' made Spencer's 
writings more successful in America than in Europe. 9 
The Unitarianism of Gilman's friends William F. Channing (son of 
founder of Unitarian theology, William Ellery Channing) and his 
daughter Grace was also a strong influence. Originating as an Arminian 
challenge to Calvinism, Unitarianism was founded in America by 
English immigrant Joseph Priestly in Boston in 1785 and became 
official, after much controversy (in which Lyman Beecher played his 
part), in 1830.40 Unitarians rejected the doctrine of the trinity, seeing 
Jesus Christ as an ethical leader and teacher, rather than a Lord and 
Saviour, though Christ was still considered divine and the source of 
religious belief. 41 According to Kirkpatrick, Gilman's emphasis on right 
conduct (rather than doctrinal purity) and a religion of action reflects 
Unitarian ideals and `late nineteenth century romantic, liberal theology' 
38 Hofstadter 30. 
39 Robert Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979) 63. 
40 Leo Rosten, Religions of America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975) 274. James Ward 
Smith and A. Leland Jamison, The Shaping of American Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
1961) 243-260. 
41 Rosten 264; Smith 253. 
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which emphasised the better aspects of human nature. 2 Indeed, when 
discussing the effect a mother would have over religion in His Religion 
and Hers, Gilman would cite woman's `reformatory tendency' and 
ability to improve the effects of proper religious teaching (as correctly 
implemented by herself) on children because children are not inherently 
bad and their misbehaviours do not therefore pose a problem of evil. 43 
Moreover, she shared with Henry Ward Beecher and the Social 
Gospelists (evangelical revivalist theologians) such as Walter 
Rauschenbusch (1861-1918) a belief in evolutionary progress, the power 
of human intellectual intervention, and the existence of sin as an 
`historical variable' which could be lessened or removed. 44 It is not 
known whether Gilman read Rauschenbusch though it seems likely that 
Beecher would have 45 The form and rhetoric of Rauschenbusch's idea 
approximates Gilman's own teaching: 
The Kingdom of God is humanity organized according to the 
will of God... the organic union between religion and 
morality, between theology and ethics ... It contains the 
teleology of the Christian religion. It translates theology 
from the static to the dynamic... By laboring for it we enter 
42 Kirkpatrick 129 
43 HH 52-53. 
44 Kirkpatrick 137. For information on the Social Gospel see James Ward Smith and A. Leland 
Jamison, eds., The Shaping of American Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1961) 294-298, 
455-456 and throughout. Sydney E. Ahlstrom's essay contained in this volume makes reference to 
parallel movements in Germany and England, 321. 
45 See Hill 139. 
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into the joy and peace of the Kingdom as our divine 
fatherland and habitation 46 
But while Beecher, the Social Gospelists and Gilman all agreed that 
inevitable and positive evolution, occurring through the labours of 
believers, would bring humanity to a more perfectly Christian state, they 
did not necessarily agree on what this state would consist of, or indeed 
what category of labour was involved. Beecher firmly believed in the 
underpinnings of a social Darwinist philosophy; those who were morally 
superior would achieve supremacy (these generally being white males) 
and would therefore be justified in retaining power. lie also believed 
that poverty was the result of sin and he feared labour protest and the 
foreigners who often composed the labour interest. 7 
Gilman appears not to have remarked on Beecher's views though her 
beliefs would come to reflect similar values. As regards poverty, editor 
Larry Ceplair explains that, after 1896, Gilman `left behind her working- 
class activity'. 8 She had plunged into depression while working in 
Chicago settlement projects with Jane Addams and fielen Campbell 
beginning in 1894 and left in poor health in 1896. She did not return, 
perhaps because of political defeats on the radical front (disintegration of 
Nationalist Clubs, the Pullman railroad strike, the presidential election) 
and perhaps, according to Ceplair, she believed that her message of 
46 Smith and Jamison 296 from Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York, 
1917) 140-142. 
47 Kirkpatrick 138-140. 
48 Ceplair 43. 
203 
social consciousness could only be comprehended and put into practice 
by the educated middle-class, doubting the strength of the working-class 
to rise above their immediate conditions and adopt her long-term goals. 
While it is certain that Gilman intended her message to reach all 
echelons of society and her disgust with the sexual-economic 
relationship is clearly derived from the middle-class experience, she 
nevertheless came to support principles of social evolution which were 
necessarily exclusionary. 49 She wrote less than six articles after 1896 
dealing with labour and its conditions, of which most regarded working 
women of the middle-class S0 Her later expressions of xenophobia and 
ethnocentrism are potent. Most certainly, however, Gilman would have 
taken issue with Beecher's complete disregard for women's economic 
oppression and simultaneous commitment to unbridled laissez-faire 
capitalism, the effects of which she was far more prescient. She would 
come to see women as harbingers of change through their own unique 
forms of labour. 
As in Besant's case, a sense of injustice may have been aroused by 
family circumstances. Frederick Beecher Perkins, Gilman's father, 
became an assistant director of the Boston Public Library and chief 
librarian of the San Francisco Library after an eccentric education and 
49 For corroboration of this view, see Lisa Ganobsik-Williams, 'The Intellectualism of Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman: Evolutionary Perspectives on Race, Ethnicity, and Class, ' cd. Val Gough, Jill 
Rudd, Charlotte Perkins Gilman: Optimist Reformer (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1999) 
30. Peyser agrees that sociology is responsible, but is more adamant that Gilman's 
authoritarianism stems from the influence of Bellamy and a complicated mix of imperialism and 
fear of globalization, as well as her dependence on traditional narrative forms. I am suggesting 
that her commitment to what is primarily a Protestant world-view and a religion of immanence 
using Judeo-Christian models for social ethics is responsible for both. 
50 Ceplair 42-43 
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uncertain careers as writer and lawyers' Perkins left his family for good 
after repeated absences in 1869, when Charlotte Anna Perkins was nine 
years old and her brother, Thomas, was ten. Gilman had neither a 
familiar father and daughter relationship nor a rewarding one with the 
physically and often emotionally distant Frederick and, according to 
biographer Anne J. Lane, she was barely able to pity him when he died 
in 1899, though she still desired his approval and guidance. They did 
write to each other and he often influenced her reading. Frederick has 
also been seen as a more sympathetic figure than Mary Westcott Perkins, 
whose well-documented coldness undercut her positive qualities and 
instilled insecurity in her daughter. 52 Lane takes the authority of 
Charlotte's later view, that her father was distant, selfish, and 
unforgivable. 53 Gilman's autobiography (albeit written in her later 
years, contrasting with her more youthful enthusiasm for her father 
which Hill depicts through diaries and letters) states unequivocally that 
`The word Father, in the sense of love, care, one to go to in trouble, 
means nothing to me, save indeed in advice about books and the care of 
them ... By heredity I owe him much.. . but his learning he could not 
bequeath, and far more than financial care I have missed the education it 
would have been to have grown up in his society. '54 
51 Lane 25-29. 
52 Hill 28,31-32. 
53 Lane 34. 
54 Living 5-6. 
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Frederick's suggestions for his daughter's reading, as she passed 
through adolescence, included the works of Reform Darwinists such as 
George Rawlinson, Sir John Lubbock, and Edward Tylor and he sent her 
copies of science magazines and Andrew White's Warfare of Religion 
and Science and James Freeman Clarke's Ten Great Religions. ss 
Reform Darwinism responded to the brutality of Social Darwinism by 
arguing for man's moral, ethical and religious responsibility to improve 
society `in accordance with God's design'. 6 Dissenters with the 
doctrines of Social Darwinism (as it came to be known), as it was 
originally established by Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner 
(among others), would include Lester Frank Ward and Edward Bellamy, 
both of whom would later have a tremendous influence on Gilman, 
along with Henry George, John Fiske, and Henry Drummond. 57 
Through her reading, Charlotte became preoccupied with the problem of 
evil. At the approximate age of seventeen, she was eager to formulate 
her own theodicy. 
The itinerant lifestyle Mary Westcott Perkins led with her children 
certainly did not encourage a sense of security either, but it may have 
fostered a dogged determination. Chapter Four of Gilman's 
55 Living 36-37. 
56 Hill 139. Hofstadter, passim. 
57 Maureen Egan, 'Evolutionary Theory in the Social Philosophy of Charlotte Perkins Gilman' 
Hypatia Vol. 4,1 (Spring 1989): 100-119. I am aware of Gilman's reference to Drummond in 
Women and Economics (p. 34) though it is not clear from where Egan draws her information on 
Fiske and George. 
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autobiography, entitled `Building a Religion', begins after an incident 
ending her childhood, in which she refused to apologise for something 
she had not done while living in a Swedenborgian community with her 
mother Mary (a woman of `profound religious tendency' who became a 
spiritualist, but was rather less colourful than aunt Isabella Beecher 
Hooker, the spiritualist). She had been watching a certain Mrs. S. eating 
some grapes from a vine in the backyard and supposedly thinking `harsh 
things of her-- that as one of a co-operative group she had no right to eat 
those grapes. I denied having thought anything about it, which was 
true'. This liberating sense of power and responsibility, lightly tinted 58 
with martyrdom, encouraged her to take the matter of her own character 
in hand and to develop her own belief system. This early experience in 
the Swedenborgian community produced an intense dislike in Gilman 
for communitarian living and irritation with the Swedenborgians' mystic 
doctrine of `Correspondence'. Gilman's antipathy toward such 
movements is illustrated also in jibes at spiritualism in His Religion and 
Hers which (like visions of utopia created by men, which will be 
discussed later) pretends to know of the world beyond but can come to 
no consistent or conclusive proof though it may convince the 
imaginations of believers 59 Scientific 'proof' as not a malleable 
concept for Gilman as it was for Besant, however impulsively she played 
with her own sociology. 
58 Living 33-34. 
59 HH 14-15,22-25,27. 
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Through her reading, she explains, she realised the importance of 
religion `as a cultural factor' and saw the `universal need of it, the 
functional demand of the brain for a basic theory of life, for a conscious 
and repeated connection with the Central Power, and for "sailing orders" 
and `a recognized scale of duties' especially when `immediate conditions 
did not tend to produce right conduct. '60 Already she was thinking in 
terms of the whole sphere of social relationships. 
A religion based on knowledge, she tells us, was her early goal. Faith 
did not mesh with the hard understanding Gilman regarded as necessary, 
and had only led to paralysis brought on by 'the concept of a fixed 
revelation' and `book-derived God' 61 Intellect was unquestionably the 
supreme arbiter of belief and founder of facts, in her view. Representing 
the first fact, action, God is `Power' or 'Force'. 2 The second element is 
a conviction not only that there is an unmitigated hierarchy in the natural 
world, but that this apparent fact demonstrates the existence of a single 
dominant force, which moves ever forward; again, the teleological 
argument from design for the existence of God, as it were is combined 
with a doctrine of immanence. God s persistently active within all 
things rather than maintaining an exclusive relation to those things. 
Good and Bad are the next concern. Examining the formation of 
crystals, as though she were observing the development of the world 
from the beginning, the young Charlotte decided that the inadequate 
60 Living 38-39. 
61 Living 38, HH 12. 
62 Living 39. 
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development is the wrong one: if a square or pentagon or hexagon is 
broken or twisted, the state produced in the matter is therefore wrong. 
Extrapolating from this a principle for organic life, she concluded that so 
far as `a given' organism develops in the way best for it, this is right. 63 
Obviously, an anthropomorphic insistence on the verifiability of human 
perception did not trouble Gilman. She was unwilling to question the 
validity of human reason or the tendency of reason to apprehend 
goodness and strive toward it. This principle would never change; in 
His Religion and Hers she would later argue: 
Ethics is... the social science... being a consciously 
apprehended system of modifying our behavior in the 
interests of our common happiness and progress... covers all 
our inter-relationship, in economics, in politics, in ordinary 
intercourse. Its basis is an understanding of the nature of 
society.. . That conduct 
is right which tends to the best 
development of humanity; that is wrong which injures it. 
The relative importance, the degree of rightness or 
wrongness in a given act, is according to the amount of 
good or evil in its effect upon society. (fill 149) 
Discovering rightness in social relations is as simple as subjecting the 
natural world to (an arbitrary) judgement of what best development 
consists of, a proclamation of good or evil being the result. Sociological 
insights and language enable Gilman to neatly encapsulate and validate 
63 Living 40. 
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her moral agenda. Her early views on death are equally compact. 
Nature is undeniably reasonable. Death, in fact, is not a thing to be 
feared, for it is not evil but an essential condition of life: 
It is told that Buddha, going out to look on life, was greatly 
daunted by death. `They all eat one another! ' he cried,. and 
called it evil. This process I examined, changed the verb, 
said, `They all feed one another, ' and called it good. (Living 
40) 
Did Gilman really believe that morality can be so simple? Does 
changing Buddha's verbs do anything to change actual conditions? This 
statement implies that it is only a change of perspective on the status quo 
that is necessary. Good and evil are relative. But this is not how 
Gilman's theory is intended to look. Science is supposed to provide real 
grounds for moral decision-making. Pain, moreover, is only a situation 
where something in the chain of evolution goes wrong: 
the most important continuous functions of living are 
unconsciously carried on within us; that the most external 
ones, involving a changing activity on our part, as in 
obtaining food, and mating, are made desirable by pleasure; 
that just being alive is a pleasure; that pain does not come in 
unless something goes wrong... As to the enormous suffering 
of our humankind, that we make, ourselves, by erroneous 
action -- and can stop it when we choose. (Living 40-41) 
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As for what God wants humans to do, that is clear; to do their jobs in 
assuming `right functional relation' to society. Finding the right way of 
doing is most important: 
Life, duty, purpose, these were clear to me. God was Real, 
under and in and around everything, lifting, lifting. We, 
conscious of that limitless power, were to find our places, 
our special work in the world, and when found, do it, do it 
at all costs. 
There was one text on which I built strongly: `Whoso 
doeth the will shall know of the doctrine. ' `Good, ' said I. 
`That's provable; I'll try it. ' And I set to work, with my 
reliable system of development, to `do the will' as far as I 
could see it. (Living 42-43) 
Just as Lyman Beecher questioned the Calvinist doctrine of 
predestination and began to nourish an heretical belief in free will, 
Gilman decided that God's will was necessarily to be performed in her 
own special work (though she had yet to define her occupation) and in 
the works of others, preferring to demonstrate religious truth by conduct 
and experience rather than dogma. Her own will to attain her goals was 
limitless, and she somehow expected that her profound energies and 
personal capacity to think and act (often dictated by a severely pragmatic 
self-discipline) might easily be found in others of all classes if they 
would only recognise their ability to similarly change their minds about 
their previous understanding of the relationship between God's will and 
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human responsibility. Her subsequent life experience would lead one to 
wonder how she was able to muster such optimism. 
After much deliberation and with great ambivalence, Charlotte 
married Charles Walter Stetson in 1884, nearly forty years before writing 
His Religion and Hers. She had been concerned that her public interests 
would come to take precedence over whatever small amount of private 
life she allowed herself, which was truly a premonition of times to be, 
for her husband felt it was quite wrong that she could conceive of 
putting any other work above that of being a good wife and mother. 64 
After she gave birth to her only daughter, Katharine, in 1885, she 
plunged into a deep depression, which affected her ability to mother, 
notwithstanding the adverse example of her own unaffectionate mother 
and the emotional scars Mary had left behind. 
Gilman's periodic depression, given that she lived in a very socially 
restrictive and emotionally repressive era, should not necessarily be 
surprising. What drove Gilman to the aforementioned breakdown, 
which she has documented in her autobiography, was her treatment by S. 
Weir Mitchell. Mitchell's `rest cure', a vicious punishment purposely 
intended by the prejudiced doctor to put in their (domestic) places the 
women of whom he disapproved 65 
In 1887, she and Walter finally agreed to separate. A divorce was 
granted in California in 1894. At this time, Katharine (who had stayed 
with Charlotte) was sent to live with her father and his new wife (he 
64Lane 169-170. 
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immediately remarried), Grace Ellery Channing, the grand-daughter of 
William Ellery Channing. Channing was a dear friend to Charlotte and, 
Charlotte apparently believed, far more nurturing and motherly than 
she. 6 Not being able to live in the kind of world that enabled her to be 
an effective professional woman and a mother (in spite of her emotional 
state, of which the causes were both internal and external) was probably 
one of the most frustrating aspects of Charlotte's life (as well as 
Besant's), and one that encouraged her crusade for reform. She suffered 
great public censure for her decision to send her daughter away and often 
regretted the decision, but also rejoiced in her new freedom. 
Her later marriage to cousin George Houghton Gilman, in 1900 
(marriages between cousins were not considered scandalous at the time), 
would be different. They had known each other since childhood and 
Houghton, now a lawyer, was gentle, thoughtful, and extremely 
supportive. Their courtship actually carried on for at least three years 
through letters and occasional visits. Charlotte destroyed all of her 
husband's letters, but Houghton saved hers. These have recently been 
published. 7 
After staying with Jane Addams for three months in 1895 she was 
asked to manage a settlement in `Little Hell', on the North Side of 
Chicago. Her unreliable health and the other doubts that may have 
6s Hill 149. 
66 Living 162-164. 
67 Mary A. Hill, Journey From Within: The Love Letters of Charlotte Perkins Gilman 1897-1900 
(London: Associated University Press, 1995). 
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occupied her mind, as Ceplair indicates above, prevented her from 
taking the assignment. 
Gilman then launched a lecture tour that lasted several years, even 
during her second marriage to Houghton. She appears to have met 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton during this time. At the Woman's Suffrage 
Convention in Washington, D. C. in 1896, Gilman `spoke, read verses 
[she had published her first book of poems, In This Our World, in 1893], 
preached, and addressed the Judiciary Committee of the House of 
Representatives -- while having the mumps! ' She had often expressed 
her desire to preach, writing to one of her editors, 'I am not a poet... I'm 
only a preacher, whether on the platform or in print. '68 Her use of 
preaching is established in her autobiography, though she does not 
appear to have addressed the matter directly as a subversive activity, 
perhaps preferring not to draw the matter into question. But as with 
Besant, Gilman's first experience of the power of her own voice 
occurred in the pulpit. 
In 1891 in Oakland, Gilman records in her autobiography, following 
various diary entries, that she was quite excited to be asked by a 
Nationalist couple to come and preach on Sunday evenings. The 
political context is significant, for the Nationalist Socialism of Edward 
Bellamy would have a strong influence on Gilman's belief that gradual 
change would be possible, rather than the armed rebellion, 'economic 
determinism', 'class consciousness', and 'class struggle' of Marx. Iier 
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sermons to this group are not described in detail, but she is later asked to 
preach by a Dr. McLean, a Congregationalist clergyman, at which 
occasion she would `Read and pray earnestly', presumably relying on 
Biblical text. 69 
Gilman was greatly impressed by Elizabeth Cady Stanton's The 
Woman's Bible (1895) and its offer of religious/Biblical support for 
belief in women's equality with men. More specifically, according to 
Hill, she approved of Stanton's 'God the Mother' imagery. Stanton 
addresses Genesis in the first chapter: 
The first step in the elevation of woman to her true position, 
as an equal factor in human progress, is the cultivation of 
the religious sentiment in regard to her dignity and equality, 
the recognition by the rising generation of an ideal Heavenly 
Mother, to whom their prayers should be addressed, as well 
as to a Father. 
If language has any meaning, we have in these texts a 
plain declaration for the existence of the feminine element 
in the Godhead, equal in power and glory with the 
masculine. The heavenly Mother and Father! `God created 
man in his own image, male and female. ' Thus Scripture, as 
well as science and philosophy, declares the eternity and 
equality of sex... (14-15) 
68 To Caroline Hill (1866-1951), editor of The World's Great Religious Poetry (1923) from 
Ceplair (p. 8) from Gilman papers, file 143, December 4,1921. The Charlotte Perkins Gilman 
Collection is housed at the Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College. 
69Living 136. 
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Two years later, a letter to Boughton of October 1898 describes 
`translating' the Lord's Prayer `to my own language... so that I am 
praying it again with real truth when I go to bed. ' Reflecting on her 
admiration of Christ, she interprets the prayer to emphasise the `divine 
business' of living. The `us' and `our' are enlarged to include God, 
forming a statement of immanentist belief . She would later explain in 
her autobiography that "'fie" is merely a survival in terminology. This 
God I was so sure of, was not him or her, not limited by personality, but 
an inescapable, ever-acting force to be used. ' Hence 'Our Father who art 
in Heaven' is completely re-read and re-written as the 'Inner creative 
force of all of us... exists in happiness... intense happiness proves God. ' 
Immediate conditions of happiness are supposed to verify the existence 
of God, who is actually a force within all of us. This is confusing, for it 
is not clear where Heaven is. To read in parallel, `Our Father' is the 
creative force in all of us and happiness is Heaven, heaven on earth, 
which therefore proves God, in Gilman's version. 
Gilman's other writings verify her belief in the immanence of God. 
The religious practice of Ilerland is notably immanentist: 
... they had a clear established connection between 
everything they did -- and God. Their cleanliness, their 
health, their exquisite order, the rich peaceful beauty of the 
whole land, the happiness of the children, and above all the 
constant progress they made -- all this was their religion. 
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They applied their minds to the thought of God, and 
worked out the theory that such an inner power demanded 
outward expression. They lived as if God was real and at 
work within them. (114-115) 
Of course, `as if' nd `real' in the last sentence betray the naivete of the 
incredulous and infatuated male narrator from `Ourland' who echoes 
Gilman's youthful description from her late teenage years, that `God was 
Real, under and in and around everything, lifting, lifting, ' a pervasive 
force for inevitable progress. Later, in His Religion and hers, she 
similarly describes the God whom woman would have apprehended as `a 
power promoting endless growth' and `a successfully acting power 
engaged in improving the world, with ourselves as conscious helpers in 
the process' rather than a 'book-derived God' of men who foments 
superstitious beliefs 70 The `faith which is aroused through conscious 
motherhood' is a `faith resting firmly on the laws of nature, seeing God 
work through them. '7' Seeing is believing, on the one hand, but the 
reverse is also true. Already believing God to be active in the functions 
of living enables the faithful to move forward in a process of 'endless 
growth' which correlates theory with practice. Religion would hinge on 
an arbitrary faith otherwise, with the potential believer always waiting 
for a miracle. Gilman's view of an immanent God thus presupposes 
faith; a total change of perspective is necessary which makes Gilman's 
version of the prayer active, rather than passive. 
70 HH 12,247. 
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The masculinity of the name of God in the Lord's Prayer is not 
directly questioned in this interpretation; she says only `may we all 
recognise and revere this fact. ' Presumably, the very notion of a `power' 
is sexless, as the very highest and most holy inhabitant of heaven in 
Olive Schreiner's Dantesque short story, `The Sunlight Lay Across My 
Bed' (a favourite of Gilman's), is thoroughly androgynous 72 Gilman 
carried two small books with her on speaking tours of the 1890s: 
Whitman's Leaves of Grass (1855) and Schreiner's Dreanzs(1910). In 
Schreiner's story, God shows the narrator first through part of llell, then 
through three levels of Heaven. The cloaked figure occupying a 
precipice of the highest realm sees all of Heaven and Hell and the paths 
upward and downward and sings an unearthly song that the narrator 
recognises, upon waking, as the song of the barrel-organ and footsteps 
on the pavement outside her window, thus verifying her persistent desire 
not to be working toward enlightenment in Heaven, as she imagines 
herself begging God for the privilege in her dream, but to seek out love, 
truth, and the beautiful on earth. In her dream, God explains: `In the 
least heaven sex reigns supreme; in the higher it is not noticed; but in the 
highest it does not exist' (Dreams 175). Curiously, though, both God 
and the narrator start calling this figure `he'. Gilman's projected 
reigning in of the sexual impulse, which she so clearly conveys in her 
article `Birth Control, ' in her non-fiction, and in Herland and With Her 
71HH247. 
72 Olive Schreiner, Dreams (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1910). 
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in Ourland, becomes the essence of her program of reform. The 
relationship of sexual and religious issues is therefore quite important. 
`Thy Kingdom come. Thy will be done' are revised as `May the 
evolution of happiness go on and be worked out in out lives. ' There is 
no concern with an unearthly heaven, it is the thought of Heaven in 
`God's coming out in life' which illuminates the next line `On earth as it 
is in Heaven'. Thus happiness and God are to be realised in our actual 
lives, not in an eternity after death. 
With the issue of forgiveness for 'our trespasses', there is some 
consternation, but Gilman resolves the difficulty of hoping to be 
forgiven in the future by leaning toward a philosophy of love, which 
allows us to forgive ourselves. So it is not `our forgiveness to be 
measured by our forgivingness', rather 
the conquering absorbing power of love which we feel as 
fast as we use it, may it flow into us more and more, 
removing our sense of discouragement and shame over 
failure-- showing all of us always that there is nothing to be 
discouraged over-- that love is able to heal and overcome 
everything-- as is proved by our own exercise of power and 
knowledge toward children and other weaker ones who 
offend us and are discovered. (Letters 189) 
This version of the Golden Rule also eliminates concern about the need 
to prepare for the afterlife. Gilman never says there is no afterlife, but 
totally discounts the notion of one as a patriarchal superstition (also 
found in traditions other than the Judeo-Christian) which exonerates 
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men (and women) from their responsibilities to this life, a backward and 
irrelevant concept to her mind. 
In fact, as before mentioned, she will eventually blame the (male) 
utopian tradition from Plato to Bellamy to Wells for failing to agree 
regarding the details of our coming life on earth. Ironically, she blames 
them for assuming that people are going to behave differently and that is 
why we have never found them convincing (1), a change in behaviour 
also assumed by visions of the afterlife. 73 But these statements are made 
long after Gilman incorporates changes of behaviour in her own literary 
attempts at such visions of human life on earth. In the meantime, she 
develops her views on the utility of love. 
Warning against too much love, that it may `intoxicate us with the 
glory of it till we lose touch with common life and forget that seeing is 
one thing, doing, another', she admonishes against the possibility of 
neglecting the necessities of this world for the emotion of another. We 
must have love in order to justify and redeem ourselves from failure, but 
this is something that may be powerful enough to separate us from the 
exigencies of the Real world. Moving to images of light and power, 
however, Gilman explains that this love-force, if controlled, will show 
us only the way: `may this measureless current of love so steadily 
pouring in all the time not press us too far... may we realize in its light 
and power that there is no evil-- it is all one long upward way. ' The 
light and power of love are necessary but they must not take us into 
73 HH 27-28. 
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another realm where the necessities of daily life are despaired of or 
dismissed. As with Besant, love is the defining force which guarantees 
the absence of evil, but it has been misinterpreted. Whether evil results 
from wrong development or the results of karma and dharma, it is the 
responsibility of the individual to conform to the laws of nature (as 
understood by Gilman and Besant) and not to allow the deadly failing of 
desire to do more damage. 
The final line of the prayer (`For thine is the Kingdom') is simple: 
`all life consists of this same spirit of eternal good-- living is simply 
experiencing God-- He is the whole thing. Amen. ' Emphasis in these 
lines is Gilman's. She first shows her fiancd how much translating the 
prayer into her `own language' means to her, and then proceeds to 
answer his letter, which apparently addressed his fears that she might 
leave him for her work. She reassures Houghton, but makes it clear that 
his ever helpful support of her must include acceptance of her wandering 
life, `my best safeguard'. 
Gilman came to see that women could and should have an 
independent influence on our systems of belief. Re-writing scripture to 
ground the integrity of her own belief was one way of finding a path to a 
more appropriate system of ethics. Her solution to the problem of evil, 
in the case of her letter to Houghton Gilman, is to eliminate it as a 
concept by reinterpreting its literal meaning. Her earlier solution 
depended on the assumption that pain and suffering only exist when 
things go wrong, that is, when an organism (social or individual) was not 
performing correctly or fulfilling its best possibility for development. 
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This newer optimism also seems extremely naive and simplistic, but 
Gilman is experimenting with the new social science, the discipline of 
studying `all the complicated processes which form and maintain a 
society. '74 She is beginning to address the issue of religious belief in 
these terms, although her most profound insights regarding the role of 
gender in religion were yet to be developed. It is also very useful to see 
how important it was that Houghton accept this kind of activity from his 
wife-to-be, for her struggle with love relationships and the purpose of 
marriage explicitly informs her theory. She writes avidly to him after his 
positive reply: 
I'm ever so pleased at your interest in my sudden impression 
of the Lord's Prayer. It is such a pleasure to talk with you 
when you care about it. You see I am immensely interested 
in finding sound sociology as I see it in the teachings of 
Christ; because I have long felt that our next advance must 
come through [the] development of existing religious 
feeling and not in contradiction to it.... (Letters 191) 
These letters were written two years after the Woman's Suffrage 
Convention of 1896, at which Stanton's book was ultimately disowned 
and at which Gilman also met Lester Ward. She makes it clear in the 
second letter to Houghton that her agenda is not to change religion 
completely, rather to reinterpret it and to somehow convey what she 
perceives as the genuine message of Christ as palpable in the current 
74 'Socialist Psychology', unpublished article or lecture, March 5,1933, typescript, Gilman 
papers, folder 178, also printed in Ceplair 302-312. 
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social fabric. Despite all of her radical theorising, Gilman wished to 
change the world views of men and women, but she could not depart 
from the tradition she found herself in. Was this because of her 
practicality or in spite of it? She later came to conclude that Jesus would 
continue to provide the answer, the philosophy of love, the Christian 
ethics: `It is no wonder that Christianity was so eagerly adopted by 
woman. Here was a religion which made no degrading discrimination 
against her, and the fulfilment of which called for the essentially 
motherly attributes of love and service. '75 Aside from the fact that 
Christianity had not been interpreted or followed correctly (or so she 
believed), Gilman had to create her own language to describe this 
problem, moreover, she had to make people listen and learn. Making 
this happen required validation, which she discovered in the words of 
Spencer, Darwin, and Ward. Religion, and particularly woman's 
potential influence on it, would provide the missing link, as it were, 
which joined the world Charlotte Perkins Gilman lived in with the world 
she wanted to believe was possible, to the point of enabling that vision, a 
religion that combined the power of God with earthly human purpose 
and reconciled theology with ethics. 
75 HH 51. 
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E) Sociology, Birth Control, Eugenics: tools for reconstruction 
True scientific knowledge cannot exist merely in an answer to the 
question, What? It must also discover the whence and tie it up with the 
whither. Knowledge becomes understanding only if it can encompass 
origin, progression, and end. 
J. J. Bachofen, Mother 
Right76 
The female, even when greatly surpassed in size and strength by the 
male, still asserts her supremacy and exercises her prerogative of 
discrimination as sternly and pitilessly as when she far surpassed the 
male in these qualities. This is why I reject the usual expression `male 
superiority' for those relatively few cases in which the male has 
acquired superior size... It is the mother and she alone that cares for the 
young, feeds them, defends them, and if necessaryfights for them. It is 
she that has the real courage-- courage to attack the enemies of the 
species. 
Lester F. Ward, Pure 
sociology" 
76 J. J. Bachofen, Myth, Religion, and Mother Right/Mutterecht und Urreligion: Selected Writings 
of J. J. Bachofen, 1859-1870, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1967). 
77 Ward 330-331. 
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The social Darwinism that Lester Ward and others were responding 
to presented itself most succinctly in the theory of Herbert Spencer as an 
offshoot of his (and Darwin's) reading of Reverend Thomas Malthus, 
who believed in the equation of progress with conditions of unrestricted 
competition and selection. 78 Malthus' Essay on the Principle of 
Population (1798), written in the early years of industrialisation, claims 
that since population expands geometrically while food supply only 
increases arithmetically, there is an inevitable result in overpopulation 
and poverty (poverty which might be prevented by providing `preventive 
checks' to the overbreeding of the poor) 79 Having expounded on his 
belief that life is a never-ending struggle for existence, Malthus 
influenced Darwin's development of the theory of natural selection, 
which explains that, under the right circumstances, certain variations in a 
species would be preserved and others destroyed. 80 Correspondingly, 
natural selection of characteristics could only be justified by the simple, 
brutal, physical struggle for survival. The question of morality is moot. 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), who began publishing his theories 
before Darwin's Origin of Species (1859) (see Social Statics, or the 
Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified and the First of 
Them Developed (1851)), wished to create a unified theory of nature, 
including human society, based on science. As Hofstadter explains, it 
78 Hofstadter 35,38-39. Lucy Bland, Banishing the Beast: English Feminism and Sexual 
Morality: 1885-1914 (London: Penguin, 1995) 190-191. 
79 Bland 198-199. 
80 Bannister 24. 
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was an amalgamation of the most popular science of his day: 'Spencer's 
thinking took shape in the bright light of English science and positive 
thought' and included 
... the nonconformism of his family [he was born in 1820 to 
a lower-middle-class English family], Lyell's Principles of 
Geology, Lamarck's theory of development [that acquired 
characteristics " could be inherited], Von Baer's law in 
embryology, Coleridge's conception of a universal pattern of 
evolution, the anarchism of Hodgskin, the laissez-faire 
principles of the Anti-Corn Law League, the gloomy 
prognoses of Malthus, and the conservation of energy .... 
81 
Hofstadter also explains that the appeal of Spencer's social theories in 
America probably had lain in this synthetic integration of knowledge. 
The theory of the conservation of energy (most clearly described by 
Helmholtz in Die Erhaltung der Kraft (1847)) also gave a high degree of 
sanction to science, and it provided Spencer with the unifying principle 
he needed, the force, or more accurately, `the persistence of force', 
which operates everywhere in the universe and in every process: 
Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant 
dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from 
an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent 
81 Hofstadter 85. 
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heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion 
undergoes a parallel transformation. 82 
Progress from homogeneity to heterogeneity, the second of Spencer's 
principles, continues until it reaches a state of equilibrium, a limit of 
individuality, represented in an organism by death. In society the limit 
is, in fact, perfection, `a stable, harmonious, completely adapted state', 
though it is difficult to determine just what the limit of individuality 
entails in human terms. 83 Hofstadter explains that this positivism would 
have been unacceptable in America were it not for Spencer's religious 
concession, the 'Unknowable': `If Religion and Science are to be 
reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and 
most certain of all facts-- that the Power which the Universe manifests to 
us is inscrutable. ' 84 The Unknowable actually surrounds science, a 
sphere of religious space for that which cannot be discovered by science. 
This cushion of space also provides grounds for the sanctification of 
what science does discover, `the survival of the fittest' being one 
proposition which justified Spencer's commitments to evolution and the 
power of the individual. The totally unified or monistic aspect of 
Spencer's theory included mental evolution and physical evolution in the 
same equation, therefore, `the survival of the fittest' meant unbridled 
82 Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 6'h ed. (New York: A. D. Fowle, 1900) 367. Hofstadter's 
interpretation is clearer: 'Evolution is the progressive integration of matter, accompanied by 
dissipation of motion; dissolution is the disorganisation of matter accompanied by the absorption 
of motion. The life process is essentially evolutionary, embodying a continuous change from 
incoherent homogeneity, illustrated by the lowly protozoa, to coherent heterogeneity, manifested 
in man and the higher animals' (36-37). 
83 Hofstadter 37. 
84 Spencer 39. 
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competition and an ethical standard allowing every man to do as he 
chose, progress being defined as the `adaptation of human character to 
the conditions of life'. 85 Through Lamarckian channels of acquired 
inheritance, continuous adaptation to conditions would lead inevitably to 
the perfection of man, but would this include woman? 
Of course if positive development were inevitable, reform was 
necessarily out of the question. `Natural law' had to be left to operate 
undisturbed. A review of the first American edition of Social Statics in 
the Atlantic Monthly asserts that the work answered to certain needs in 
the population for the support of traditional ideals: `The calm deductions 
of reason are brought to enforce the distinctive American doctrines in 
which the loyal citizen has sentimental belief. '86 William Graham 
Sumner (1840-1910), an extremely popular exponent of social 
Darwinism, would argue that poverty was part of `the struggle for 
existence', that there should never be government intervention, and 
offered only moralising (and useless) words on the solution: 'Let every 
man be sober, industrious, prudent, and wise, and bring up his children 
to be so likewise, and poverty will be abolished in a few generations . '87 
Challenging Spencer's monism and Sumner's arrogance, Lester Ward 
(1841-1913) proposed a helpful dualism for Gilman which separated 
mental evolution from physical evolution. Ward saw a basis for 
85 Hofstadter 40. 
86 Bannister 63 from Atlantic Monthly 16 (1865): 383. 
$7 William Graham Sumner, Essays of William Graham Sumner, Albert G. Keller and Maurice R. 
Davie, eds. (New Haven: Yale UP, 1934) 109, as quoted in Hofstadter 61. 
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distinguishing between the economies of the body and the economies of 
the mind. The physical or active, animal aspect of evolution is without 
purpose. However, Ward believed that humans can control their 
environments with purposeful action. Natural law and `human 
advantage' are not related, for laissez-faire trade laws result in 
tremendously inequitable distribution of wealth, `founded in accidents of 
birth or strokes of low cunning rather than superior intelligence or 
industry. '88 Nor did so-called natural law provide natural correctives to 
the situation in the way of regulation or barriers against monopolies. 
Man must apply himself to the direction of natural processes and prevent 
the wastes of competition. Ward argued that there could be no 
competition anyway, without the regulation necessary to prevent 
monopolies. 89 The control of this process, as well as other social 
processes required the intervention of the mind, the conscious director of 
evolution 90 
Ward, born of a poor family, educated himself while working as a 
labourer and eventually qualified as a secondary school teacher. After 
serving (presumably for the Union) in the Civil War he became a clerk 
in the Treasury Department and took evening classes, earning diplomas 
in arts, law, and medicine. Because he was able to improve himself 
(Gilman felt similarly about herself) he believed in the power of 
88 Hofstadter 72-73. 
89 Hofstadter 75. 
90 Bannister 127. 
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education and also, to a large degree, in the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. Spencer and Lamarck were responsible for this. When 
he was confronted with the findings of neo-Darwinian August 
Weismann, which demonstrated that Lamarck was wrong, he countered 
with the assertion that `the capacity to acquire knowledge is another 
matter', that `[c]ertain arts and talents which apparently run in family 
lines cannot be accounted for by the theory of natural selection because 
these talents have no value in the struggle for survival. i91 Education 
would have no value if acquired characteristics were not inherited and 
Ward could not accept this. Lamarckianism explained that the `intense 
exercise' of the higher faculties impressed them `profoundly upon the 
plastic brain substance and reacting upon the germs of 
posterity,... transmitted [them] to descendants through centuries of 
developing civilization. ' 92 
Like Spencer who also was not a scientist (though he was accepted by 
the scientific community), Gilman saw herself as a social philosopher. 
From Spencer she claims she learned 'Wisdom and how to apply it'. 93 
Spencer also introduced her to Malthusian ideas about overpopulation, 
which probably fuelled her later eugenicism, and the unfortunate 
Lamarckian foible. She later corrected herself with regard to Lamarck in 
Herland, discussed below. While describing the enormous and 
91 Hofstadter 77 regarding Lester Ward, 'The Transmission of Culture, ' Forum (1891). 
92 Bannister 128 from Ward, 'Neo-Darwinism and Neo-Lamarckism, ' Glimpses of the Cosmos, 4 
(New York, 1913-1918) 290-295. 
93 Living 154. 
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continuous growth and improvement of the people there, Zava, a teacher, 
explains their theory of conscious improvement. Terry, one of the men 
visiting her country points out that Weissman [sic] proved that acquired 
characteristics are not transmissible, which argument Zava then 
rationalises by implicating the expression of latent traits of the original 
mother of the race of Herland. But Jeff, another of the three visitors, 
immediately argues that it must be their `soul culture' and their psychic 
growth that has made such a difference. 4 The notion of `psychic 
growth', which will be returned to later, of course reflects Ward's 
response to what he perceived as the `animal' degradation of social 
Darwinism. In His Religion and Hers, Gilman would argue of 
unsavoury characteristics that, regardless of the means of inheritance, 
`appear they do and transmitted they are. '95 Education, in her view, was 
essential to any improvement in the socio-economic and biological 
conditions of women, and therefore to improvement in the species. 
The most significant implication for education as regards Gilman's 
interest in Ward is Ward's Gynaecocentric Theory, `the greatest single 
contribution to the world's thought since Evolution', as Gilman happily 
puts it. 96 Her effusive dedication of The Man Made World to Ward 
describes him as 'one of the world's great men... to whom all women are 
especially bound in honour and gratitude for his gynaecoccntric theory of 
94 Herland 78-79. 
95 HH 10-11. 
96 Living 187. 
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life'. 97 As expressed in Pure Sociology (1903) and as Gilman 
understands it, Ward's theory asserts `that the female is the race type, 
and the male, originally but a sex type, reached a later equality with the 
female, and, in the human race, became her master for a considerable 
historic period. '98 Ward's version is longer, and less interesting (but it is 
intriguing to see what kind of material Gilman sifted through for her 
own purposes): 
... that originally and normally all things center, as it were, 
about the female, and that the male, though not necessary in 
carrying out the scheme, was developed under the operation 
of the principle of advantage to secure organic progress 
through the crossing of strains. The theory further claims 
that the apparent male superiority in the human race and in 
certain of the higher animals and birds is the result of 
specialization in extra-normal directions due to adventitious 
causes which have nothing to do with the general scheme, 
but which can be explained on biological and psychological 
principles... It accounts for the prevalence of the 
androcentric theory by the superficial character of human 
knowledge of such subjects, chiefly influenced by the 
illusion of the near, but largely in the case of man at least by 
tradition, convention, and prejudice. 99 
97 Spelling in UK edition of MMW. 
98 MMW 7,163. 
99 Lester Ward, Pure Sociology (New York, London: Macmillan, 1903) 296-297. 
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Tradition, convention, and prejudice, of course, are the cultural products 
which Gilman continuously aims to subvert. Ward helpfully sanctions 
the cultural application of biological principles. The key word is 
`normal'. The Androcentric Theory attributes the origins of biological 
and social problems to the nearly exclusive influence of the male, whose 
inherent characteristics of desire, combativeness, and need for self- 
expression have upset the natural balance and usurped the power of the 
original `race type', the female. Is the male, as `extra-normal' therefore 
abnormal or more normal? 
Gilman spends much time accounting for male superiority and its 
effects. Like Besant, Gilman is attracted to the story physiognomy might 
tell. Woman is physically more human: `the face of the woman 
approximates the human more closely than that of the man ... the child, 
representing race more than sex, is naturally more akin to her than to 
him... The male preserves more primitive qualities, the hairiness, the 
more pugnacious jaws'. 100 Her physical power is clearly intended to be 
morally superior to his, manifesting itself in a less differentiated fashion 
closer to the `race' type captured most clearly by the physical nature of 
the pre-pubescent child. The more male, the less moral, it would seem. 
Woman is also the first teacher, administrator, co-ordinator, legislator, 
executive, and mother of industry. 101 As mentioned before in the article 
10° MMW 163. 
101 MMW 189. 
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`Effect of Literature Upon the Mind', she is also the inventor of 
language: 
The economic activities of the mother, beginning in simple 
maternal instinct, soon assumed group forms and developed 
group forces. Language itself, the early requisite of further 
growth came through woman's activities, rather than in the 
solitary efforts of the huntsman. Even where hunting was 
done in groups, the hunters must be silent lest the prey 
escape. (HH 253-254) 
The point at which the transition from matriarchal to patriarchal stages 
occurred is uncertain, but Gilman explains that while Woman was 
initially superior, the repository of human qualities and race qualities, 
she being the ideal sort of human type; she is completely opposite to 
man in that her mental as well as physical qualities are characterised by 
a gathering, nurturing, centripetal force. Man's centrifugal force, his 
scattering, projecting impulse (`perfectly right and admirable in its 
place') includes `those dominant characteristics, desire, combat, self- 
expression' all of which enabled man to assert himself and push woman 
into subjugation. 102 But this subjugation was actually necessary, for 
man had to become human as well; he had to learn how to love and care 
for children and the race as a whole, while woman stood in the 
102 MMW 82. Women and Economics: A Study of the Economic Relation Between Men and 
Women as a Factor in Social Evolution, 1898, Carl N. Degler, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 
1966) 74-75,127,129. 
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background, exercising her natural capacity in serving him until this task 
was accomplished. 103 
Curiously, though, the qualities that were considered to be masculine, 
such as rationality, skill in public affairs and business, and the ability to 
develop productivity through social institutions such as government, 
these are considered human qualities actually developed originally 
through the female. These human qualities have been monopolised by 
the male sex, according to Gilman. 104 But now the economic aspect of 
human life is in jeopardy, due to inherent qualities of the male which 
have caused an exaggerated emphasis on sex-distinction to govern 
relations between the sexes, generating inefficiency and inequality. It is 
time for women to resume their places, to resume human activities in 
government and industry, and to be the equals of men (even though this 
material change does not complete the matter). 
Identifying the status quo as both a development of the skills women 
originally taught to men and the outcome of what men have done with 
those skills independently of women describes a rather contaminated 
mixture. Arguing that the outcome, the man-made world, is actually a 
more human world with men in it who are more human than women, 
and which women should now be free to join is an equivocation. 
Moreover, after joining this world, women are to continue their activity 
of constructing the race, a `human process', to which women are 
peculiarly suited: of developing `fitness' by selecting the fit. 
103 WE 74-75. 
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Destruction, the social Darwinist process of eliminating the unfit, is not 
a human process, but `merely a male process'. 105 Educating and 
reintroducing women to the world, which, under the domination of men 
has kept them in the home and stunted their personal and intellectual 
growth, will enable women to make wiser choices in their exclusive task 
of sexual selection. Men have exaggerated sex-distinction in both sexes 
because of their own invalid sexual demands. Therefore, women must 
respond to the call of social responsibility. 
On the one hand, the notion of trying to have women make 
improvements from within the existing structure makes Gilman's 
demands more plausible, but at the same time it thoroughly undermines 
her purpose by asserting that the injurious man-made capitalist 
industries and vastly inequitable economic systems are, in origin, the 
positive products of female labour and ingenuity which have been 
harmfully overused. It also avoids her program of socialism, even 
though woman is apparently the first socialist as well ('As a matter of 
fact the woman, the mother... is the first to consider group interests and 
correlate them'). 106 Several of her short stories fully advocate 
capitalism, as practised in `Beewise', for example. Gilman tries to show 
how well women can perform in a man's world in order to demonstrate 
reasons why they should be given opportunities to do so (such as the 
middle-aged woman who wants `more business in life' in `Aunt Mary's 
104 WE 43,51. 
10, MMW 190. 
106 MMW 189 
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Pie Plant'), yet this belies deeper changes which are necessary. The 
process of mental evolution that would make the practical changes 
Gilman demands and remove women completely from the drudgery of 
household labour would require the wholehearted co-operation of men, 
financial and otherwise and the conversion of the whole society. Here 
the concept of inevitable and positive evolution meets the need for 
control of the outcome, an evolution which apparently needs some 
coaxing if it is not to bring us full circle to the world we thought we had 
left behind. 
Ideally, there is to be a balance of centripetal and centrifugal forces, 
social (female) and individual (male) impulses, like that more generally 
proposed by Edward Bellamy in `The Religion of Solidarity' (1874): 
The instinct of universal solidarity, of the identity of our life 
with all lives, is the centripetal force which binds together 
in certain orbits all orders of beings... The fact of 
individuality with its tendency to particularizations is the 
centrifugal force which hinders the universal fusion, and 
preserves the variety in unity which seems the destined 
condition of being. Thus these mutually balancing forces 
play each its necessary part. 107 
An extremely influential philosopher and writer (we have already noted 
Besant's interest and the influence of Theosophy on Nationalism), 
Bellamy wrote this excerpt long before his most famous utopian novel 
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Looking Backward (1888), which Hill claims sold 10,000 copies a week 
in 1890. He also conceptualises his idea of `nemesis' in this 
unpublished essay, according to biographer A. E. Morgan, and discusses 
the way Christianity provides some relief from the sense of guilt 
spawned by more ancient religions, an idea Gilman does not attribute to 
Bellamy specifically, but a theme she will develop in her own terms, as 
in the poem `The Real Religion' (1914), later discussed. There is much 
of Spencer's theory of equilibrium in this, but in a politicised form more 
useful for Gilman. But while it describes the undignified and wasteful 
condition of woman's economic dependence on men, Bellamy's solution 
in a separation of the sexes is not quite the answer Gilman is looking 
for. Gilman often asserted that she did not intend to denigrate men but 
to establish a basis for an equitable relationship between the sexes. To 
do this required focus on the outmoded and overgrown tradition giving 
social and economic ascendancy to men in order to bring about a 
balance of influence on societal institutions between (heterosexual, it 
should be duly noted) men and women. 
Unfortunately, religion has sanctified and law has established the 
horrifying relation of woman's economic profit to the power of sex 
attraction. She is to become nothing but an egg-sac in her activity of 
race preservation unless the power of self-preservation is restored to her 
(economic activity). 108 Improvement, the third task of humanity, can 
107 Arthur E. Morgan, Edward Bellamy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944) 201 from 
unpublished fragment. 
108 WE 52-59. 
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only occur when both sexes work together (that is, when women have 
the exclusive power of sexual selection, just as men have had) to decide 
what kind of people they wish to make and to educate those people in 
turn to perpetuate the species and continue improvement. Obviously, the 
exclusivity of woman's power in the arena of reproduction begs the 
question of equality, but if nature can be controlled, why not human 
nature? The humorous poem `Similar Cases' (1890) became quite 
popular for its parody of social Darwinian perception. After similar 
examples provided by the Eohippus and the Anthropoidal Ape, who are 
chastised about having to change their natures, it is Neolithic Man's 
turn: 
There was once a Neolithic Man, 
An enterprising wight, 
Who made his chopping implements 
Unusually bright. 
Unusually clever he, 
Unusually brave, 
And he drew delightful Mammoths 
On the borders of his cave. 
To his Neolithic neighbors, 
Who were startled and surprised, 
Said he, `My friends, in course of time, 
We shall be civilized! 
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We are going to live in cities! 
We are going to fight in wars! 
We are going to eat three times a day 
Without the natural cause! 
We are going to turn life upside down 
About a thing called gold! 
We are going to want the earth, and take 
As much as we can hold! 
We are going to wear great piles of stuff 
Outside our proper skins! 
We are going to have Diseases! 
And accomplishments!! And Sins!! 
Then they all rose up in fury 
Against their boastful friend, 
For prehistoric patience 
Cometh quickly to an end. 
Said one, `This is chimerical! 
Utopian! Absurd! ' 
Said another, `What a stupid life! 
Too dull, upon my word! ' 
Cried all, `Before such things can come, 
You idiotic child, 
You must alter Human Nature! ' 
And they all sat back and smiled. 
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Thought they, `An answer to that last 
It will be hard to find! ' 
It was a clinching argument 
To the Neolithic Mind! 
Altering nature, challenging social Darwinism and previously existing 
theories of `human nature' are natural responses for Gilman. In her 
article paralleling the thought of Gilman and Spencer and substantiating 
feminist appropriation of Darwinian theory, Lois Magner claims that 
after Darwin, `science became as powerful as religion in providing a 
rationale for theories of human nature and the proper arrangement of 
society. "°9 Antoinette Brown Blackwell (1825-1921), the first woman 
minister in the United States (Congregationalist) admonished that 
women must confront the "alleged biological `proofs' of female 
inferiority by developing for themselves the scientific basis of their 
pursuit of equality. "110 Magner asserts that Gilman took up Blackwell's 
challenge with the greatest alacrity. Indeed, science enabled Gilman to 
confront religious issues from a gendered perspective. 
The most metaphorically plain example of the intersection of science, 
evolution and morality, the birth control movement, would not have 
been possible without the study of the female body which blossomed, for 
109 Lois N. Magner, 'Darwinism and the Woman Question: The Evolving Views of Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman', Critical Essays on Charlotte Perkins Gilman, J. B. Karpinski, ed. (New York: 
G. K. Hall, 1992) 115-127. Blackwell is quoted in this article from The Sexes Throughout Nature 
(1875; rep. Westport: Hyperion Press, 1985) 235. 
110 Magner 115 
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better or worse, into research on sexual behaviour and medical 
treatment, including the development of gynaecology as a legitimate 
speciality. Margaret Sanger and Marie Stopes, the Malthusian League 
and neo-Malthusians in England, and the National Birth Control League 
in America might not have been possible at any other time in history 
were it not for the fact that science sanctioned the application of reason 
to the question of family limitation and, in spite of the indignation of 
various quarters, thereby legitimised discussion. The neo-Malthusians 
also made self-satisfied associations between a falling British birth rate 
and the very existence, height and breadth of the women's movement. III 
As mentioned before, the social purity movement encompassed religious 
desires for control of both private and public worlds. The repression that 
might ensue from such vigilant activity was not often foreseen. 112 
Gilman was attracted to this sub-movement and helped to organise a 
Social Purity group in California. 113 
Those who resented such discussion and were appalled by activism 
for the cause of birth control led Marie Scopes to a telling last resort. 
Scopes eventually believed herself to be a priestess or prophetess and 
confronted the Catholic Church in 1920 with what she claimed was a 
message from God: A New Gospel to All Peoples: A revelation of God 
uniting physiology and the religions of man. She refuted the teachings 
of Paul on the married state, described the necessity of sexual activity 
111 Bland 202. 
112 Bland 97,95-122. 
113 Hill 182. 
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for its own sake, in order that men and women (and children) be whole 
individuals, proclaimed that sexual union was not designed for the sole 
purpose of creating children, and commanded (through God) that 
couples use the best means of birth control `placed at man's service by 
Science'. 114 Here, confronting actual behaviour, the practical met the 
theoretical in a way which not only challenged previously accepted 
social laws regarding, for example, a woman's duty to submit to her 
husband and procreate if necessary, but also the religious foundations of 
those laws. 
Far from advocating sexual freedom as made possible by science in 
the service of a reasonable God, Gilman, like her contemporary Frances 
Swiney, takes the opposite side of this debate, arguing that the pressure 
of population is the result of 'our own irresponsible indulgence' in her 
article 'Birth Control' (1915). h 15 Rather than refuting the religious 
arguments of those opposed to the dissemination of information 
regarding birth control methods, Gilman offers a rationale for their 
claims. Those who advocate birth control do so for three reasons: 1) 
economic pressure 2) the physical health of the mother 3) `a desire for a 
"safe" and free indulgence of the sex instinct without this natural 
consequence. ' The first two reasons are our own fault; we must correct 
the economic conditions which cause such pressures and we must create 
1 14 June Rose, Marie Stopes and the Sexual Revolution (Boston: Faber & Faber, 1992) 136. 
115 `Birth Control, ' The Forerunner 6 (July 1915) 177-180. 
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the optimal conditions of healthful living necessary for women to have 
natural and healthy periods of maternity. She adds: 
Wiser people, more far-seeing, with a higher standard of 
living to keep up, have accepted their restrictions as final, 
and sought to limit their numbers as to maintain that 
standard for the few. If we would apply our reasoning 
power and united force to secure a fair standard of living for 
all of us, we could go on enjoying our families for many 
centuries. ('Birth Control' 177) 
The final reason, enjoyment, is objected to partly on the grounds of 
religious conviction and partly on the grounds of an antipathy toward the 
notion of free indulgence. Religion provides very serious reasons which 
Gilman, in her optimism, does not actually question, much less refute: 
We are beginning at last to have a higher opinion of God 
that we used to entertain. The modern mind will not credit 
an Infinite Wisdom, an Infinite Love, with motives and 
commands unworthy of the love and wisdom of a mere 
earthly father. ('Birth Control' 178) 
Likewise, science provides an even more serious objection that gives 
weight to the religious concern, and that is the objection to birth control 
on the grounds of what sex union is to be used for. Feelings are relative 
and reactionary from this perspective, which claims that sex is `a 
biological process for the perpetuation of the species, and that its 
continuous indulgence with no regard to reproduction or in direct 
exclusion of reproduction indicates an abnormal development peculiar 
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to our species. ' Moreover, to call a thing natural does not make it right. 
This is an unpopular view, Gilman says, but `it remains true that every 
advance in all human history has been begun by the ideas of a few, even 
of one perhaps, and opposed with cheerful unanimity by all the rest of 
the world. ' 116 
The change to a different way of thinking about the use of sex and to 
a change in an entire standard means that neither one sex nor the other 
will be higher in status: 
the resultant status is not of an emasculate or e-feminate [sic] 
race; or of one violently repressing its desires; but rather that 
of a race whose entire standard has changed; in physical 
inclination, in emotion, and in idea; so that the impulse to that 
form of sex-expression comes only in a yearly season, as with 
other species of the same gestative period [these species are 
unnamed]. ('Birth Control' 180) 
Eugenics, "the science of improving stock" according to founder Francis 
Galton, would focus the issue of reproduction on moral grounds. As 
Lucy Bland explains, genetic purity and moral purity became 
synonymous and even philanthropic concepts, each bolstering the other 
while giving the power of reconstructing society directly to women, 
leading to a relatively small amount of feminist criticism. ' 7 Gilman is 
wholeheartedly absorbed with promoting improvement of the `race', 
116 'Birth Control, ' 180. 
117 Bland 229-231,235. 
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even citing the eugenic benefits of warfare. ' 18 Her utopian novels will 
most fully explore applied eugenics. Religion's claim, and Gilman's 
God who (at least) possesses the sensitivity of an earthly father, are 
validated by science. But the author recognises that this is an unpopular 
`truth'. Herland (1915) will present the case for the control of sexual 
expression in a far more entertaining if equally problematic manner. 
Reviews of Gilman's work, though admittedly difficult to obtain, are 
generally quite positive. There does not appear to have been a strong 
backlash against her writing except among a few offended male 
reviewers and except in so far as women did not live up to her 
expectations of them. The flapper, for example, was a tremendous 
disappointment, perhaps prompting more output from Gilman in an 
attempt to correct a story gone all wrong. But after a time, her 
popularity flagged. Kessler comments on the waning interest in Gilman 
after the Great War and the passage of the women's suffrage amendment 
in 1920, that the `proliferating Freudian pleasure principle' caused the 
`constriction of a nearly ubiquitous Protestant work ethic' and led to a 
distaste for didactic literature. 119 (43) 
Kessler also suggests that Gilman's style may be to blame. 120 
Gilman's mixture of science, philosophy, and didacticism failed to keep 
"8 MMW 208-226. 
119 Kessler, Progress, 43. 
120 Kessler, Progress, 44. 
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her audience at the end, even in a murder mystery in which the evil 
patriarch has been murdered in several different ways to make the point 
brutally clear. And she also virulently attacked Freud as the cause of 
modern problems, particularly the continuation of the view that a 
woman's sexuality was a commodity. She hopefully dismisses Freud's 
'perverted sex philosophy' which `seems to embody the last effort on the 
part of man to maintain his misuse of the female. ' 121 Gilman could 
wage a counter-attack on what she saw as Freud's apparent motivation 
of desire for preserving a man's so-called 'rights' by using her (Ward's) 
scientific theory. Moreover, she could maintain her religious views on 
birth control because they were justified by science, and vice-versa. 
Curiously, like Freud, she would indeed find Judaism to be the 
essentially masculine and patriarchal form of Western religion, but 
unlike Freud, she would celebrate her perception of the feminine appeal 
(or `humanness') of Christianity (in His Religion and Hers) and its 
potential offer of redemption from a life concerned with death and the 
fate of the soul. What Freud most obviously did offer Gilman however, 
as is well-demonstrated by the conscious `conversion' of the male 
narrator of Herland, is psychology itself and the possibility of applying 
scientific principles toward the understanding, education, and control of 
the psyche through techniques of diversion and displacement. 
However, the language of science was man's language, just as 
arbitrary as any other, Dale Spender argues in Man Made Language, but 
121 HH 164. 
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one that appeared to be universal in its supposedly objective description 
of reality such as that Gilman perceived in Spencer, Darwin, and Ward. 
Writing in 1980, Spender reacts to language in a way that disclaims or 
ignores many current insights about the formation and acquisition of 
language. But Gilman would probably have agreed with her in principle 
if not on the question of scientific language. As Spender helpfully 
explains, there `is a new interest in such areas as the philosophy or 
sociology of science in which the question of "objectivity" is being taken 
up, and where old answers are being viewed as inadequate and false'. '22 
The recent work of Theodore Roszak and Evelyn Fox Keller have been 
mentioned (and there are others), and of course there are the anti- 
positivists of the Frankfurt School. Spender herself uses linguistic 
science, or at least the trappings of its theories, as she herself is not a 
linguist, to make her own point clear, and it is difficult to see, if her 
argument is to be taken literally, where her objectivity may lie. The 
introduction of new words and changes of words and usage are an 
important aspect of Spender's solution. Writing itself is the critical 
activity, which ensures that women do not feel trapped in someone else's 
language-world and remain silent. That the words patriarchy and sexism 
exist provides significant evidence that women have begun to create a 
reality for themselves. 
Spender attests to the area of common purpose shared by religion and 
science which Gilman blended together, joining the biological, 
248 
theological and sociological history of women with Darwin's 
evolutionary narrative. Gilman's arguments for changes in literary 
content and plot structure and her own experiments in that area, her 
reinterpretation of the Lord's Prayer, and even her attempt to 'reformulate 
common proverbs demonstrate a similar purpose in reconstructing not 
only language, but, inevitably, thought. 123 But Gilman does this publicly 
within forms of discourse that may actually support dominant hierarchies 
and modes of belief against which feminists, Gilman included, 
traditionally array themselves. 
Left in a `natural' state, according to Gilman, humanity ought to have 
progressed through reason and experience in an evolutionary manner. 
But the consistent economic subordination of woman has thwarted this 
progress, a subordination based only on ideology. Making the 
relationship between ideology and action dynamic, reorienting the use of 
Judeo-Christian religion to serve the ends of life, rather than a possible 
life after death, could reorganise society. All that was needed was a 
`change of mind', and, as Gilman would put it in her early utopia 
Moving the Mountain (1911), a new religion called `Living and Life'. 
The following sections will discuss the concept of utopia, why 
Gilman chooses the genre, and how it applies to her thought. Three of 
Gilman's serialised novels, will be discussed, including Moving the 
Mountain, Herland (1915), and With Her in Ourland (1916). 
122 Dale Spender, Man Made Language (London, Boston, Melbourne, Henley: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1980) 140-141. 
123 HH 170-171. 
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Moving the Mountain addresses the main issue of a religion 
concerned with life rather than death and the afterlife, but becomes 
overwhelmed by frankly terrifying answers to the `problem' of disease, 
immigration, overpopulation, race, and sex as solved by the intensive 
and wholehearted use of eugenics that would not be out of place in 
Aldous Huxley's anti-utopian Brave New World. But what it most 
suffers from, perhaps, is its immediacy to the present day and its lack of 
a convincing ideological foundation. John Robertson is lost in Tibet in 
1910 and returns in 1940 to find everything completely changed. 
Because of the relative brevity of the time lapse, people like himself are 
still around and all but a few have been converted. These people show 
for all those eminently practical purposes how it was done and explain 
why, which discourages convictions that it is possible to move `Beyond 
Socialism', as John's sister Nellie puts it. Moreover, the sweeping 
change in religion is comprehensive in a social sense, but not compelling 
in a psychological sense, for the society produced (without revolution) is 
not justified strongly enough. The religion of socialism does not work 
under circumstances of such gradual change, and the political 
component is skipped over in order to concentrate on material 
fundamentals which begs the question of which comes first, theory or 
practice. 
Herland is able to redeem the idea of utopia, but only at the expense 
of sacrificing men entirely from the social experiment to show what 
religion should truly mean. Ironically, Herland's religion is quite 
different from that of Moving the Mountain in the aesthetic sense, and 
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very similar to Christianity. It restores the emotional purpose lacking in 
the previous novel's religious experiment, emphasising the 
psychological life of the society much more than in the previous novel. 
Moreover, the unnamed country is much prettier, more remote and less 
jarring for not being the hands-on re-creation of cities we already know. 
Man, in this context, is the last thing to be changed, the finishing touch. 
Herland is able to concentrate much more intently on the differences 
between women and men and therefore on the way the foreign religion, 
which is so similar to that of the women in theoretical terms, can be 
common to both, finally uniting them in purpose. Is it this similarity 
which actually demands the reintroduction of men to an all-female 
society, in order to fulfil the demands of an implicit Christian narrative? 
Or was Herland doomed to stasis to begin with? It may be Gilman's 
pragmatic concern with application and the function of her utopia that 
leads her to Christianity. The attempt at the barest of differences 
between sexes and within sex relationships appears as a compromise. 
Ironically, the practice of Christian teaching which is realised in a one- 
sex world meets only with difficulty when the structure that makes the 
ideology fit, the heterosexual family, becomes a societal goal. 
With Her in Ourland, the sequel to Herland, is not really a utopian 
novel, rather, a dystopia or anti-utopia which takes Gilman's present day 
world as the horror to be avoided. The heroine of Herland accompanies 
her new husband back to his world to study and analyse it, hopefully to 
save it, though she cannot do this all by herself and eventually takes her 
findings back to her country for evaluation. Swiftly demonstrating her 
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ability to master the various languages they encounter and taking 
copious notes, Ellador unfortunately concludes that Judaism is very 
much at fault, due to the peculiar talent of Jews in `literary expression', 
through which they have been able to perpetuate a 'race egotism' (which 
Christianity has actually enabled). Ellador believes there is much truth 
and good will in our religions, if they would only be used, much as the 
devotion we used to hold for kings, she argues, should be transferred to 
democracy. 124 There is much inconsistency in this serialised novel, as 
though Gilman were rushing through and changing her mind rather often 
about what she really wanted Ellador to tell us. It was much easier in 
Herland, where there was only the risk of offending a few fictional men. 
This novel attempts to apply the ethics of Herland to Ourland in order to 
save it. 
124 With Her in Ourland, IX-X. 
V. WOMAN ON THE EDGE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: REDISCOVERING 
UTOPIA 
Spender's conclusions in Man Made Language regarding the 
language of science and the possibility of women creating their own 
language leave aside the question of transcendence discussed by 11. Lee 
Gershuny in her article `The Linguistic Transformation of Womanhood' 
(1984), which confronts the activity of rewriting language with its final 
product; what is it? That is, what kind of world is to be created by this 
new language, and are the language and the world view common to 
women? Fantasy literature, for Gershuny, provides the answer by 
making female experience visible. Gershuny also believes, with critic 
Carol Pearson, that `in feminist utopian fiction in general, women seem 
to agree about the kind of society they want. " 
Whether that is true or not, it is true that many women have been 
attracted to the utopian tradition at least since the nineteenth century, as 
Carol Farley Kessler shows in her anthology of what she identifies as the 
feminist examples of American women writing utopian stories and 
novels between 1836-1919.2 Also writing in the 1980s, Kessler makes 
the curious distinction between what she regards as feminist utopian 
works and those utopian works written by women which are not 
1 H. Lee Gershuny, 'The Linguistic Transformation of Womanhood', Women in Search of Utopia: 
Mavericks and Mythmakers, ed. Ruby Rohrlick, Elaine Hoffman Baruch (New York: Schocken, 
1984) 189-199; 193. 
2 Carol Farley Kessler, Daring to Dream: Utopian Stories by United States Women, 1836-1919 
(Boston, London, Melbourne, Henley: Pandora Press, 1984). 
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feminist. `Feminist' here means that they deal with `feminist values', 
which Kessler gleans from Olive Banks' Faces of Feminism: A Study of 
Feminism as a Social Movement (1980) and which include: a) social 
reform and moral guardianship b) Enlightenment philosophy, concern 
with reason, natural rights, autonomy c) communitarian socialism. 
Kessler's array of criteria which designate utopia in the case of 
feminists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is helpful in so 
far as we accept these definitions of feminist values, but Kessler says 
little about the genre or tradition of utopia because she believes enough 
has been said regarding the history of the utopias of men; rather, she 
prefers to separate the utopias of women (the feminist ones, that is) from 
those of men because they are essentially different somehow, or perhaps 
she would like them to be, even though some of them obviously are not, 
for they have been excluded. What her book depends on is a working 
definition of utopia, and Kessler concentrates on function as the 
determining factor. The didactic purpose of certain literature, including 
Aesop's Fables and Everyman, the medieval morality play, is 
highlighted as well as much late nineteenth century literature `lately 
decried by twentieth-century critics as moralistic'. 3 Yet Kessler urges 
some reconsideration of the term didactic as used pejoratively, for much 
recent fiction by women, she explains, including utopian novels of 
which a great many were written during the 1970s, has received 
approval of critics like Rachel Blau DuPlessis. DuPlessis lauds the 
3 Kessler, Daring to Dream 4. 
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speculative nature of such narratives which contain elements from 
`assertive discourse' (e. g. sermons, manifestos, fables, tracts, speeches) 
and analyse the past while projecting into the future, provide collective 
protagonists which embody Socratic questions, and also unreal elements 
which encourage the reader to dislodge himself or herself from the 
acceptance of the known world. This loosening encourages the reader's 
mind to be more receptive to change, and Kessler quotes: `An ethical art 
moves the reader beyond acceptance of existing values and institutions'. 
4 Thus transcendence is achieved through application. Gilman would 
agree. 
It would be well to consider, in spite of the historically specific 
feminist ruminations of Spender, Kessler, and DuPlessis, however, just 
what utopia, or the utopian tradition, has been. This is a difficult 
question to answer because utopia is notoriously difficult to define in the 
first place, according to scholars of utopia. Perhaps the most elegantly 
simple description I have discovered is that of Ruth Levitas in The 
Concept of Utopia (1990): 'Utopia is about how we would live and what 
kind of world we would live in if we could do just that. '5 Afterward, 
Levitas asks the grittier questions: `Are all images of the good life 
utopian, or only those set in the future and intended to be implemented? 
Should the pursuit of spiritual perfection be included, or paradises 
beyond death, or does utopia refer only to transformed versions of the 
Rachel Blau DuPlessis, 'The Feminist Apologues of Lessing, Piercy, and Russ'. Frontiers: A 
Journal of Women Studies 4 (1) (Spring 1979) 1-2. 
5 Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (New York, London: Philip Allan, 1990) 1. 
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social world in which we live our lives before death? Are lines to be 
drawn between utopia and religion, or utopia and "real" politics? And 
what is utopia for? Does it help to change the world or to stabilize 
existing societies? '6 
Levitas comes to no clear conclusions regarding these questions, after 
surveying the history of what others have thought utopia to mean and to 
be. To varying degrees, content, form, and function, she explains, tend 
to govern the descriptions others use to define utopia, and such 
definitions may or may not be consistent within themselves. Levitas 
prefers an `analytic' definition of utopia which asserts that the 
fundamental element in utopia is desire, desire for a better way of being 
and moves beyond definitions of utopia as an alternative world, whether 
possible or not: 
It involves the imagining of a state of being in which the 
problems which actually confront us are removed or 
resolved, often, but not necessarily, through the imagining 
of a state of the world in which the scarcity gap is closed or 
the "collective problem" solved. 7 
`[S]carcity gap' refers to the difference Herbert Marcuse observes, 
after Freud and Marx, between the historical condition of the scarcity of 
resources and the repression of the desire for those resources (originally 
understood as Freud's concept of Eros) which in turn produces society. 
To put it crudely, then, if all resources and desires were balanced, the 
6 Levitas 2. 
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scarcity gap would be closed. Much more ought to be said about 
Marcuse (and Ernst Bloch), but what is important here is to understand 
that Marcuse, according to Levitas, does not propose a solution of 
Cockaygne-like proportions, but rather the `qualitative change in the 
character of needs and wants, such that material consumption by the 
currently affluent will decrease, while "real" needs, wants, and 
satisfactions increase for all. '8 The Marxist `collective problem' is also 
important for discussion, but these are examples which Levitas uses to 
illustrate her point that an analytical definition applies to various 
conceptions of social and economic problems that prevent utopia from 
being a reality in the social or private sphere. Moreover, the pursuit of 
`spiritual or psychological states' may be included in this definition as 
well as other forms of behaviour. Function is not limited. And this 
definition `allows us to explore the ways in which form, content, and 
function interact and are conditioned by the social context of utopia. '9 
Levitas' definition lends itself nicely to an interdisciplinary approach 
which can helpfully be used to study Gilman and her utopias. But 
Gilman's use of literature in particular is what causes her writing to fit 
into a more general scheme of literary study. 
Krishan Kumar's view that utopia itself is an essentially literary form 
which is purely Western and begins with Thomas More offers more 
general insights regarding the history of writing utopia. In addition to 
Levitas 191. 
8 Levitas 139. 
9 Levitas 192. 
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the classical notion of the ideal city, he emphasises the impact of 
Christian millenarianism (its antecedents being found in Jewish 
messianism and the book of Daniel) on the tradition as fundamental to 
its development for the belief that there would be, after the Apocalypse, 
a heaven on earth. And this would be a foretaste `the more delightful for 
being fleeting, of that eternal bliss which the faithful would enjoy in the 
everlasting life at the right hand of God. '10 Even though the Council of 
Ephesus pronounced millenarianism a heresy in AD 431, the movement 
continued to ferment, though quietly during the Middle Ages, which 
produced no utopias under the weight of Augustinian contemptus mundi 
which expresses so strongly, even in Augustine's City of God, the 
conviction that `My kingdom is not of this world. ' Kumar believes the 
almost `willful' obscurity of life as described by the millennium myth 
corresponds to the same obscurity of life presented by socialist utopias. 
But this uncertainty appears to fuel actual attempts at the development of 
this vision and leads to transformed behaviour `often on a revolutionary 
scale, ' which includes the activities of a myriad of sects and 
experimental communities, particularly those in eighteenth century 
America such as the Shakers, Rappites, and Oneida Pcrfectionists. 12 
Kumar points out that those actual communities which lasted the 
longest, like these millenarian groups, were religious in nature (like the 
10 Krishan Kumar, Utopianism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991) 9. 
11 Kumar 9. 
12 Kumar 9-10. 
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Shakers who lasted 180 years, the Rappites lasted 100, and the Amana 
community continued for 90 years). Tellingly, those communities which 
were entirely secular, such as New Harmony, Brook Farm, the Fourierist 
Phalanxes, and the Icarian Settlements lasted less than six years on 
average and some only a few months. 13 It should be remembered that 
these sects were famously egalitarian regarding the position of women 
and liberal, even promiscuous about sexual matters, perhaps drawing 
into question the truly liberating quality of the experiment for women. 
After close study of the sexual practices of such communities, overtly 
religious or otherwise, Louis J. Kern believes that their intentions in 
regulating sexual practice (only at Oneida was widespread sexual 
activity encouraged, but within a controlled environment) were in fact to 
restore a threatened patriarchy. 14 It would be interesting to know, 
though it seems quite unlikely, if homosexuality was ever on the agenda. 
Kumar is at pains to argue that utopia is also a secular form of 
thought, which necessitates human agency in the achievement of the 
perfectibility of man and life on earth. Thus, while all of the utopias 
written through the end of the seventeenth century were religious in 
purpose, and were often written by priests and monks, science became 
subordinate to these ends and established a literary tradition of achieving 
the perfected vision, with science finally serving some ethical and social 
ideal. This model easily adapted itself to the more worldly views of the 
13 Kumar 76. 
14 Louis J. Kern, An Ordered Love: Sex Roles and Sexuality in Victorian Utopias; the Shakers, the 
Mormons, and the Oneida Community (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1981) 286-287. 
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Enlightenment. 15 Examples of Renaissance utopias include Tommaso 
Campanella's City of the Sun (1623), Johann Valentin Andreae's 
Christianopolis (1619) (which literally demonstrates the melding of 
Christian and classical influences on the genre), Francis Bacon's New 
Atlantis (1627) and Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy (1621- 
1638). 
More's utopia, Kumar argues, is best seen as a kind of novel and 
most definitely contributes to the development of the conventional novel 
in the eighteenth century. The effect of movements toward democratic 
reform on the novel may also be pertinent. In any case, literary realism 
offered `a vast repertoire of techniques for at least "domesticating the 
improbable" (Wells had written that it benefited the utopian (or science 
fiction) writer "to domesticate the impossible hypothesis"). 16 Quoting 
David Lodge, Kumar describes the elements of realism that enable the 
genres of utopian and science fiction to succeed at creating "pseudo- 
historical verisimilitude" as in Orwell's London of 1984, which seems 
just as real as the London of Dickens or the Paris of Zola. '7 Kumar's 
views of literary realism and the development of the utopian novel are 
helpful, but his insistence on viewing the utopian genre as a non- 
religious product after the Enlightenment and apparent secularisation of 
such writing is somewhat problematic. It is as though he would have us 
15 Kumar 54-55. 
16 Kumar 25. 
17 Kumar 25-26. 
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see the Utopian imagination as a secularised imagination after a certain 
point in time. Kumar does not consider the effect of process (whether it 
be transformation or displacement, as discussed by Green in Chapter I) 
in the business of religious change or the ethical implications of utopia 
generally. 
Before her courtship with Houghton, in 1896, the same year she met 
Ward at the Woman's Suffrage Convention, Gilman attended the 
International Socialist and Labor Congress in London and met and 
visited a galaxy of famous thinkers and writers. She went not as a 
Socialist, but as a representative from the Alameda County, California, 
Federation of Trades. She rejected Marx, but not Socialism: 
My Socialism was of the early humanitarian kind, based on 
the first exponents, French and English, with the American 
Enthusiasm of Bellamy. The narrow and rigid `economic 
determinism' of Marx with its `class consciousness' and 
`class and struggle' I never accepted, nor the political 
methods pursued by Marxians. (Living 131) 
It seems that Gilman may have liked the qualities of Bellamy that 
William Morris overlooked in his criticism of `machine life' in 
Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888). Countering with News fron: 
Nowhere (1890), Morris desired to emphasise a truth in art that seemed 
to be missing from Bellamy's utopia. Gilman admired Bellamy, saying 
that he had no style and had not invented much, but did put in popular 
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form the "truth of ages" just when the world needed it. 18 She liked his 
optimism, logic, "largeness of thought" and "immense human love". 19 
Gilman admired Morris also, but not to the same extent. 20 Bellamy 
advocated evolutionary change as exemplified by his portrayal of Boston 
through protagonist Julian West, who was put to sleep in a trance in 
1887 and awakens to find himself in the home of Dr. Leete and his 
daughter Edith in the year 2000. A gradual shift of capitalist ownership 
to the entire people of the nation, bloodless and simple, is described. A 
very complex hierarchy of labour replaces the corporate world, however, 
and women and men are separated into their own 'industrial armies'. 
Unhindered sexual selection has also vastly improved the race. 
Religious practice is unhindered and even made convenient, though it is 
obviously Christian. West and his hosts listen to a lengthy sermon 
broadcast over an intercom system. In the sermon the priest, Mr. Barton, 
emphasises the realisation of the spirit of Christianity in the new age: 'It 
is very easy to believe in the Fatherhood of God in the twentieth 
century. ' 21 
Gilman became a lecturer and writer for this evolutionary socialism 
called Nationalism, especially between 1890 and 1895. Government 
ownership of transportation and utilities, educational reform, co- 
'8 Lane 169-173. 
19 Lane 169-173. 
20 Living 209,212. Gilman met Morris at the Congress and at his home in Hammersmith and 
described his death on October 3 of that year as 'a great loss to the progress of England, of the 
world. ' 
21 Bellamy 200-201. 
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operation and community were advocated. But these Nationalists were 
middle-class intellectuals, not activists. Kessler argues that it was the 
idealism of the Nationalists that excited Gilman, `who did not question 
the paternalistic and racist tone of some of its thinking. '22 While it is 
true that Gilman often seems unaware of such a 'tone' of thinking, there 
still appears to be an emerging difference between Gilman's concept of 
utopia and that of her male counterparts, though she is not entirely 
certain how to convey this. These differences beg the question of 
whether utopia is indeed the right vehicle for her to use. 
Levitas' identification of the admittedly complex element of desire in 
the utopian tradition is taken to the level of cultural psychology by 
another critic, David Bleich, in Utopia: The Psychology of a Cultural 
Fantasy (1970). This dissertation, actually published in 1984, describes 
the authors of utopian novels, to use the author's own later description of 
his work, as `paralyzed in masculine adolescence, appropriating the 
utopian genre in order to conceal their individual frustration as artists 
and social reformers, and to express their own wishes for traditional 
political power. '23 Utopia is seen as a `peculiarly masculine genre, ' like 
sage writing, and Bleich believes it is the product of the Oedipal conflict 
as schematised in early childhood by object relations psychoanalysis. 
22 Kessler, Progress, 23. 
23 'David Bleich, Utopia: The Psychology of a Cultural Fantasy (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research 
Press, 1984). Self-description from 'Sexism and the Discourse of Perfection' American 
Transcendental Quarterly 3 (1989) 11. 
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The business of object relations psychoanalysis is not necessarily helpful 
or necessary to Bleich's argument, but the outcome identifies utopia as 
`the name of a feeling rather than a plan of action. ' That is, an infantile 
wish for nutritional merging, that the father will be gone and the mother 
will always be at the child's disposal, is mobilised by adolescent 
masculine energy and, socially, becomes transferred to the relationship 
between the individual and the rest of society. 
Bleich explains that fantasy names the feeling of childhood by 
expressing for the adult what the child lacks the language to express, 
there being several phases of adult fantasy corresponding to earlier 
childhood phases. Erik Erikson's demonstration of the mutual 
interaction of individual development with social values establishes a 
paradigm for examining public fantasies as `instrumental in creating the 
psychological groundwork that is to form the personality of the child in 
his or her subsequent adult world. '24 Key public fantasies of this world, 
in turn, form a generalisation of the childhood fantasies of its leading 
figures and the mythologies of the general population. Studying what he 
calls the `Transition Period' (1870-1914), Bleich takes two authors, H. 
G. Wells and Henry James, as examples of `utopian personalities', but 
Plato, Thomas More, and Hitler also fall into this category. Identifying 
the most easily recognisable element of the utopian emotion to be the 
Christian fantasy, `a fundamental of culture, ' which subsequent 
millenarian activity translated into social action, Bleich explains: 
24 Bleich, Utopia 5-6 
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the implicit `now' in the fantasy's quest for salvation was 
made explicit. By the time More invented the word `utopia' 
the `new world' across the sea and the new printed word at 
home rendered `salvation now' worth working for. Through 
More, the Christian fantasy joined with the notion of its 
possible realization to produce the utopian fantasy, and 
hence the utopian emotion as we commonly know it today. 
(128) 
Thomas More, of course, wrote what is largely considered to be the 
first true utopia in Utopia (1516), which Bleich sees as one of the tests 
of the `efficacy' required of the Christian fantasy in the age of the 
Reformation. Believing Christian rebellion to have been in the air long 
before Martin Luther, Bleich tells his version of events in Christian 
history through the Middle Ages, highlighting millenarian activity. 
What is most interesting about this version of events is the way Bleich 
finally compares More to Thomas Muntzer, who, as an extremist 
exponent of Luther, first broke away from Catholic orthodoxy and died a 
martyr, like More, defending his own (millenarian) orthodoxy (League 
of the Elect) and actively attempting to 'do the job in reality'. This was 
Muntzer's adolescent mistake. More kept to the literary sphere and the 
rules of social decorum: 
Both men, in short, were motivated by the same fantasy and 
were troubled by analogous crises of identity. But More, 
owing to features common to his personality and his society, 
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expressed it in terms of traditional adult behaviors and 
thereby gained sainthood; Muntzer remains in the gallery of 
historical demons. (21) 
There is an echo here of the different approaches of Besant and Gilman, 
though the point won't be pressed. While it is probably not quite 
accurate under most circumstances to consider H. G. Wells a literary or 
historical demon, it is true that Bleich compares Wells and his work, A 
Modern Utopia (1905) to Henry James and The Golden Bowl (1905) and 
reaches a similar conclusion. James moved on to adulthood, making the 
transition from literary realism to concentration on more subjective 
experience while Wells stayed paralysed by adolescence. But Bleich 
ultimately finds this whole analysis of neurosis inadequate (and so do I) 
to describe the tremendous enthusiasm for the utopian vision in England 
and America at the turn-of-the-century and takes his concerns with 
utopia a step further in 1989, in his article `Sexism and the Discourse of 
Perfection. ' 
In a fresher vein, then, Plato and More still cannot disavow 
themselves of this negative view of utopia, a `genre invented and 
sustained by men who wanted power, didn't get it, and wrote books 
about the best of all possible worlds to create a vicarious kingship for 
themselves. '25 Utopia is about power. Bleich explains that masculine 
utopists such as Plato and More, but including Bellamy, Morris, and 
Wells, were either less privileged members of a privileged class or 
25 Bleich, Sexism 12. 
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secondary figures among novelists and social reformers who 
`nevertheless bore an unconscious sense of privilege that came from 
being men' and consequently (women writers pursuing utopia included) 
the utopian novels and schemes written are addressed to `other men in 
the hierarchy of social privilege. '26 Moreover: 
The revolutionaries, the utopists, the evangelicals and other 
clerics, and the traditional masculine academy all participate 
in a discourse of perfection which either justifies war in the 
name of a higher morality, or articulates the hope for social 
justice with the vocabulary of religious salvation, or both. 
(13) 
Asking whether feminist utopianism can challenge this view or even 
change the academy itself, Bleich examines Gilman's Herland and finds 
it lacking. While certain contemporary feminist critics and theologians 
like Rosemary Ruether identify `the lie', 27 Gilman is included in the 
26 Bleich, Sexism 14. 
27 Bleich quotes from Ruether's `The Big Lie' in Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist 
Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983) 264-265: 
'Those who rule pay their professors to proliferate lies, to generate a mental universe that turns 
everything upside down. The Big Lie makes those who toil appear to be idle, while those who 
speak into dictaphones appear to be the hard workers. It makes women appear the offspring of 
males, and males the primary creators of babies. It makes matter the final devolution of the mind, 
and mind the original source of all being, It regards the body as an alien tomb of the soul, and the 
soul as growing strong the more it weakens the body. It abstracts the human from the earth and 
God from the cosmos, and says that that which is abstracted is the original, and the first, and can 
exist alone and independent. 
The Big Lie tells us that we are strangers and sojourners on this planet, that our flesh, our blood, 
our instincts for survival are our enemies. Originally we lived as disincarnate orbs of light in the 
heavenly heights. We have fallen to this earth and into this clay through accident or sin. We must 
spend our lives suppressing our hungers and thirsts and shunning our fellow beings, so that we can 
dematerialize and fly away again to our stars. ' 
It is said that mothers particularly are the enemy, responsible for our mortal flesh. To become 
eternal and everlasting we must flee the body, the woman, and the world.... 
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wave of nineteenth-century utopianism in which `no novel challenged 
the idea of divine rule as manifested in chosen rulers. '28 Like Ruether, 
who assembles a scale of events leading to patriarchal domination 
(control of the womb, exploited labour, rape of the earth and its peoples, 
`the big lie', and the disclosure of divine wisdom), Bleich attacks the 
underlying hierarchies present in these utopias and their notions of 
perfectibility, which assume that those lower on the scale will have to 
rise with the majority of people being `deceived into collaboration with 
sexism by religious ideology, which itself establishes the discourse of 
perfection. ' 29 
Bleich, finally, does not believe that Gilman transformed the genre 
into `something more authentic than it was in the hands of men. '30 
Rather, he argues that it is unfortunate that 'insofar as the discourse of 
perfection is a received cultural habit, it tries to inhibit initiatives, such 
as Gilman's, to change it. '31 It is true that Gilman both recognises and 
participates in the game when she argues that the thought of the world is 
made and `handed out' to us by the makers of books. But it is equally 
obvious that she intends men to read her work and be horrified and 
provoked, then proselytised, in spite of whatever concessions we may 
see her making to their world views. 
28 Bleich, Sexism 15. 
29 Bleich, Sexism 15. Ruether 259-266. 
30 Bleich Sexism 17. 
31 Bleich, Sexism 17. 
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Bleich's view is corroborated by Thomas Galt Peyser in 
`Reproducing Utopia: Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Herland' (1992). 32 
Peyser takes issue with critical readings such as those of Susan Gubar 
(and Ann Lane, biographer and editor) which stress Gilman's use of 
humour and `rely too heavily on the assumption that a refusal to portray 
the existent amounts to a rejection of social order, overlooking the 
possibility that even a vociferously adversarial ideal can underwrite 
dominant ideology. '33 He explains: `This in fact was particularly likely 
in Gilman's America, where the espousal of radical causes had become a 
therapeutic diversion for many members of the middle class. '34 
Most insightful is Peyser's critique of Gubar's assertion that it is an 
`abusive' or `probable' reality which `prompts women to imagine a 
revolutionary possible. '35 The utopian vision is supposed to inhabit an 
imaginary space, a place outside the prescribed space of culture, but this 
necessarily depends on the pre-existence of `a utopian imagination, a 
realm of interior freedom sequestered from the necessitarian dictates of 
the patriarchs. '36 Utopia requires its opposite in order to exist. Though 
he seems to be demanding an impossibly pure form of utopia, Peyser 
identifies the problem of `dominant ideology, ' if not outright masculinity 
32 Thomas Galt Peyser, 'Reproducing Utopia: Charlotte Perkins Gilman and llerland, ' Studies in 
American Fiction, 20 (1992) 1-16. This essay has been substantially reworked to emphasise 
Gilman's participation in imperialist dialogue in Utopia and Cosmopolis: Globalization in the Era 
of American Realism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998). 
33 Peyser 1. 
34 Peyser 1. 
3s Peyser 1. 
36 Peyser 2. 
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inherent in the genre as well as the question of how Gilman can be 
considered a radical and an outsider and bearer of truth for feminists if 
such literature is truly autonomous from history. 37 
Gilman's reworking of the Lord's Prayer and her remarks to her 
fiancd, George Houghton Gilman, that she wants to find sound sociology 
as she sees it in the teachings of Christ, her vaunting of middle-class 
values and ways of life and her privileging of racial purity and the 
hegemony of the white race bear witness to a conscious adherence to 
convictions which do not contradict the `discourse of perfection'. 
Nevertheless she is still perceived as a radical, a fact which stresses her 
historical contingency and the value of her own undoubted attempts to 
subvert convention and tradition. 'The Yellow Wall-paper' is most 
popular today, perhaps, as many argue, because it succeeds in the 
metaphorical and linguistic vein where other stories appear to fail. But 
what marks Gilman's utopias for continually rewarding study is their 
concern with the entire sphere of social relation, the religious 
foundations of social behaviour, and the problems presented by sexual 
difference, difficulties which have not been resolved by the evolution of 
an androgynous ideal or neuter sex, or universal transcendence through 
gnosis, or otherwise. 
37 Peyser 2. 
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® Tramps in Paradise: the short distance utopia 
One of the most distinctive features of the human mind is to 
forecast better things... This natural tendency to hope, 
desire, foresee and then, if possible, obtain, has been 
largely diverted from human usefulness since our goal was 
placed after death, in Heaven. With all our hope in 
'Another World, ' we have largely lost hope of this one. 
Some minds, still keen in the perception of better human 
possibilities, have tried to write out their vision and give it 
to the world. From Plato's ideal Republic to Wells' Day of 
the Comet we have had many Utopias set before us, best 
known of which are that of Sir Thomas More and the great 
modern instance, 'Looking Backward. ' 
All of these have one or two distinctive features-an 
element of extreme remoteness, or the introduction of some 
mysterious outside force. 'Moving the Mountain' is a short 
distance Utopia, a baby Utopia, a little one that can grow. 
It involves no other change than a change of mind, the mere 
awakening of people, especially the women, to existing 
possibilities. It indicates what people might do, real people, 
now living, in thirty years-if they would. 
One man, truly aroused and redirecting his energies, 
can change his whole life in thirty years. 
So can the World. 
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Gilman, Preface to Moving the 
Mountain 
It is significant that while there are references throughout Gilman's 
other fiction and short stories to religion in the form of ministers and 
sermons and concepts of God's will, it is only in the more expansive 
novels, where space allows more experimentation and explication, that 
religion becomes central. 
The self-consciously titled `A Woman's Utopia, ' a fragment of a 
serial which Gilman started publishing in 1907 in a failed magazine 
(called The Times Magazine), conveys the author's intention of re- 
writing utopia for women. Christian Socialism, in the form of a local 
minister and member of humanitarian debating society, inspires a group 
of women to `spiritual and practical' revival, which in turn sparks 
revision and reform in social development. The heroine, Hope 
Cartwright, is given twenty million dollars by her boyfriend to employ as 
she sees fit for twenty years while he, Morgan G. Street, travels about 
(for they have had some serious arguments preventing their marriage). 
In 1927, Street returns to New York to learn that the revival organised 
the women. The money funded a political party for reform as well as 
projects in child-culture, apartment hotels, socialised industries, and 
municipal utilities. 38 Street observes the improved status of women in 
38 Gary Scharnhorst, Charlotte Perkins Gilman (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1985) 81-82. The 
fragment is located with Gilman's papers at Radcliffe College. Scharnhorst does not give exact 
references. 
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the new society, is in the process of being converted, and had the story 
continued probably would have married Hope. 39 
Scharnhorst's summary, explaining that the central ethical issue in 
this story is the removal of economic dependency from the condition of 
women, is augmented by Kessler. Some of the details of the new society 
include the religious tenet of `Love in Action' (religion having become 
the study of ethics, the science of human conduct) the Upgrade 
Publication Company and a science of child culture which encourages 
the development of humanity 'from egoism to socioism. '40 'Love in 
Action' teaches that it is one's duty to serve beyond the immediate 
family and that those social services constitute worship, much the way 
they do in Besant's Theosophy and as they will in Herland. This piece 
prefigures the pattern of all subsequent utopian experiments and 
foregrounds the religious aspect at the outset as the galvanising force of 
the new society. 
In 1912, Gilman published in The Forerunner a parable of `an 
entirely new form of Government-a Democracy' -- a very short story 
(two pages) called `A Strange Land'. Aesthetically, it resembles both 
William Morris' London in News From Nowhere and Tierland, where all 
wealth, beauty, growth and progress are `made' by the people. The 
`ridiculous amount of satisfaction' which the people are said to derive 
from such beauty reaches its peak in the schools, the most beautiful 
buildings they can make: `This is where we worship God... improving 
39 Scharnhorst 82. 
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the image as fast as we can. '41 The narrator comments parenthetically: 
`Now we were told long since that man was made in the image of God, 
and some of us believed it, but it did not occur to us to consider if the 
images were a credit to the original'. 
The making of better people as the object of social activity informs 
both this fragmentary story and Moving the Mountain, where the New 
Religion called `Living and Life' is the most important development in 
society, and that which makes all the rest of the material changes 
possible. In this serial, Gilman uses what Scharnhorst calls her `reform 
naturalism' (similar to Kessler's `reform realism, ' though it takes 
Reform Darwinism into account) which made it possible to transcend 
the contradiction of design and purpose inherent in conventional 
naturalism: `Gilman was no less scientific than Dreiser [in The 
Financier (1910)], just as Ward was no less scientific than Spencer. '42 
As the novel seeks to present things as they could be very soon and in a 
very realistic way, it employs both the techniques of utopian novelists 
and realist novelists like Dreiser, Jack London, and Upton Sinclair. 
Because it seeks to distance itself from the `proper' male version of 
utopia, however, it loses its utopian quality and becomes less effective as 
a realist novel. Gilman's way of explaining how a tramp becomes a 
Professor of Ethics when `Living and Life' is taken to heart becomes too 
40 Kessler, Progress 49; cites page numbers 372-375, chap. 3 of story. 
41 `A Strange Land, ' The Forerunner, Vol. 3,8 (August 1912): 207-208; Kessler, Progress 182- 
185. 
42 Scharnhorst 89. 
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immediate for a comfortable escapist fictional experience, but is this not 
the aim of the reformer? 
The preface is a quite accurate description of what this novel tries to 
do, in removing what Gilman sees as the `remoteness' and unreality 
from previous men's utopias. Setting the novel in the year 1940, only 
thirty years in the future (she adds ten years to the span of 'A Woman's 
Utopia') becomes a risky proposition, however, for with a dose of 
realism an unwillingness to suspend disbelief on the part of the reader is 
more likely. Changes which are intended to seem so immediate and 
possible, the didacticism of the novel personified in the figure of Nellie, 
are less likely to inspire. Indeed, the social changes depicted in the 
novel which include women keeping their maternal names, commuting 
couples, and independent and single career-women, are the norm rather 
than the exception now, though it took longer than Gilman hoped for this 
to occur. 
What is shocking for the modem western reader, in the midst of this 
almost comforting normality, is the highly organised system of 
`humaniculture' which weeds out degenerates, maintains a regulated 
population, demands `Compulsory Socialization' for immigrants, makes 
the transmission of syphilis and other diseases a crime, and forbids those 
with such diseases or other undesirable characteristics to mate. While 
this is quite exciting in the science fiction genre, it is horrifying in an age 
when we seem to have decided that anything, including human cloning, 
is possible; the notion of accepting this as a reform tract rather than 
revolutionary apocalypticism is out of the question. But 1912, when the 
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novel was issued as a single volume, as Schamhorst helpfully points out, 
was the `height of the eugenics craze. '43 The Eugenics Education 
Society was founded in 1907 and Francis Galton became Honorary 
President in 1909 (he was knighted for his contribution to science). The 
society began publishing its journal, the Eugenics Review, also in 1909, 
and organised an International Eugenics Congress in 1912.44 Besant's 
prescriptions for progress and the pervasive concept of degeneracy have 
already been addressed. It therefore seems likely that Gilman's 
proposals were not entirely shocking to her audience. They seem to 
undermine the pertinence of her narrative to the late twentieth century 
cultural values of inclusiveness, multiculturalism, and political 
correctness. But what makes the story important, though less 
compelling than Herland, is the way religion is used to justify these new 
social values. 
John Robertson, the protagonist and narrator, is the son of a 
Methodist minister and a 'Yankee' mother. Having developed a talent 
for languages and become a philologist, Robertson goes off on an 
expedition to India and Tibet, eager for 'a sight of those venerable races, 
those hoary scriptures, those time-honored customs. '45 Of course, he 
falls off a precipice and is rescued by native Tibetans, good Buddhist 
people, he says, who would teach him `what they knew' and accept him 
43 Scharnhorst 89. 
44 Bland 226-227. 
as Moving the Mountain (New York: The Co-Operative Press, 1912) 12 (hereafter referred to 
parenthetically in the text or as MTM in notes). 
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into their community for thirty years, until his sister Ellen (now Nellie) 
sets out to find him and finally identifies his belt and his white face 
under the hood of his peasant coat. Immediately upon recognising 
Nellie, Robertson falls again, conveniently hitting his head and 
forgetting all about his experience with the peasants. In this way, and 
through the treatment of his Tibetan clothing (below), Robertson is 
rescued from any identity with an unacceptable culture. Since bringing 
him back to the United States, Nellie has encouraged him to write about 
his new life in order to relieve the `pressure' and Robertson agrees it is a 
useful process in his re-education while relieving `mental tension' 
(MTM 11). 
The only thing Robertson recalls of his experience before becoming 
lost in the Himalayas is having read a six month-old newspaper 
explaining that `Mrs. Eddy' (Mary Baker Eddy (1821-1910), founder of 
the Christian Science movement)46 had been dead quite some time and 
that a new religion had `burst forth and was sweeping the country, madly 
taken up by the women' (MTM 12). Since losing his rather selective 
memory again, he is glad of his new life and has 'no longer any interest 
in those venerable races and time-honored customs. ' lie remembers not 
one day of the thirty years he has lost, and picks up where he was 
mentally at the age of twenty-five, though he is now fifty-five: 'I have 
46 Gilman's reference to Christian Science in this novel is obviously worth knowing about, though 
I can't find any precedent for it. Her letters and diaries may hold some clues, but as she never 
makes a formal issue of it to my knowledge, I can surmise that Eddy at least provides an example 
of the kind of woman-inspired religious reform that Gilman advocated. Religion was not 
supposed to be static, rather, she would argue in Ilis Religion and Ifers, that the old worn-out 
ideas must be replaced, just like scientific knowledge. 
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those filthy Tibetan clothes, sterilized and packed away, but I never want 
to look at them' (MTM 14). While Gilman's male narrators are never 
omniscient nor even wise, they do have a tendency to reflect 
conventional values rather clearly, values which Gilman would 
challenge generally. But Robertson's antipathy towards his experience 
in Tibet is rather extreme and unexpectedly hostile, an attitude which is 
intended to contrast sharply to that of his supposed love for his new- 
found home, the home on which he is genetically, and therefore racially 
(for it is important to remember that race could not be separated from 
biological conditions at the time) dependent. 47 
In the meantime, Nellie has inherited the family farm since the death 
of their parents, a farm which turned out to be a very rich mine (what 
kind is not specified) and enabled Nellie to study as much as she liked, 
including medicine; now she is president of a co-educational college 
(exceptional now, extraordinary in 1940). As a New Woman, Nellie 
seems `queer' to John, for she is not old-looking and while a brisk and 
sturdy figure she is `not in the least mannish, nor in the least self- 
assertive, ' rather, she `takes things so easily-as if she owned them' 
(MTM 20). Nellie is no longer a weak and overworked late Victorian 
housewife, but a physically capable working mother; she expresses no 
hint of the androgyny or manliness, still wears skirts, and has a 
heterosexual marriage. She sounds a lot like the kind of woman Gilman 
partly became, and like other activists of a late-Victorian creed who 
47 For some of the most recent information on the still-current debate, see Natalie Angier, 
'Genome Work Proves Race Only Skin Deep, ' New York Times 22 Aug. 2000, reprinted in The 
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maintained an emotionally unthreatening aspect. Nellie delivers her 
brother John from the Tibetan wilderness and shows him a new way; so 
dramatically changed, however, she was the little sister who, John says, 
`believed everything I told her; minded me like a little dog' and John 
will have some difficulty splicing the two Nellies together (MTM 15). 
During their sea voyage back to New York from India, Nellie uses 
various devices to prepare her brother psychologically for their return, 
which techniques the narrator does not directly observe (as the reader is 
being instructed). Nellie talks to him fondly about old times and gives 
John magazines, asking him to read a story and some articles. The 
magazine is edited and published by women, he later observes. The 
story is about the business adventures of a partnership of two women 
who are not young nor `handsome' and he finds it enjoyable. One of the 
articles deals with information about municipal services and the other, 
more provocative, concerns a suggestion on `educational psychology' 
with recent progress detailed. Significantly, there are no advertisements; 
women are to be seen as producers and not consumers. He initially feels 
threatened, but his sister reassures him that men are still active in all 
businesses (even though there used to be one and a half million `extra'). 
John is both horrified and intrigued by some of the new women on 
the ship, but is informed that `Uncle Jake' and 'Aunt Dorcas' and 
`Cousin Drusilla' still live on the same old farm with their private road 
and that people go to visit them 'as if they were the Pyramids' (MTM 
Fresno Bee, Al. 
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18). At the end of the novel, when Robertson finds himself pining for 
the old ways, he visits his kinfolk and eventually marries the pale and 
overworked Drusilla with the intention of rescuing her from her life of 
farm labour and turning her into a New Woman. 
In the meantime John interviews his sister on board ship about the 
changes that have taken place. He asks for novels that will tell him what 
has happened: `Tell me all, I can bear it-as the extinct novels used to 
say. But I cannot bear this terrible suspense! Don't you have novels 
anymore? ' (MTM 37). Nellie reassuringly tells him that they have better 
novels than ever written. But he begs her for details anyhow, demanding 
to know if they have adopted Socialism and found it a failure and 
'impracticable folly' but Nellie casually informs him that Socialism was 
adopted twenty years ago and now they have 'got beyond it' (MTM 40). 
What has occurred, she explains, parallels the development of 
Democracy from the talk of the 'heavenly results of Democracy' in the 
eighteenth century, to the more active efforts to make it work in the 
nineteenth century. So socialism has been improved on, but even this is 
not the main thing, for the main step was a New Religion (MTM 42). 
`We didn't used to think much of religion, did we? ' Nellie says with 
`an expression of amused retrospection' (MTM 42). John's assertions 
that much time and money were spent on religion are scoffed at. He 
asks if there was another 'Incarnation of any body' and his sister allows 
that there was certainly somebody with an unmistakable Power (Lester 
Ward, most likely, though the identity of this person is left ambiguous), 
but as a `minister's son, rigidly reared' with the horrors of Calvinism, 
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John is uninterested in this talk and generally sceptical about religions, 
of which he had studied all with little reverence for any. Perhaps 
because of his antipathies toward most religions, however, John is in a 
preferable state for receiving the wisdom of the New Religion; in fact 
Nellie asserts that he is `equal to a considerable mental effort' (MTM 
43). But John is not impressed, at first, when he learns that the new 
religion is mainly about behaving better. There isn't any real name to it 
besides 'Living' and `Life' as Nellie explains; they have changed their 
minds and the `world has come alive' (MTM 46). In place of Revelation 
and Belief they now have, via the incarnation of a great teacher, Facts 
and Knowledge. What John thinks of only as the invocation of good 
behaviour, however, comes from his past habit of perceiving of such 
things in individual terms, Nellie tells him. In fact, they no longer have 
`religious people' for it is not a separate thing any longer: `it is what all 
of us have at the bottom of everything else, the underlying basic fact of 
life' (MTM 200). The New Religion has brought with it the conviction 
that religion is a matter of community and of practical universal 
application: 
You'll see results. That will make it clearer to you than 
anything I can say. But if I may remark that we have no 
longer the fear of death-much less of damnation, and no 
such thing as `sin'; that the only kind of prison left is called 
a quarantine-that punishment is unknown but preventive 
means are of a drastic and sweeping nature such as we never 
dared think of before-that there is no such thing in the 
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civilized world as poverty-no labor problem-no color 
problem-no sex problem-almost no disease-very little 
accident-practically no fires-that the world is rapidly 
being reforested-the soil improved; the output growing in 
quantity and quality; that no one needs to work over two 
hours a day and most people work four-that we have no 
graft-no adulteration of goods-no malpractice-no 
crime. (47-48) 
The notion of a powerful founder is hinted at but there is little of 
Jesus here or formal religious worship, for worship is conducted through 
the activity of daily life. The trappings of a traditional church are not 
needed, perhaps, if it is no longer necessary to preach. But John has 
missed the synthesis. On arriving in New York, Robertson is confronted 
with happy and healthy faces, familiar but strange, including a brother- 
in-law who confirms for him that Lester Ward was indeed right and that 
woman is the race-type. There is also a nephew, Jerrold, and a niece, 
Hallie, an official in charge of food production and distribution. 
Robertson discovers `New' New York and is introduced to several 
experts, who explain the peaceful economic transition that has taken 
place. 
Much time is spent in observing the way children are raised and 
educated; there are some schools, because they `haven't wholly 
outgrown the academic habit, ' but books are little used except for 
reference, and `[e]ducation no longer impairs our machinery, ' teachers 
explain (MTM 204,222). In fact, a great deal of the instruction, by 
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teachers who are mostly women and nearly all mothers, is oral: the 
children were `trained to think... to question, discuss, decide; they could 
reason' (MTM 218,223). There appears to be a strain of anti- 
intellectualism in this, but as Herland will show, this education is 
lifelong and pervasive and the capacities of children who are unaware 
that they are being taught are (naturally) almost superhuman. The use of 
oral method is appropriate if it is remembered that women, according to 
Gilman (and many contemporary linguists) are the first inventors and 
teachers of language. It is when she deals with this issue that Gilman is 
most compelling, for in moving away from books, language again 
becomes the province of mothers. Unfortunately, the reader is not to 
hear how this is done, though the child literature is made by the greatest 
artists, as described by Nellie: 
Literature is the most useful of the arts-the most perfect 
medium for transfer of ideas. We wish to have the first 
impressions in our children's minds, above all things true. 
All the witchery and loveliness possible in presentation- 
but the things presented are not senseless and 
unpleasant.... But the major difference is in our stories of 
the future, our future here on earth .... the very best writers 
make them; good verses and pictures, too. And a diet like 
that, while it is just as varied and entertaining as the "once 
upon a time" kind, leaves the child with a sense that things 
are going to happen-and he, or she, can help. (MTM 208) 
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After observing such happiness, Robertson begins to enjoy himself in 
his new environment, though he has occasional queasy patches. He is 
much helped when he talks to people who experienced the change 
firsthand. An old friend, Frank Borderson, embodies the change 
himself. A former cocaine addict and alcoholic who dropped out of 
college, broke many laws, became diseased, and is now a Professor of 
Ethics, Borderson was redeemed by the new faith; he was assisted out of 
his malaise not by a priest but by a physician, a `real soul-doctor' (MTM 
248). He is best able to show John what happened to him by literally 
breaking out of his new personality to enjoin with his old aspect, in order 
to put things in plainer language. His first explanation, though, is blunt 
and confusing for Robertson. It explains the physics of the new religion 
rather than the emotion of it: 
The business of the universe about us consists in the 
Transmission of Energy. Some of it is temporarily and 
partially arrested in material compositions; some is more 
actively expressed in vegetable and animal form; this stage 
of expression we call Life. We... the human animals, were 
specially adapted for high efficiency in storing and 
transmitting this energy; and so were able to enter into a 
combination still more efficient; that is, into social 
relations... This Energy is what the human mind has been 
conscious of ever since it was conscious at all; and calls 
God... . Because of its special 
faculty of consciousness, this 
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human engine can feel, see, think, about the power within it; 
and can use it more fully and wisely. (MTM 243) 
This does not sit well with Robertson, who says it may be fine for the 
new minds but not for his. Borderson then assumes `the old attitude' 
and Robertson watches `an expression of pain slowly grow and deepen 
on his face, ' and then tells him to stop. But Borderson goes on to 
describe in Robertson's layman terms, just what happened: 
What was called God was still largely patterned after the old 
tribal deity of the Hebrews. Our ideas of `Sin' were still 
mostly of the nature of disobedience... We were beginning 
to see something of Social values, too, but not clearly. Our 
progress was in what we called `The natural sciences'; and 
we did not think with the part of our minds wherein we 
stored religion. Yet there was very great activity and 
progress in religious thought; the whole field was in motion; 
the new churches widening and growing in every direction; 
the older ones holding on like grim death.. . Ethics being 
taught indeed, but with no satisfying basis. Now here was I, 
an ill-assorted team of impulses and characteristics, 
prejudiced against religion, ignorant of real ethics, and 
generally going to the devil.. . the Dark Ages were still in, in 
spite of all we had to boast of. However, this new 
perception came. (MTM 244-246) 
These two explanations illustrate the problem of translating new 
scientific insights into understandable, dare we say conventional, moral 
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terms. Robertson complains again about not getting enough 
information, but Borderson sees him as an example of `the kind of 
mental jumble I spoke of. ' He explains that knowledge of evolution did 
not come by revelation or by any one or two men: `We have had many 
writers, preachers, lecturers who discoursed and explained (and Gilman 
would presumably include herself among these); this new precept as to 
the relation between man and God came with such a general sweep that 
no one even tries to give personal credit for it' (MTM 246). But this still 
does not satisfy Robertson, particularly since Borderson does not call it 
`religion' either: `Ethics is The Science of Human Relation. It is called 
Applied Sociology-that's all' (MTM 247). `How does a thing like that 
touch one, personally? ' Robertson asks, `You leave out entirely the 
emotional side of religion' (MTM 247). Borderson responds with the 
argument that old religions were to believe or deny, but this is to act on, 
with a general recognition of `right behavior'; however he rephrases to 
clarify that the love of God and man that used to be preached is now 
practised. The Energy itself is called Love: `Love, the real thing we had 
in mind when we said "God is Love, " is beneficent energy' (MTM 248). 
What made them do it, John Robertson asks. `Just nature, John. It is 
human nature. We used to believe otherwise. ' And then Borderson goes 
quiet while he explains his rehabilitation process in a `moral sanitarium' 
where he learned that Ethics cannot be predicated on nor religion 
practised by individuals. Put a tramp in paradise, he says, and there is 
some hope of him, though many of the more hopeless degenerates, 
perverts, and idiots were killed (! ). Gilman quietly makes short shrift of 
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this nasty but necessary solution. Now Borderson is married to a 
woman, a `broken lily', who had been in a similar condition. They are 
not allowed to have children, but they are quite happy together. 
Ironically, while individualism is the thing which had discouraged the 
development of society, it is the very thing that is now encouraged of 
women. Nellie explains that `individuation is in inverse proportion to 
reproduction' and that when they individualise the women, `develop 
their personal power, their human characteristics', they don't have as 
many children (58). This message was not just petrified in fictional 
idealism. Zona Gale includes in her forward to Gilman's autobiography 
a letter written in 1899 by an otherwise unknown woman named Marie 
Hoffendahl Jenny. Jenny, a Unitarian minister in Des Moines, Iowa who 
desires to preach Women and Economics, praises Gilman for her early 
attempt (in Women and Economics) to balance the scale of ethics and 
asserts: `During the present period of transition I believe it is wise to 
preach individualism to women, and Christianity to men. Surely Jesus 
himself gives us the completed ideal wherein no virtues are masculine 
and none are feminine. '48 
The levelling action of collectivising the men and individualising the 
women is subtle, but clearly essential. Controlling outward expression 
of sexuality is an obvious method. The men all wear knickerbockers, 
but the women display varying modes of dress and wear whatever they 
like (MTM 66). Florentine gowns and `Greekish' draperies are 
48 Living xxi-xxii. 
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included. This does not necessarily clash with collective conceptions of 
religion or ethics for the women, too, aspire to a certain standard of 
beauty, but the question of why they have these apparent privileges is 
simply not addressed. The rehabilitation process that Borderson endures 
is invented to correct an extreme of personality, but it is quite clear that 
Compulsory Socialization of immigrants and the weeding out of other 
qualities is intended to match an ideal. Physically for women, in fact, 
this is the `big, vigorous' Greek ideal, as Owen explains to John (MTM 
117). Owen and John both find these women attractive; they are not 
confused by female appearances, only pleased by them. This will 
change completely with Herland. What should be clear is that these 
women have much more control over the new society and its modes of 
expression, with half of all artists being mothers who have created a new 
literature for children and women in places of power, literally legislating 
morality. 49 
The New Religion of Moving the Mountain does not seem to be quite 
enough, somehow, to bring a change to an entire society, without 
revolution or revelation, and it suggests that "The natural sciences" 
alone are not adequate. Occasionally, Gilman throws barbs at her 
mentor, Edward Bellamy and at the sexism and horror of Wells. 
Bellamy is implicitly accused of creating a world where individuals, 
such as Gilman's Harvard-educated ship's hand, are made to do menial 
work without choice. Gilman's character is in between jobs and simply 
49 MTM 205. 
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getting some experience (playing in the gutter, as it were). And 
Gilman's women, as Nellie points out, do whatever work they like 
(Owen clarifies that men do most of the heavy lifting) whereas women 
in Bellamy's utopia do the work they are `adapted' to. 50 
Moving the Mountain is not quite a realist novel and not quite a 
utopia. The vagueness of the ideological foundation for the new world 
leads to such unintelligibility. This lack of commitment to a specific 
genre is not necessarily a bad thing, but by creating angst in the character 
of John Robertson, the author undermines the positive effects of 
conversion. A certain language is missing, which would make the new 
world intelligible and comfortable for Robertson, who must write to find 
his own idiom. He is forced to admit, grudgingly, that the world is a 
better place aesthetically and materially, but as he explains: 
It was a beautiful world, but it was not my world. It was like 
a beautiful dream, but seemed a dream nevertheless. I could 
no longer dispute that it was possible for people to be 
`healthy, happy and wise'... But they were not the people I 
used to know; those, too, were like Frank Borderson and 
Morris Banks-- changed so that they seemed more unreal 
than the others. (274) 
His eventual marriage to Drusilla, also an outsider, in a brief Cinderella 
story within the story, returns him to the place from whence he came. It 
will take time to absorb all the new changes, so perhaps it is best for him 
50Bellamy, 185. 
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to start at the beginning, but the reader is left with the burden of 
imagining Drusilla's, indeed Robertson's, conversion and 
transformation. Moreover, Nellie, who never goes to visit her backward 
relatives, seems rather a condescending and unhelpful figure in the end. 
Perhaps it is all a subtle suggestion that Robertson should never have 
gone to Tibet in the first place. 
This attempt at utopia was possibly initiated before the author had a 
clear idea of what man's religion meant. In 1923, she would begin His 
Religion and Hers with a poem of four stanzas, titled `Two' in the book, 
but originally titled `The Real Religion'. This poem had been published 
nine years before in The Forerunner of May 1914, the magazine Gilman 
wrote and published almost entirely by herself for seven years (1909- 
1916) under the auspices of the Charlton Publishing Company, which 
she had formed with Houghton Gilman. 
The poem illustrates two ways of belief, creating a primary text which 
incorporates ideas of worldly knowledge with immanence, piety, faith, 
and love. The first two stanzas describe the horrors of the religion of 
`Man the hunter, Man the warrior' whose `mind, searching inward, /Saw 
in all one red reflection' and created `dark religions' which are `Built on 
Death. ' The Soul, here made as flesh, is severed from the body in man's 
religion. It experiences all the horrors of the body as flesh, and 
proceeds, in man's system, `In fear, black fear of the dark, /Red fear of 
terrible gods' to face `eternity, fearful, unknown' in Death. The 
accentuation of `red' and `black' fear obviously draws from more 
classical ideas about hell, but also serves to highlight man's relationship 
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to more supposedly primitive races. I do not know if Gilman ever read 
Stendhal's (Henri Marie Beyle, 1783-1842) Le Rouge et le Noir (1830); 
more political references might be drawn as well. 
`Death, and the Fate of the Soul' as underscored in the religion made 
by man contrast plainly with the theme of `Birth, and the growth of the 
Soul' of the following two stanzas dealing with the `real religion' of 
woman. `Woman, bearer; Woman, teacher; ' is `Filling all the earth' 
with her service as mother. It is social service on which woman bases 
her religion, her actions functioning in contrast to the good works that 
might be done selfishly by her male counterpart in order to earn his way 
into heaven, if in fact he is not already marked for damnation. 
Antipathies to Calvinism aside, man's fate has been determined. Her 
`awakening, searching' mind presently sees `a fair world young and 
growing' and the Soul `in the body established'. The new Soul, though 
surrounded by flesh, operates independently of bodily limitations and 
exists in `the ever-new beauty of childhood' and `the wonder of opening 
power'; its tasks are `learning, improving, achieving, /In hope, new 
knowledge, and light, /Sure faith in the world's fresh Spring'. 
Obviously, images of the Soul's power abound in the woman's 
religion, suggesting intellectual and emotional strength as well as the 
rationality implied by `new knowledge' and `light'. Gilman cleverly 
associates light (a light of purity, knowledge, and hope) with woman and 
darkness (a darkness of evil, ignorance, and despair) with man, though 
she probably would have seen innumerable examples of 'dark' women 
in her day: Salome and other versions of fatal women, for example, or 
even Pater's `La Gioconda. ' It is yet unknown whether she was familiar 
with J. J. Bachofen's theory (Mutterecht und Urreligion/Myth, Religion 
and Mother Right, 1859-1870), but there is no incompatibility between 
earth and light in her view; indeed knowledge of God on earth is through 
an understanding of his will as expressed in nature. Bachofen's theory, 
albeit affirming the existence of a matriarchal past, is founded in the 
conviction that patriarchy is the superior, triumphant phase of the 
evolution of a collective spiritual consciousness, the ultimate 
consequences being quite immaterial. The power of the mother is 
temporary and earthbound: 
The transience of material life goes hand in hand with 
mother right. Father right is bound up with the immortality 
of a supramaterial life belonging to the regions of light. As 
long as religion recognizes the seat of the generative 
principle in tellurian matter, the law of matter prevails: man 
is equated with unlamented lower creation and mother right 
governs the reproduction of man and beast. But once the 
creative principle is dissociated from earthly matter and 
joined with the sun, a higher state sets in... mortality is 
restricted to matter, which returns to the womb from 
whence it came, while the spirit, purified by fire from the 
slag of matter, rises up to the luminous heights of 
immortality and immateriality. (129) 
This extraordinary passage sums up the views of centuries of (male) 
scientists, priests, and poets on women, but it was Bachofen's theory of 
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a 
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`mother-right', recovering from mythology the cultural truths of the 
ancient world, which was revolutionary in its time . 
51 Gilman champions 
the cause of the material life as the only life we can truly know anything 
about living, whether it generates evil or not, and is not bothered by its 
transience. She will explore matriarchal religion, to a certain extent, as 
an ideal state of being and of politics in Herland, but she ultimately tries 
to convert the insights she develops regarding women and religion to a 
foundation for a general system of ethics based on Christian principles. 
Moreover, if we are to concentrate our highest powers on the 
improvement of human life, then we must have the most accurate 
information pertaining to the exigencies of the material life. Thus 
Gilman turned to science for the most accurate view of reality. 52 But the 
difficulty she has in adapting the principle of rational thought to a 
woman's religion is illustrated here. 
The fifth line of the third stanza of this poem conveys a change of 
direction. Woman is described as tirelessly performing her educative 
and other mothering services to the earth, and there is a great pause: 
`Service of the tireless mother/Filling all the earth; - Now her mind 
awakening, searching, /Sees a fair world young and growing' in the 
`hope, new knowledge, and light' of the enlightened Soul (my 
emphasis). Woman herself experiences a vision of the `real religion', 
based on birth and implemented with traditionally female nurturing 
qualities; she expands her activity to include the world. She also claims 
51 See also Erich Neumann, Der Grosse Mutter/The Great Mother (1955). 
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Enlightenment values that man so prizes: learning, knowledge, 
achievement, the light of rationality, the growth of the Soul. There is no 
reason why these things should not be attributed to women, something 
Gilman does, as a self-described humanist, in The Man Made World, but 
they form a certain set of intellectual values from which women had 
been traditionally excluded. Simply taking them is bold. This is not the 
first of Gilman's reversals, but it is an important one, which steps back 
from her first utopian novel and re-formulates perspective. The 
separation of gender allows the author to explore the possibilities of a 
woman's religion. The two sexes are needed in order to foreground a 
woman-centred agenda, even in a purely female society, as illustrated by 
Herland. 
52 Kirkpatrick 136. 
VI. HIS RELIGION AND HERLAND: THE RE-EDUCATION OF DESIRE 
Myth is nothing other than a picture of the national experience in the 
light of religious faith. J. J. Bachofen, The Myth of 
Tanaquilt 
In all sub-human life the physical body serves as a vehicle and 
expression of the spirit, but the human spirit, as it rises, expresses itself 
in and works through material forms we make. Gilman, His 
Religion and Hers2 
For Bachofen, myth describes the most reliable source of social 
history in the ultimate expression of collective thought. Relationships 
between mythologies of different cultures demonstrate the continuity of 
Western religious tradition through a dialectical process of recreation. 
Regardless of the accuracy of history or legend, he argues, `What cannot 
have happened was nonetheless thought. External truth is replaced by 
inner thought. '3 Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, he developed a 
`scientific' approach to the study of religion, collecting documentary 
evidence, observing phenomena, and discovering laws which he 
1 Bachofen 213. 
2 HH 71. 
2 Bachofen 213. 
3 Bachofen 214. 
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believed governed relationships between religious mythologies and their 
continuous development. Great myths are described and linked in a 
chain of spiritual history which leads to the theory of `mother right' or 
the positing of an early form of matriarchal religion before that of the 
patriarchal, which explains the vestiges of such worship of women and 
mothers in various Western religions from pagan to Christian. As 
previously explained, Bachofen's version of this progression, beginning 
with the matriarchate, is to be fulfilled in the patriarchal form as the 
most advanced development; so Bachofen presupposes the linear, 
positive evolution of religion as a natural phenomenon, an intellectual 
habit of his times, but one that reinforces the final validation of the 
status quo in the patriarchal system. The sensitivity of the Swiss 
scholar's narrative and depth of his probing into the recesses of religious 
history met the admiration of contemporary American anthropologist, 
jurist, and ethnologist Lewis Henry Morgan who praised Bachofen's 
contribution to science in Morgan's Ancient Society (1877). Subsequent 
correspondence between the two men culminated in the gift to Bachofen 
of various publications concerning native Americans from the U. S. 
Government. Moreover, American women activists Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton and Matilda Joslyn Gage were strong supporters of the obscure 
European intellectual and his thesis, which would be used to inform 
their own arguments. In her 1891 essay `The Matriarchate, ' Stanton 
pursues Bachofen's point through to the sixteenth century, when 'Luther 
° Bachofen iii. 
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eliminated the feminine element wholly from the Protestant religion and 
brought the full power of the Church to enforce woman's complete 
subjection. i5 A chapter of Gage's book, Woman, Church, and State 
(1893), is also dedicated to the validation of the matriarchate. These 
women went on to discover for themselves historical evidence of 
matriarchy in Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and Teutonic cultures, as well as 
in early Christianity, though they derided Christianity for enforcing and 
perpetuating the subjection of women. 
Gilman never indicates having read Bachofen, but if she had, or if she 
had read Frazer or Jane Harrison, her relationship with the idea of 
matriarchy might still be one of ambivalence. She is clearly familiar 
with the concept and addresses it several times, strongly desiring to 
valorise matriarchy on the one hand, but also doubtful of the usefulness 
of the deification of motherhood at times, for it is just such motherhood 
that has bound women to hearth and home. There is also the question of 
history, which, as Gilman has argued, has been written by men. 
Religion, too, has been given to us by men as a result of the economic 
subjugation of women and consequent social hegemony of men, there 
being no question in Gilman's mind of the inevitability of religion, for it 
is part and parcel of the `normal social evolution' that should have taken 
place: `A normal development of religion... seeing the broad road of 
progress as the line to be followed in right doing, would have 
strengthened our joy in good workmanship, exhorted us to mutual 
5 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, `The Matriarchate, ' Transactions of the National Council of Women, 
ed. Rachel Foster Avery (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1891) 141; Behnke, 164-165,179. 
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appreciation and inter-service, kept before us the splendid hope of race 
improvement. '6 But with man's influence religion has become a 
hindrance, having instituted divine sanction to justify women's miseries, 
nurtured the concept that human nature is evil, and fostered the 
separation of religion from the concerns of this life as a `revealed' truth, 
consequently succumbing to preoccupation with life after death. Most 
notorious for Gilman is that man's influence has divorced religion from 
conduct. 7 There is an unquestionable general need for religion, 
however, emotional as well as pragmatic. As to the choice of 
matriarchy, Gilman explains in Women and Economics: 
... matriolatry is a sentiment so 
deep-seated, wide spread, 
and long-established as to be dominant in every class of 
minds. It is associated with our religious instincts, on the 
one hand, and our sex instincts, on the other, both of which 
we have long been forbidden to discuss, --the one being too 
holy and the other being too unholy, -- that it is well-nigh 
impossible to think clearly and dispassionately on the 
subject. (WE 175) 
Moreover: 
Our tenderest love, our deepest reverence, our fiercest 
resentment of insult, all centre about the mother to-day 
rather than about the father; and this is a strong proof that 
6HH214-215. 
7HH 218-223. 
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the recognition of woman's real power and place grow upon 
us just as our minds grow able to perceive it. (WE 177) 
Later, in The Man Made World, she asserts that "`the mother-right"-or 
as we call it, the matriarchate-the father being her assistant in the great 
work' was the original and legitimate base of family life, which 
pronouncement would quite agree, denotatively, with Bachofen (MMW 
36). Gilman obviously has a deep empathy as well as sympathy with the 
emotional aspect of maternal power. Her writing conveys a passionate 
tone and the desire to connect the power of women not only to fact but 
to feeling; but her desire to think clearly and dispassionately is also 
reflected in assertions that innate female superiority and primacy are 
scientific facts, her position on birth control and her belief in the duty of 
women to select sexual experience on the basis of their primary duty of 
race `improvement' bearing heavily on this attitude. Many pages later 
she becomes uncertain of the use of matriarchy: 
We know nothing of ethical values during the matriarchate; 
whatever they were, they must have depended for sanction 
on a cult of promiscuous but efficient maternity. Our 
recorded history begins in the patriarchal period, and it is its 
ethics alone which we know. (MMW 135) 
The notion of `promiscuous but efficient maternity' is rather 
condescending. Would the author prefer not to deal with the 
implications of a pre-existing matriarchal society? The question of 
reviving a pre-patriarchal past in order to validate utopian convictions is 
quite new. Clearly the question of `patriarchal ethics' is the essential 
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one for Gilman, a concern which can be dealt with in the present reality; 
speculation about original female ethics would in this case be 
speculation and myth-making and the sociological treatise should avoid 
this (though Gilman has certainly done her share of speculating! ). 
Returning to sense what is needed in terms of motivation, Gilman later 
explains that religion is a theory of life, an emotion ('an attitude of 
mind'), and action. In Herland, the author creates an agricultural, 
matrilineal, matriarchal society where the male narrator discovers how 
religion is inseparable from behaviour. If man caused the goddesses- 
'types of motherhood, mother-love, mother-care and service'-to 
dwindle to forms of `alluring Aphrodite' and has decided the gods are 
really like him, 8 then the whole construction must be supplanted and his 
ideas, and consequently hers, changed. If women are to look to 
goddesses for guidance, they must do so intelligently, with the support 
of the facts; with an absence of recoverable spiritual history that can be 
trusted, this is a difficult task. Theoretically, we should be dealing with 
the exigencies of reality and the gods of men, but this is not practically 
possible, until, ironically, the world of Herland is realised in fiction. 
Moving the Mountain begins to address the practical problem of 
woman's relationship to religion and how it is to be resolved by 
absorbing the economic and social concerns of women into the New 
Religion. The result is authoritarian, simplistic, and less than 
compelling in both practical and theoretical senses. In literary terms it 
8 MMW 141. 
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falls somewhere between utopia and fictional realism, but being neither, 
it succeeds at neither. Literary utopias must be fully realised and self- 
contained. Intending to instruct the reader through Robertson's 
experience, the author creates a stock male character who certainly has 
some interesting features, including an interest in Buddhism, which is 
immediately squashed, and a background as a professional philologist, 
which is not used or explored at all after Robertson leaves Tibet behind. 
But for all the psychological manipulation he experiences, Robertson's 
inner life is not explored either, aside from the obvious difficulty he has 
in adjusting to his new world. He is to learn a new social language, 
which he often anticipates, actually, and there is little reflection 
involved. His troubles adjusting are apparently easily solved by 
comparing old and new, new being better of course. Though the 
narrator has growing pains, it is taken for granted that his marriage to 
Drusilla presumes a happy ending, enabling both to enter society as 
complete New Man and Woman. Reading Herland highlights the 
weaknesses of the previous novel and demonstrates that Gilman's utopia 
has yet to develop fully. 
But onto what kind of ideological framework is Gilman to drape her 
second try at utopia? Krishan Kumar explains that in America in the 
nineteenth century (indeed, from the beginning), utopia is everywhere, 
to the point that this 'ideological or "pragmatic" utopianism, a unique 
and almost contradictory blend, had the paradoxical effect of driving out 
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almost entirely the formal literary utopia. '9 Actual experiments were 
made on a vast scale, within an environment of reform and the 
exploration of the politico-social forms of socialism and communism, 
more often (successfully) than not with the plan of "realizing the state of 
civilization that Christ foreshadowed. "° The Oneida colony, already 
mentioned, made experiments in `complex marriage', eugenics, and 
`male continence' as well, but was classed by their president John 
Humphrey Noyes as one of the "religious socialisms. "' 1 Yet the success 
of Bellamy's Looking Backward prompted a slew of literary answers 
and similar attempts to present the American utopia in national form. 12 
Gilman's rather late entry obviously has its own unique concerns and 
desire for reform of sexual relations between men and women. Gilman, 
who disliked the Swedenborgian community she inhabited with her 
mother during childhood, was deeply affected by Bellamy, Socialism, 
Fabianism, and her own religious tradition. How, in light of the 
resurgence of the study of matriarchy and social experimentation, is 
Gilman to convey her utopia as social theory through her utopia as 
narrative? 
9Krishan Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) 81. 
10 Kumar, Modern Times, 87. Kumar quotes a disciple of Oneidan president John Humphrey 
Noyes whose History of American Socialisms (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1870) he still 
considers the best source on the subject. 
11 Kumar, Modern Times, 88. See also Barbara Goldsmith, Other Powers: The Age of Suffrage, 
Spiritualism, and the Scandalous Victoria Woodhull (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998): 
12 Kumar, Modern Times, 81 
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Serialised in The Forerunner in 1915, Herland was not published in 
novel form (as Moving the Mountain was) until 1979. Coming as it did 
within the field of feminist criticism developing in the 1970s and 1980s, 
certain aspects of the novel have been highlighted as particularly 
successful. First of all there is the general project of turning the tables 
on men by putting them in the woman's place, a subversion of 
convention lauded by feminists of the 1980s. Gilman's humour has also 
been lauded as a primary feature lacking in the feminist agenda (which 
is supposed to partly save her from charges of racism). Gilman's 
purpose of trying to realise an egalitarian sort of relation, economic and 
social, between the sexes is not in question. But in order to create a 
fuller understanding of her contribution to the feminism and the 
literature of her time, all of her ideas must be explored for what they 
were. 
The religion of Herland, Motherhood, plays a central role in the plot's 
formation; `more Christian' than any people the narrator has ever seen, 
the Herlanders have been waiting for the New Hope (a paraphrase of `the 
Good News'? ) of Fatherhood. The mysterious project of reintroducing 
men, that is, reality, to a perfectly self-sufficient race of androgynous and 
wholly parthenogenetic women throws their original religion back into 
question. Herland is both utopia and the move away from utopia, a 
paradise which is paradoxically lost as soon as sexual difference is 
introduced. 
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Originating in the historic incident of a parthenogenetic or virgin 
birth, the female society of Herland is indebted to a miracle of 
evolutionary proportions. Subsequent generations, in spite of firmly 
inbred principles of growth and change, have held this past in sacred 
esteem, relying on its promise to guarantee the future. The importance 
of the religion of Motherhood, the religion which is simultaneously the 
social miracle, is illustrated in the clash of cultural identities occurring 
when three American men, who have decided to investigate the isolated 
South American country, end up facing an unfamiliar (or are they? ) 
breed of women in a situation they are obviously unprepared for. 
Gilman uses the format of an adventure novel, like Conrad's heart of 
Darkness (1899) or Haggard's She (1887), written from memory (for all 
of the narrator's notes are lost) which parodies the process of 
exploitation and colonisation these novels describe. 13 As soon as 
Herland is reached, the men will find themselves on the receiving end of 
such activities, benignly though they may be treated. 
Primitive 'poison-arrow'(H 144) native South Americans, living far 
below the protected plateau of Herland, tell the explorers the legend of 
`a strange and terrible Woman Land' and how no men ever come back 
from trying to find it. Gilman takes joy in teasing the whole race of men 
represented by her protagonists, including the primitives who live 
beneath and around Herland but never invade or contaminate it. Each 
character represents a particular form of stereotyped heterosexual 
13 See Sandra Gilbert, Susan Gubar, No Man's Land:. The Place of the Woman Writer in the 
Twentieth Century Vol. II (New Haven, London: Yale UP, 1989) 5-25. 
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masculinity: Jeff Margrave is a sensitive and romantic physician and 
poet, Vandyke Jennings ('Van') is a sociology major and therefore, we 
are to assume, a balanced intellectual, and Terry 0. Nicholson is a 
wealthy, chauvinistic, adventurous `man's man'. After making their 
attempt by plane and surveying the well-cultivated hills and fields and 
cities which resemble a garden-like `civilization', Terry, Jeff, and Van 
land Terry's aircraft on an isolated rock and make their move toward the 
interior, to discover more forests, glades and gardens, where Terry 
observes that they do not kill birds but that they do kill cats and that 
there obviously must be men here because of this fact. Is the cat and 
dog thing really necessary? Well, it does raise the question of gender 
identification rather immediately, atrocious though the example is. 
Reading into this symbolically suggests that the women are in fact 
destroying an ancient token of femaleness and malevolence; and the 
independence of the cat is clearly a problem as well. The use of cats for 
agricultural purposes is ancient, so any suggestion that they are 
controlling pests must be wrong. Or perhaps this is foreshadowing of 
the role-reversals to come: the men soon meet a trio of bird-like girls 
twittering in a tree, Ellador, Celis, and Alima, the women whom they 
will eventually marry. 
As the most open-minded, thoughtful and unbiased personality, Van 
becomes the narrator. Van's objective but naYve descriptions and 
unassuming demeanour, his 'middle ground', make him the perfect 
candidate for conversion to the perspective of his future mate, Ellador, 
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in the marriage game being played behind the men's backs; the 
inhabitants of the country intend to observe the new male specimens and 
decide which is most suitable to become Father of a new race. 
Opening the second paragraph with `Nobody will ever believe how 
they looked, ' Van also observes the colourful freshness of the healthy 
girls in the first meeting, using the anthropological but also (innocently) 
chauvinistic simile of `parrots'. It is to be wondered how the women 
regard the strange men. Like John Robertson, Van writes of the 
experiences of himself and his friends and ideas which he is still trying 
to make sense of, but which have converted him to a new way of 
thinking. He and the other men are immediately struck by the way the 
women look, and the way the women look at them, giggling and girlish, 
but completely unimpressed by Terry's antics at trying to attract them 
with the baubles he has brought with him. The socio-economically 
stratifying power of exaggerated sex distinction in the human species, as 
explained in Women and Economics, will clearly not operate here, for 
Gilman's utopians (are they humans? ) display none of the perverse 
frippery of the women of Ourworld. Herlanders (the country is not 
actually named, though Ellador does refer to it as 'Eierland' at the end of 
the sequel, With Her in Ourland) wear breeches and tunics with many 
useful pockets, have short hair and non-glamorous features; they are not, 
therefore, conventionally beautiful. To have the men recognise the 
beauty of such unconventional women, void of the contrivances of a 
male-dominated culture, is surely a goal, but one which asserts 
androgyny rather than sex distinction as an ideal. Later, Van remarks at 
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how, in their own new sexless attire, there are only beards to distinguish 
the men from the women. 14 Hairiness, if we remember, is associated 
with the primitive male version of the race type. Indeed, Van will meet 
with the most approval for being the most like them, like `People, ' as 
Ellador will explain, in spite of her automatic assumption that `in a bi- 
sexual race the distinctive feature of each sex must be intensified' (H 
89). When the men dress themselves for their first public appearance, 
Van is `comfortable' though unable to describe what he looks like, 
while Terry, a true peacock of self-expression, displays a `Henry V' air 
and Jeff contrives himself as a 'Huguenot Lover' (H 84). Terry is too 
masculine, Jeff too feminine, apparently, though it is Jeff who will 
remain as a potential father for the new race. His romanticism of the 
paradise they've discovered is designed to amuse, for he accepts without 
understanding, and puts the new world on a pedestal, a fundamental 
error (but what is his alternative? ). Van is somewhere in between; yet 
there must be intensified distinction. But how much is the question, for 
the line between too much and too little is vague at best. The purpose of 
the (hetero-)sexual act, as sanctified by religion (therefore 
unquestionable), will answer. 
After the initial meeting and playing a game of cat and mouse, in 
which the women are too quick, the men eventually find themselves 
surrounded by an army of older women; when they begin to act 
defensively they are taken and anaesthetised. Waking up for Van is 
14 Herland, 45,84., hereafter to be referred to parenthetically in the text. 
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itself a mesmerising experience, like swimming through `a deep warm 
ocean, nearer and nearer to full light and stirring air. Or like the return 
to consciousness after a concussion of the brain' (H 24). Their 
surroundings are perfectly comfortable and it is apparent that the men 
are not to be tortured or enslaved, rather treated as guests. 
In order to communicate, the men must learn a new language first, as 
well as teach their own. This prerequisite establishes the principle of 
psychological immersion in a totally new society which 'works' on all 
three of the men, and is successful on two. After learning the language, 
the men are given three personal tutors, Zava, Somel, and Moadinc. 
These are older, less exuberant, women who teach them the ways of 
Herland. The men are to start from scratch, like children. This does not 
sit well with Terry in particular, who is disappointed that he did not find 
the race of primitive man-hungry Amazons he was after, and he 
convinces the other two to try to escape their plush prison. Failing 
spectacularly to do this, they are returned to their schoolroom. 
Van first learns of the parthenogenetic capabilities of the women, the 
reason why there are no men. This, of course, prompts a history lesson. 
Approximately two thousand years ago, `at about the time of the 
Christian era', according to Van's ingenuous retelling, they were a 
polygamous, slave-holding, bi-sexual people (i. e. populated by both 
sexes) occupying a great amount of land with free passage to the sea. 
He adds: `there is no doubt in my mind that these people were of pure 
Aryan stock, and were once in contact with the best civilisation of the 
old world. They were "white, " but somewhat darker than our northern 
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races because of their constant exposure to sun and air' (H54). Van 
gleans from the information given that there was, in fact, a high degree 
of social development, like Ancient Egypt or Greece (H 67). In fact, 
most of the male population was decimated in what sounds like 
something akin to the Peloponnysian Wars. Finally, earthquakes and a 
volcanic eruption filled in their passage to the sea and only a few men 
and slaves (and many of the women and girls) were left alive. The 
slaves killed the men who were left as well as the boys and the old 
women and tried to take power; but the remaining women revolted, 
killing the men instead. 
And so `[t]here was literally no one left on this beautiful high garden 
land but a bunch of hysterical girls and some older slave women, ' 
according to Van (H 55). Without the stabilising effect of the men, the 
girls are `hysterical, ' though it is not clear whether he is told this or 
thinks this. A revolution did, therefore, occur to make this place 
possible, but it happened two thousand years ago. But the utopia is 
credible as a utopia because it simultaneously refers to a recognisable 
form of human history while contrasting an ideal future in some good 
place that is also no place, a totally controlled environment. Most fully 
realised in terms of temporal and spatial arrangements, this utopia is out 
of time; though it takes place at the present day. As it is removed to an 
isolated and uncharted geographic area, it is also out of place. Someone 
has said that for Americans, the past is another country. Occasionally, 
utopia describes an idealised past, like Morris' medieval England. 
These men are discovering a perfectly realised matriarchal agricultural 
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ideal like that which Bachofen recovered for history and which Gilman 
has expressed qualms about but nevertheless finds useful. Wishing to 
experiment with the prospect of what effect women would have had on 
religion, and therefore on society, if they were given the chance, Gilman 
finally chooses an exclusive world of women, but also appropriates the 
nineteenth-century project of recovering the seminal civilisation of 
white westerners. 
The `miracle' of parthenogenesis occurred five or ten years after the 
revolt, when one of the `harem-bred' women began giving birth to 
female children. She was placed in the Temple of Maaia, Goddess of 
Motherhood, to be observed. This temple was apparently available for 
keeping the woman after the strange incident. In the sixth century BCE, 
a `Queen Maya' gave birth to the Buddha. Besant points out several 
times, in totally different contexts of course, that maya means `illusion, ' 
but whether Gilman knew this is doubtful; the irony is too keen. `Mafia' 
was also one of the daughters of Atlas and Pleione, a Pleiad. She was, 
according to Thomas Bulfinch's Mythology, the eldest and most 
beautiful of the Pleiads and mother of Mercury by Jupiter. The Pleiads, 
seven nymphs of Diana who were turned to pigeons and then stars, were 
pitied by Jupiter because the obsessed Orion pursued them, perhaps an 
allusion to Terry's later misbehaviour in the novel. The ruin of Troy so 
upset the Pleiads that they became quite pale; the very disturbed Electra 
left her place (her son Dardanus had founded Troy), and only six stars 
are now visible. Troy and its associations with goddess-worshipping 
religion may also be relevant. 
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But perhaps Gilman did not research the name of the goddess too 
intently and is confusing it with Gaea, Mother of the Earth, or 
attempting to make a reference to Mary, Mother of Jesus, and recipient 
of the more ancient tradition of Cybele, Isis, Demeter, and Diana. At 
any rate, Maaia may function as an hieroglyph in the way H. D. uses 
many names ('mer, mere, mere, mater, Maia, Mary/Star of the 
Sea, /Mother. ') in Tribute to the Angels (1945). 15 Yet, the culture sounds 
as though it was quite masculine to begin with, which makes the 
immediacy of a temple to the Goddess of Motherhood odd, either a swift 
invention made to accommodate the miracle (the text simply 
acknowledges that they put the first mother in the temple) or an ancient 
relic finally put to use again, casually inserting the idea of matriarchy 
through symbol to validate the far more obvious though problematic 
idea of an all-female community. Gilman's lack of thorough explication 
of the idea of matriarchy both underscores her ostensible concern with 
'humanisation' rather than the achievement of an exclusively feminine 
world and her drive to truly realise utopia in the future, rather than to 
muse on the past and some sort of `blood and soil' revival that cannot be 
substantiated, especially in Gilman's day. 16 Even Morris well 
understood that his idealisation of the medieval was based on art and not 
historical fact. " 
15 H. D. , Tribute to the Angels (London: 
OUP, 1945) Section 8. 
16 Christa Wolf, Cassandra: A Novel and Four Essays, trans. Jan Van Heurck (London: Virago, 
1984) 260. 
17 William Morris, News from Nowhere, ed. James Redmond (1890; London and New York: 
Routledge, 1970) xxxi. 
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Nonetheless, the opportunities an all-female society poses, aesthetic 
and otherwise, are various, freeing Gilman's pen to explore the more 
fantastic and bring fiction to martial her science in a way that potential 
fact failed to do. Her rewriting, rather than rejection, of ancient history 
leads not to the world we live in today or in thirty years, but to a 
completely different and otherwise unimaginable future. Van will later 
explain, in the context of his new relationship with Ellador, that he gets 
a queer feeling from the `loving "up"' he learns to do, which awakens in 
him some `ancient dim prehistoric consciousness'; it is like `coming 
home to mother' (H 142). The feeling generated by the new world is 
one of an awakened consciousness and the revelation of old feelings. 
The men are like children in this new context, and are treated like 
children. John Robertson, too, has his consciousness raised; he actively 
puts his past in permanent storage in order to cope with the present, but 
he has many questions about how and why his world has changed which 
are not easily answered. There is no arguing with Herland, though Terry 
tries, because it is `finished'. The disruptions and violence which 
created the conditions for the development of the utopia are long over. 
Referring to Titus Andronicus, Van says of the women's uprising 
against the slave men: 'I suppose they were about crazy-can you blame 
them? ' (H 55). 
Regarding the conception of her own novel, Cassandra (1984), 
Christa Wolf explains how the Troy she thinks of, one based very much 
on her doubt of the facts Homer supposedly presents, is really a model 
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for a kind of utopia, because the reality of the women of Troy does not 
exist for us. 18 With no history and few examples of women's writing to 
take direction from, she argues, woman's writing becomes problematic, 
existing so far as women experience a different reality from men and 
express it and to the extent that they aim at autonomy. 19 
But what Gilman thinks of Ancient Troy or Greece is quite different 
from what Wolf envisions. Wolf would prefer to leave Homer aside and 
create her own mythology. Gilman idealises the stories she has learned 
of the ancient past, assuming the `Greek ideal' in many places to be a 
thoughtful and noble aspiration, as well as one her readers would be 
familiar with. She accepts the recognisable, standard story of the great 
ancient civilisations leading to the `Christian era', at which point 
Herland begins its life. But Gilman does not wish to make the same 
mistakes as her counterparts Plato, Bellamy, or Wells, much as she may 
respect them. His Religion and Hers sheds further light on Gilman's 
view of utopia: while books are the only source of information about our 
coming life on earth, she explains, and none of them agree with each 
other in detail, religion has been unhelpful as well: 
If religion had concerned itself with our earthly future, it 
would have had a strong influence. Such pictures as it has 
given us of a vague millennium have been, if anything, less 
convincing than the Utopias. We can more easily believe in 
people's behaving well toward one another-as, indeed, 
18 Wolf 224. 
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many of them do now-than in contiguous naps of lions and 
lambs. (HH 28) 
But religion must take up the aims of society and promote them, Gilman 
argues, and the one religion which `urges most of real race improvement 
is that of Jesus. He taught unmistakably of God in man, of heaven here, 
of worship expressed in the love and service of humanity. But our 
strange death-complex was too strong even for his teaching' (111135- 
36). Later she is succinct: 
There was never a religion that would have gone so far 
toward building the kingdom of God on earth as the 
teaching of Jesus; and never one more blackened by hideous 
theories of hell and damnation, by persecutions, tortures, 
and devastating wars. (HH 42-43) 
Herland strives to replace the `death-complex' with a religion based 
wholly on life and the reality of women's lives: but this is not 
necessarily matriarchy. 
In fact, Herland lives so much in the present that it has no laws older 
than twenty years and holds no institutionalised form of veneration for 
the elderly mothers. There is no tradition of daughters taking care of 
their mothers or even carrying on with their old ideas. Ellador explains: 
`We do things from our mothers-not for them. We don't have to do 
things for them-they don't need it, you know. But we have to live 
on-splendidly-because of them; and that's the way we feel about 
19 Wolf 259. 
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God' (H 112). This constant erasure of any debt to the past is 
responsible for the consistent renewal of the society; or is it the other 
way around? Does the theory come before the practice? Gilman has not 
decided. Though founded in an act of tremendous violence in the 
murder of the last remaining men, the society is redeemed by the 
miraculous virgin birth and subsequent purification through a single-sex 
institution. The lifelong learning process for the making of better 
people, which discards old ideas as soon as newer and better ones are 
discovered, is intended to ensure constant progress. The monastic 
parallel in ideological history and lifestyle reinforces the purity of the 
Herlanders. 
Theirs is a collective mind, and all inhabitants of Tierland, individual 
talents aside, absorb the same bases of knowledge, ironically of their 
own ancient history and its traditions. What is critical, first of all, is 
their duty to their race, which is maternity and all of its occupations. 
The `hysterical girls' were replaced by women, `New Women', even: 
`Mothers in their own right, and the whole spirit of the country changed 
from mourning and mere courageous resignation to proud joy' (1156). 
After the first miracle, other women became pregnant as well, 
developing the culture of mothering and extensive educational project 
the men observe all around them. But eventually they had to control 
their population due to limitations of geography and resources. Van's 
assigned teacher, Somel, explains: 
You see, before a child comes to one of us there is a period 
of utter exaltation-the whole being is uplifted and filled 
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with a concentrated desire for that child. We learned to 
look forward to that period with the greatest caution. Often 
our young women, those to whom motherhood had not yet 
come, would voluntarily defer it. When that deep inner 
demand for a child began to be felt she would deliberately 
engage in the most active work, physical and mental; and 
even more important, would solace her longing by the direct 
care and service of the babies we already had. (H 70) 
A woman's purpose in Herland is to learn and educate, to produce 
her one child and help provide for the welfare of all through `united 
action' (H 60). This requires a sense of duty and psychological control 
of the most personal nature. Orgasm, it would appear, is something 
even a non-sexual (? ) Herlander must be wary of, for reasons of 
population control of course, as Ellador explains, but the intensity of 
this potential ecstasy will become even more significant in the long run. 
Van constantly praises their grasp of psychology, so fine that in spite of 
the fact that the children are `cultivated', they do not seem cultivated: 
`When it came to psychology-there was no one thing which left us so 
dumbfounded, so really awed, as the everyday working knowledge-and 
practice-they had in this line' (H 72). Having become genetically 
engineered, nearly agricultural (so the metaphor seems to go) products 
of their own scientific advancement (of both botanical and mammalian 
varieties), the women unite their science with a penetrating knowledge 
of psychology, making their science a uniquely social one. In fact, 
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Lester Ward declares in his preface to Dynamic Sociology (1893) that 
psychology is the body of truth upon which sociology `directly reposes. ' 
In The Sexual Fix (1982), Stephen Heath discusses the concept of a 
commodified sexuality as a Victorian invention, which is transformed 
from the theatrical exhibitionism of Charcot (who took photographs of 
women subjects in the midst of apparent hysterical attacks and seizures) 
and many other doctors of his day to the twentieth century world of the 
individual. In bringing subjects to speak in a private room, Freud 
invokes the story, more accurately `history', of an individual life 
emanating from sexual origins, according to his variously interpreted 
theories, and making sex inseparable from the history of the 
individual . 
20 But Herland is not about individuals or individualisation, 
the kind of individualisation that makes New Women in Moving the 
Mountain but destroys the society when generated in men. Somel tells 
Van that they learn their own 'history, with its accumulating 
psychology' and this psychology is not assigned a 'personal' status: `It is 
ours; it is among and between us, and it changes with the succeeding 
and improving generations. We are at work, slowly and carefully, 
developing our whole people along these lines. It is glorious work- 
splendid! ' (H 105). The personal sex impulse we are familiar with 
becomes diffused, simultaneously liberating and constraining. Van 
explains: 'Two thousand years' disuse had left very little of the instinct; 
also we must remember that those who had at times manifested it as 
20 Stephen Heath, The Sexual Fix (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982) 43,47-48. 
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atavistic exceptions were often, by that very fact, denied motherhood' 
(H 92). This will lead to Terry's complaint that the women have 
`neither the vices of men, nor the virtues of women-they're neuters! ' 
(H 98). (It is to be wondered what Besant would think of this. ) But the 
point of improvement and growth is to overcome the limitations of 
Terry's sort of human psychology, relying on history to provide a 
blueprint for future advance. 
The result of all this masterful cultivation of mind, body and spirit is 
a thoroughly interrelated system of immanentist religious practice. It 
takes a few tries to describe the religion of Zierland, but Ellador's 
history leaves Van certain that they have a concept of God, who is not 
male, but of indeterminate location, not a `Big Woman' somewhere, but 
a `Pervading Power, and Indwelling spirit' who is not personified the 
way the Hebrew God is, as an old man with whiskers, etc. (1 1112). 
Though it is called a Mother Spirit and is perceived as a spiritual 
magnification of actual motherhood, Ellador explains that their central 
concept of a Loving Power was assumed to have a motherly relation to 
their people. This is the extent of the evidence offered on the question 
of whether the religion or the society came first. They appear to have 
been simultaneous, with the virgin birth providing the initial impetus 
and subsequent thought ascribing maternal feeling to the force behind 
the miracle. `What I cannot understand... is your preservation of such a 
very ancient state of mind. This patriarchal idea you tell me is 
thousands of years old? ' Ellador asks. She continues to quiz Van on 
who the great Hebrew teacher was. The Christian tradition was initiated 
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by `some great teacher who is dead' he explains, but Judaism is linked 
to pagan religions, though it is considered inspired and "the Word of 
God"-all quite confused, as Gilman is determined to separate the two 
religions (H 113-115). She cannot understand why we have kept these 
concepts for so long, having changed others. Ellador is also puzzled by 
the Sacrifice and the ideas of the Devil and Damnation as well as 
Immortality: 
`But it means Heaven! ' I insisted. `Peace and Beauty 
and Comfort and Love-with God. ' I had never been so 
eloquent on the subject of religion. She could be horrified 
at Damnation, and question the justice of Salvation, but 
Immortality-that was surely a noble faith. 
`Why, Van, ' she said, holding out her hands to me. 
`Why Van-darling! How splendid of you to feel it so 
keenly. That's what we all want, of course-Peace and 
Beauty, and Comfort and Love-with God! And Progress 
too, remember; Growth, always and always. That is what 
our religion teaches us to want and to work for, and we 
do! ' 
`But that is here, ' I said, `only for this life on earth. ' 
`Well? And do not you in your country, with your 
beautiful religion of love and service have it here, too-for 
this life-on earth? ' (H 117) 
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As a sociologist, Van is not necessarily sensitive to archaeological 
facts which might offer clues to the change in religion from the 
patriarchal period of the country's ancient history to the present, though 
he asks Ellador, who feels unable to explain it all very clearly (1 1111). 
The only ruins to observe are the remnants of the ancient fortresses, 
which are still used, and the ambiguous scattered temples, which are 
employed for spiritual guidance, as needed. When Van horrifies Ellador 
with the idea of infant damnation, she runs to one of these temples, 
where a wise woman tells her she does not have to think there `ever was 
such a God-for there wasn't. Or such a happening-for there wasn't. 
Nor even that this hideous false idea was believed by anybody' (11 110). 
The `red pepper' in Ellador's eyes is taken out 'so quickly-so easily! ' 
Whether it is true or not, this is not something for a lierlander to be 
thinking about. With Her in Ourland will explain that Ellador's own 
mother is one of these wise ladies and there is actually quite an intense 
bond between the mother and daughter, though such personal 
attachments are not usual, according to the country's social philosophy 
of communal motherhood. Gilman wants the psychology of the country 
to be uniform and this inner history is critical to the continuation of the 
religious system, but it is prescribed: there can be no behaviour that 
would create a unique, or individual experience. The women are New 
Women, but they must not deviate from what Gilman is striving to 
define as normal in physical and psychological terms. 
Repression figures prominently in the society. The various mind- 
cleansing temples are quite obvious. The sublimation of sexual feelings 
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prior to maternity required of those who have already given birth once 
or of those who have been asked not to is also quite glaringly apparent. 
The teaching of psychology as a collective element is also needed to 
maintain the unity and coherence of the whole. Atavistic feelings and 
more differentiated sex distinctions, like those Alima seems to possess 
and which Van supposes make her a more possible choice as Terry's 
mate, are generally weeded out (H 130). Alima is also less adept at 
psychology than her other companions. Extreme 'femaleness' has 
consistently been counteracted with androgyny in the interest of the 
creation of a more human society, albeit still one of women, as the `race 
type', and of heterosexual women at that. But the feelings preceding 
conception would doubtless be heterosexual if men were involved for 
Van sees in Ellador's eyes, at times, a `look' she does `not at all realize' 
(H 98). 
Ellador does not allow herself to be swept away by this feeling, 
which comes surprisingly easily to her, and Alima's reaction to Terry's 
sacrilegious act in attempting to consummate their marriage and/or rape 
her is to wish Terry to be put to death. The awareness of the changes 
which extreme sexual differentiation may bring is embedded in the 
memory of the whole race. Their religion has long since been applied to 
their conduct and these new/old behaviours are taboo. 
Van, nevertheless, is enchanted by their commitment to their religion 
and becomes converted. But does he need to be? The ideas contained 
are not unfamiliar: 
321 
Here was a religion which gave to the searching mind a 
rational basis in life, the concept of an immense Loving 
Power working out steadily through them, toward good. It 
gave to the `soul' that sense of contact with the inmost 
force, of perception of the uttermost purpose, which we 
always crave. It gave to the `heart' the blessed feeling of 
being loved, loved and understood. It gave clear, simple, 
rational directions as to how we should live-and why. 
And for ritual it gave first those triumphant group 
demonstrations, when with a union of all the arts, the 
revivifying combination of great multitudes moved 
rhythmically with march and dance, song and music, among 
their own noblest products and the open beauty of their 
groves and hills. Second, it gave these numerous little 
centers of wisdom where the least wise could go to the most 
wise and be helped. (H 115) 
Van exclaims: `You are more Christian than any people I ever saw' (H 
115). He is quite ready to join. But the arts hold another important key 
to the difficulty of reintegrating the men. All of the arts and their 
religion are in a position of stasis in Herland: `They had begun at a 
period when the drama, the dance, music, religion, and education were 
all very close together; and instead of developing them in detached lines, 
they had kept the connection' (11 100). There is no space for 
divergence. Child literature does work and is something Van could 
actually spend years studying, probably because it develops freely from 
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the conflicts of sex-role socialisation and within the context of a concept 
of one life cycle rather than two, though the literature is not actually 
described (H 44,101). Their drama is `flat' (or simply an extension of 
the tradition of children's literature? ) because there is no tension 
between good and evil, it lacks the sex motive, there is no jealousy, 
aristocratic ambition, or opposition of wealth and poverty (H 99). As all 
conflicts have been resolved, the arts, as important as they are for 
children, remain exuberant but largely ceremonial. Bleich points out 
that Roman Catholic Christianity `has similarly exulted in the public 
`union of all the arts' and also remarks on the association of such 
celebrations with maternal love, which iconography has `served actually 
to devalue motherhood by dissociating it from sexual lovemaking, 
exactly as Gilman tries to enhance its value by the same dissociation. ' 
21 
But there is no question of the Herlanders feeling any lack of something 
in their arts. 
ED Love conquers all 
'Anybody'd think we were High Priests of-of 
Philoprogenitiveness! '... 'These women think of nothing but children, 
seems to me! We'll teach 'em! ' Terry 0. Nicholson 
22 
2! Bleich, 'Sexism and the Discourse of Perfection, ' 20. 
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Why, then, should the men be returned? Why should Herland even 
desire the New Hope of Fatherhood? Genetic diversity is one basic 
answer. To make `new' men is the response Ellador will offer, for she 
hopes to have a son with Van eventually, and they do, at the very end of 
With Her in Ourland, clearly conforming to the Christian narrative. Or 
do the men themselves fulfil the demands of a millennial vision with 
their own `Second Coming'? When difference is introduced, however, 
and readers are left to real and familiar heterosexual experience, utopia 
recedes. Jeff stays behind, to be the first father of the new race, an 
experience left undescribed. The focus is on Van, who will take Ellador 
on to Ourworld. As With Her in Ourland will demonstrate, the new 
race, as represented by the son of Ellador and Van, is only possible in 
Herland, partly because Ellador would not risk having a child in 
Ourworld, but also because Gilman cannot change Ourland with Van 
and Ellador. Nor can she complete utopia with Jeff's progeny, if, in 
fact, sexual intercourse is involved in the creation of it. And so the story 
will close, as the author wishes, in Herland with Van and Ellador and 
their son, but with no details as to how their particular story truly ends. 
Nor does any of this answer how all of this is to be reconciled with the 
religion of Herland, a religion which is supposed to be different, but 
ends up endorsing the same traditional heterosexual relationships under 
the aegis of a religion of love, relationships which it would be 
challenging. Having described Gilman's use of the metaphor of race to 
22 Herland 119. 
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describe gender relation, `not an error in the usual sense because it is 
created by ideological values from which there is no thought to escape, ' 
Bleich puts it much more succinctly, that passion must be pure in the 
religious sense and `if not transcendental in the narcissistic masculine 
mode, then nevertheless an ideal for all people. Love remains the 
`answer' for Gilman to the enduring conditions of social difference. It 
remains the term that lives through social change, as if it were immune 
to the radical rethinking sought by feminism. This immunity is a feature 
of religious dogma endlessly emphasized by preachers of all persuasions 
and embodied in the idle faith that 'love conquers all. '23 
Bleich is still in the process of determining Gilman's worth, and does 
not allow for the fact that `the radical rethinking sought by feminism' 
may refer more to contemporary feminism and does not necessarily have 
to include all aspects of Gilman's work. Incidentally, on the last page of 
With Her in Ourland, printed in December of 1916, is the poem 'Santa 
Claus', exhorting parents to tell true stories to their children, and the 
truth about Jesus, who loved everyone. The purpose of Berland is quite 
obviously to highlight the problems truly existing in the relationships of 
women to men and in what Gilman regards as a man-made world. The 
perfection of heterosexual relations, however, requires the perfection of 
the spirit, of the mind, of the body. This is all that Eierland can aspire 
to; having merely maintained their level of development. Though they 
are supposed to be improving all the time, they can only evolve into a 
23 Bleich 19-21. 
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different species altogether, or rejoin the outside world and Gilman's 
imperative of heterosexuality limits their options. Ilerland can therefore 
be seen as a female model of a monastic community, vitalised by the 
real prospects of perfectibility within their private sphere, but unable to 
maintain such an ethic when the uncommon element of sexual 
difference is introduced. When the control a single parthenogenetic 
being has over her orgasm is relinquished, to a large degree, as Gilman's 
narrative is suggesting, it is in the service of a higher social ideal. 
Thomas Laqueur's final discussion of Freud in Making Sex (1990) 
suggests that the differentiation of sex is critical to Gilman's program of 
devaluating passion or eroticism, which also makes empiricism 
triumphant. While Freud may think believing in God and paternity in 
the absence of truth or proof is a step forward for the intellect, Gilman's 
understanding of the intellect values the plane of nature, facts over 
fiction, body over spirit. But she senses a need to put the spirit back 
into the body and to tell the story of this (or what's a heaven for? ). The 
devaluation of passion cannot hold after the notion of heterosexuality, 
unquestioningly associated with the introduction of sex difference, is 
introduced. Behaviour must be altered in order for sex difference to be 
accommodated, the foundation for which alteration is religion. The 
male seed is needed; orgasm is fundamental. Why? The possibility of a 
lesbian society, suggests Herland, is not acceptable. Gilman brings men 
to a world of women for essentially the same reason Laqucur believes 
Freud moves the centre of orgasm in woman from the clitoris to the 
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vagina; society is necessary and the sexual pleasure of women must be 
redirected toward social ends. 24 
Of course, Gilman did not seriously expect Herland to provide a real 
alternative, but her novel suggests an answer to the `Woman Question' 
she may not have intended, that while it would be best for all to be new 
(and practising) Christians and have a new form of heterosexual 
relation, the historical concept of Christianity, imbued with its own 
particular imagery and language, prevents this. Love prevents this. The 
language, the art , the science of Herland 
is inevitably influenced by its 
patriarchal past, and that of the author as well as the reader. 
24 Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, MA; 
London: Harvard UP, 1990) 240-243. 
CONCLUSION: PARADOXES OF PARADISE 
As many searched for the master key to salvation in the late ninctccnth 
and early twentieth centuries, a proliferation of categories and ideologies 
emerged. Such lists of labels apply to Besant and Gilman themselves as 
reformers, scientists, sociologists, theologians, proto-feminist activists, 
socialists, nationalists, and writers. Sharing the goal of creating a pure 
ethical system which will promote the conversion of human character 
and, consequently, social reconstruction in an atmosphere of perceived 
religious and moral crisis, Besant and Gilman adopt evolutionary 
perspectives which either assume or promote this transformation. Their 
systems are imbued with religious purpose, which is to enable 
comprehension and actualisation of a divine plan against perceived 
evils, to discover the ways of God among men and women, and to make 
manifest a predetermined destiny. Judeo-Christian rhetoric and ideals, 
utopian, millenarian, and socialist principles mesh with scientifically 
and sociologically informed perspectives to constitute the political and 
economic means of an ethical end. This largely involves 'purifying' 
society and redefining gender roles to reflect some `higher' ideal. 
Narrowed ultimately to a positive view of history, indicated by post- 
millennial visions of overcoming evil to achieve Paradise on earth, this 
solution may lead to isolation or empire-building, but either is 
necessarily in the service of an intuitively felt Providence. 
Besant and Gilman, who held great authority and wide followings, 
therefore present a challenge to what historians refer to as 
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`secularisation theory, ' which holds that as the end of the nineteenth 
century neared, society became less religious. There are many ways of 
defining the religious and the secular, definitions which become quite 
fluid in the face of the increasing proliferation of non-orthodox 
sectarianism throughout the nineteenth century. To be 'without God' 
(as Besant describes the Atheist in her autobiography) is not necessarily 
to be without religion or the need for an ethical system whereby social 
harmony may be realised. We might also consider earlier women 
writers influenced directly by the Evangelical movement or later 
activists who also take issue with the Bible directly, including Matilda 
Joscelyn Gage and Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Religion as rewritten and 
revised becomes an important catalyst for more pragmatic as well as 
spiritual reform. However, these rewritings often reflect the models 
against which they have been constructed. 
The challenging of paradigms of gender, race and class plays a great 
part in the reformers' objective, but their programs are problematic, 
particularly as they continue to alter their own ideas. As a Secularist, 
Besant is active in confronting the issues of birth control and the rights 
of married women, lecturing to the masses and contributing to 
Freethinking publications. Her turn to Socialism is an attempt to put the 
ethical concerns of Atheism and Secularism into practice. But Bcsant 
later becomes a Theosophist and adopts the platform of a reinvented 
Buddhism and Hinduism. Her themes tend to trace along the traditional 
Judeo-Christian pattern both during her conversion crises and in her 
autobiographical writing and particularly during her period as 
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Theosophist. Her desire to be a martyr for her cause is duly observed by 
herself as well as her biographers. Her Theosophical vision, coloured as 
it is by a complicated esoteric science of the soul, conforms to the 
utopian dream shared by many reformers and charismatics of her time 
and is consistent in spirit with her Socialist ideals, or so she believes. It 
is a dream largely driven by Christian ideas of heaven on earth, the 
Judeo-Christian narrative of the Incarnation and its symbolic union of 
heaven and earth, male and female, as well as a linear sense of historical 
development, albeit within a karmic cycle. Moreover, her Western 
audiences often require forms of explication and analogy which will 
make her unorthodox ideas intelligible. In whatever guise her ideology 
finds itself, as nonconformist, Atheist, Socialist, or Theosophist, 
Besant's goal is to obtain the democratic Christian ideal in both political 
and spiritual terms, a Brotherhood of Man (Sisterhood is not mentioned) 
working in union with a divine directive in the spirit of self-sacrifice, 
the ultimate goal being gnosis, `to know God directly' or `meet the 
Master and bow at His blessed feet. " 
In spite of her Theosophical ecumenism and democratic goals, Bcsant 
is found retreating more and more to an unseen (and therefore still 
possible) world of spirit within an increasingly complicated hierarchy of 
levels of spiritual achievement and ever more elaborate ritual which 
alienates both theosophical supporters and political protcg6s. Instead of 
lecturing and publishing pamphlets on the mission of Theosophy and 
1 Elaine Pagels, Adam, Eve, and the Serpent (New York: Vintage, 1989) 60. Also Besant, Is 
Theosophy Anti-Christian? (London: Theosophical Publishing Society, 1904) 26. 
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general social principles, she concentrates more on an ultimate vision of 
universal fraternity and racial purity and how Theosophy can correct (or 
correct the perceptions) of current social and political crises, with the 
addition of a messiah, J. Krishnamurti, to lead the way. As radical as 
Besant is in thought and deed throughout her early years, her life as a 
Theosophist is striking for its apparently antithetical qualities, her 
celibacy, her complete reversal on the issue of family planning, and her 
paradoxically hegemonic geo-political thinking. Yet the roots of her 
Theosophy may be found in her `too religious' nature, which also 
powered her atheism and her Socialism. Her constant search for Truth 
may have been rewarded, yet her desire for real change in earthly life 
was compromised, perhaps because truth is intrinsically exclusive, or is 
this simply an assumption we feel compelled to make? 
Gilman's utopian vision has been more widely studied than Bcsant's 
but similarly conforms largely to the Judeo-Christian narrative and to 
the literary model of utopia. Gilman's ideal world is a utopia of 
constant progress and innovation, harmonising the feeling of heaven on 
earth with practical earthly reform. For Gilman, however, the goal is to 
make her texts perform the action of actual reform and it is the use of 
fictional narrative in particular which characterises the intersection of 
Gilman's ethics with her fundamental world view. Yet, for all of her 
imagination, she must also tailor her language to encourage the response 
of her audiences. Her demand for the legitimisation of woman's social 
and economic contribution generates a dichotomy of sexual values and 
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racial attributes which are resolved by the demands of a didactic 
narrative based on social needs. 
Both writers perceive the need for external government, in spite of 
beliefs in basic human freedoms, because humans are inherently 
imperfect, even sinful. Evil is pain caused by improper development 
and ignorance. To control and purify the body, the demands of which 
lead to dissolution, is therefore the first step in a process of 
rehabilitation and regeneration. 
Both writers speak against the Judeo-Christian tradition explicitly as 
a failed or corrupted dream, an invention of patriarchal authority used to 
establish power and control over any and all aspects of life through the 
legislation of knowledge and morality or ethics. Yet, the performative 
nature of their enterprise eludes them as they disseminate examples of 
the ethically sublime and thereby attempt to alter human nature. Both 
authors either directly or inadvertently adopt traditional utopian schemes 
and those hierarchical or authoritarian positions which, as they arc used, 
ultimately question the possibility of gender and racial equality and 
reinforce the dominant ideology and status quo through adherence to 
traditional ethical standards such as chastity or marriage as the 
appropriate means to the good and spiritually honest life, and, rather 
paradoxically, the idea of social responsibility. 
In a revisionist process, different forms of writing are employed, 
including non-fiction, fiction, autobiography, and also poetry in the case 
of Gilman, the Roman-style oration (the immensely popular 
entertainment of the public lecture or more often, sermon). Certain 
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rhetorical techniques become common. The tradition of the Victorian 
sage calling back his/her listeners and readers to the path of 
righteousness, for example, is often apparent. The language of 
materialism and objectivity as applied to analyses of social and indeed, 
spiritual, problems reflects the discourse formulated by previous 
scientists and social-Darwinists. With regard to one element of Besant's 
intellectual inheritance in Theosophy, for example, spiritualists, in many 
ways the heirs of the tradition of scientific rationalism, readily adopted 
the language of evolution as a verification of their own understandings 
of the invisible world, ignoring Darwin's challenge to their 
anthropomorphic assumptions and, in fact, providing a type of scientific 
evidence for the survival of the spirit after death by using such 
language. 2 Washington pointedly states that 'Madame' Helena Petrovna 
Blavatksy would `subsume' the facts presented by evolutionary theory 
and apply them to everything from 'atoms to angels', thereby forming 'a 
grand synthesis that makes religious wisdom not the enemy of scientific 
knowledge but its final goal. '3 Besant turns to chemistry, to history and 
the social sciences, and to Blavatsky. Gilman turns to the new field of 
sociology and its pioneer Lester Frank Ward as well as Thorstein 
Veblen, Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and other social-Darwinist 
writers. To varying degrees, Gilman and Besant similarly adopt an 
2 Alex Owen, The Darkened Room (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) v-vi. 
These views point the way to the reversal of what may be considered empowering positions of 
female influence from spiritual leadership into authoritarian dogma. 
3 Washington 52. 
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ethos which reflects the modes of discourse used by their predominantly 
male counterparts in the sciences. 
The use of such perspectives and ideological furniture imparts 
credibility, on the one hand, but also transforms characteristics of the 
genres of sage writing or utopian writing, for example, as well as their 
use. As applied by feminists, these genres become refreshed and 
infused with a new purpose. Besant and Gilman use their rhetorical 
skills to rally their audiences to action with familiar themes and 
paradigms while promoting more radical programs. But this use of 
science, as understood and applied, tends to undercut the reformist 
agenda by informing the discourse with prevailing racial and social 
valuations. But this begs the question of intention. If we blame the 
language and the narrative for controlling the writing, what is professed 
is not necessarily what is meant, but are we to assume that Besant and 
Gilman, as feminists or proto-feminists, were therefore free from the 
prejudices which plague other writers and public figures? 
A difficulty which plagues interpretation and analysis of any form of 
expression is historical context itself. Separating the art from the 
politics of a given writer is both difficult and disingenuous. Obviously, 
assumptions have to be made about what art is for (as well as what 
history is for). In this case, the art of writing and speaking is intended to 
be used in the most material way for the reform of society. Therefore, it 
is absurd to suggest discussing the work of Gilman and Besant without 
acknowledging their very own spoken intentions in writing and without 
examining their politics. 
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Moreover, discussing the religious teachings of these writers is not 
only to examine proto-feminist religious views or to analyse literary and 
rhetorical techniques as they apply to religious matters, nor to analyse 
such techniques as they apply to religious matters amongst feminists or 
women writers generally, but to discuss contributions to the history of 
religion, of literature, and of religiously inspired literature in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This discussion is also 
intended to present writings that are generally considered obscure in a 
new light which may expose their essential contradictions and 
accomplishments, thereby enriching our understanding of all of the 
above topics and helping to create a more complete literary and 
historical context. Without such challenges to reigning literary 
paradigms, how are we to determine the value of those paradigms? 
Gilman would argue that literature must be of use, as Besant would 
argue that nothing is so heavy as the responsibility of the 'public 
teacher' and nothing more powerful than the written and spoken word. 
Striving for truth in function as well as form, this writing still believes 
that beauty is a test, but also that it is the incidental, much anticipated 
product of a perfected world. 
ED The indeterminacy of the body 
Theosophy, Anthroposophy, Swcdcnborgianism. Christian Science, 
Socialism, Gilman's own faith and sociology of womcn, ctc. all attempt 
to appropriate scientific method and language as a means of acquiring 
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legitimacy and validation. This creates an impasse between orthodox 
science and the apparent applications of it. Such attempts at synthesis 
claim to offer proof, unlike any other religion, but such proofs are arc 
notorious for inspiring faith in some and catcalls from others; it is a test 
of faith as to who may be able to hear over the spiritual telegraph, for 
example. And this business of communications technology (who has it, 
is it effective) is centred in the bodies and minds of mediums and their 
hearers, in the faithful. Yet it is the very indeterminacy of these 
enterprises and gods, perhaps like the indeterminacy of orthodox 
religion itself, which gives such philosophers and theologians their 
strengths. The limit of metaphor or allegory, like any other analogy, is 
that it breaks down at some point. Following Kant again, we cannot 
know the thing in itself, but we might try to claim a space in which we 
can know the thing as we think it is; if we can test the verity of such 
belief, we might claim truth and universality. 
Away from the pins and pliers of science the idealists wrest control of 
subjectivity; objectivity is nevertheless an illusion, they seem to suggest. 
It is this independence which gives control of the body back to the 
subjective hearer/vicwcr/medium, which in turn creates an atmosphere 
ripe for the participation of women. Creation of that indeterminate and 
subjective space provides shelter to the grasping spirit and intellect. It 
also creates a no-man's land between women's bodies and science. 
But the two-sex model is needed. The employment of the marriage 
metaphor, of unity in diversity, is intended to create perfection and 
finally know truth. Imagining the hermaphroditic or androgynous past 
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or future is to imply current degeneracy, but this, too, is nccdcd to 
symbolise reasons for reform. Utopia requires its antonym. Writing is a 
plaything in the hands of the reformer, and such toys may be cast aside 
in the interest of actualised ideal evolution. In the absence of this 
circumstance, for these proto-feminists, utopia is a toy needed by a 
humanity still struggling with its own childhood. 
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